

THE PROSPECTIVE REVIEW.

No. VII.

ART. I.—JUVENILE DELINQUENCY.

IN former numbers of the first series of this publication we endeavoured to awaken public attention to the state of our criminal population, more particularly to that portion of it whose destitute condition and whose miseries excite, more than any other class, our sympathies and our hopes. We entered into a somewhat detailed examination of certain institutions in France and in Germany, having for their object the reformation of young criminals, and we also at some length stated what had been done at our asylum at Warwick, and at other reformatory institutions, particularly at Parkhurst. It was our object at that time, to show that we were behind other nations in regard to the treatment of juvenile offenders, and that both our duty and our interests made it essential to place ourselves at least on a level with our continental neighbours. We were sanguine enough to hope that Government might have been induced to take the subject in hand, and after due consideration to have adopted such measures as might lead to the desired result. Since those papers were written, four years have elapsed, and this period has continued to afford evidence of the beneficial working of reformatory institutions, and has also given melancholy proofs of the increasing evil attending our present method of dealing with juvenile criminals.

The institutions at Mettray not only flourishes to a surprising degree, but nearly a dozen similar institutions

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have arisen in other parts of France, all of which have been attended with the same satisfactory results.

Some of our readers may not remember the particular objects sought to be gained by the founders of the institution for the reformation of juvenile criminals at Horn, near Hamburg. The establishment at Mettray, in the department of Indre et Loire, is founded on the same principles, and is devoted to the same ends, as the parent institution. The founders of the establishment at Horn were of opinion that the infliction of severe punishment was not the best mode of awakening the moral sense, and of preventing crime. In fact, they read the results of severe punishments in the constantly-increasing record of crimes, in the defiance of all repressive institutions, in the utter disregard of police, and in the hardy disdain of death. The cause of these fearful results they thought was to be found in the fact that none of the punishments so savagely inflicted were calculated to touch the heart. They succeeded in some degree in exciting temporary fear, but they signally failed, not only to cultivate, but even to preserve, the moral sense. To bear with endurance the lash and long privation and confinement became a sort of heroism with the criminal, and unquestionably those most conversant with the criminal population will not hesitate to affirm that there is a prevailing notion among them, that, after they have suffered the punishment awarded by the law for their crimes, they have atoned for the offence,—the consequence of our present system has been to annihilate any other feeling in their minds. They have rarely a sense of having done an injury of a public nature. Those who wisely founded the institution at Horn saw this, and they tried a grand experiment when they substituted kindness for cruelty, freedom for restraint, and dispensed with the fetter, by cultivating with success habits of self-control. Fortunately, this experiment has been crowned with great and deserved success. The society was followed in 1839 by the one at Mettray, and it affords us the greatest pleasure to say that the promise of usefulness, which it gave in its early years, has been amply realized. It was founded in 1839. The first inmates were received in 1840. The establishment was intended for three hundred children.

On the admission of a child, his physical condition is carefully examined: almost all the children having from early life lived among the impure, are found to be more or less diseased; the prevailing disease being scrofula, aggravated by the habits and mode of life. The physician restores the physical tone, and the moral cure begins; the object being, to give society, in exchange for the criminal and diseased child, an honest and a robust man. When the child is placed in the institution, the director studies and becomes the master of his character, habits, and disposition, and then the suitable treatment is followed. Sentiments of justice and religion are awakened in their hearts, without which conversion is impossible. They are well clad; the dormitories are simply but efficiently arranged; each has a hammock; the colony is divided into sections of twenty children, each section forms a family, and in each there is a member at the head called the Father, and a subordinate called the Elder Brother, who exercise no authority but that which comes from kindness and persuasion. This arrangement completes the machinery, for without those endearing associations which arise from family affections, the most effective means of reformation would be lost. When the section is thus formed, it is placed in a state to provide for their wants, to build their house, to cultivate the garden and field belonging to it, giving them labour profitable to themselves and the institution, and at the same time rendering them familiar with domestic habits and fire-side duties.

Having thus, with brevity, given a very meagre outline of the machinery of Mettray, we refer our readers to the numbers of the *Christian Teacher* which contain at length all the details, the most minute of which will repay the study of that reader who feels with us the deep responsibility which belongs to society in this direction.

Whilst the generous public in France have been thus active, with few exceptions we have done little. We confess, however, that we are more anxious to prepare the public mind for legislating on this great business, than to form or open institutions, which, though excellent in their objects and intentions, may not be what we most desire to see. Our object is to force the question on the attention of the Government, to convince them that this is worthy of the

nation, and ought to be a national work, and that, both in a moral and a pecuniary view, the subject is too full of interest to be longer neglected. We are aware that the question is surrounded with difficulties, but not one of them is in our opinion of an insuperable nature. The subject is no doubt painful, and perhaps to the majority of readers it may be revolting, but nevertheless the treatment of moral is quite as important as that of physical disease, and, however painful, the duty must be done. It is only those who are animated by a sense of that duty, and who have carefully contemplated the good to be done, by a total change of the mode in which we now treat juvenile offenders, who will have the energy to persevere in a continual discussion of the evil, until the Government shall take the course we have recommended, and apply itself to the curative process.

We shall show that there are abundant reasons why this should be done; we shall show, not by isolated cases, but by a narrative of what has been accomplished elsewhere, that we neglect a most important duty which others perform; and that in fact the success of the plan admits of no doubt if the experiment be properly tried. We have before said that our former papers were written four years ago. Up to that period the success of the establishment at Mettray, as we have shown, had been satisfactory, but since that time it has been most encouraging. To the proof:—we begin with extracts from the report of the “*Colonie Agricole de Mettray*” for 1842.

“In our colony, the general conduct has been good, better even than we could have expected: you may judge of this by perusing the journals kept in each family. The result of the compendium of these books of morality is, that in the month of January 1841 half our children had not deserved punishment; in February, March, April and May, two-thirds; in June, July, August, September, and October, three-fourths; and in November and December, four-fifths. These are positive and encouraging calculations.”—P. 7.

In the two following extracts we find important truths, hopeful to those who have faith in this good work, and giving materials for serious reflection to those who, having the power, lack the spirit to rectify a great wrong.

"We have to correct many more vicious habits than evil dispositions. Their return to virtue is sincere, is voluntary, and shows itself at every moment in the most evident manner."

"The conduct of our children proves that they were less culpable in infringing their duties, than the society which had neglected to instruct them."—P. 8.

In almost every page we find more encouragement.

"The various services and laborious employments of the Colony are entrusted to those Colonists who have merited our confidence. We have two Colonists attendants on the sick, under the superintendence of a Sister of Charity, whom they emulate in care and attention for their comrades."

"This is the reason why we have made our appeal to the domestic affections. Do not consider as an illusion the partition of our population, its division into families, and the establishment of each of these families in a separate house; do not consider as vain and useless denominations, the titles of Fathers of Families which we give to their heads, or those of Elder Brothers which our Colonists themselves confer on those of their number who have shown themselves most worthy to command them."—P. 12.

"We have divided our population, for primary instruction, as we have divided it for all other labours and duties. The organization of the Colony, and all its reformatory power, we cannot too often repeat, depend on the establishment of our families, and everything which brings us back to this foundation completes our system. We have found the means of uniting the advantages of general and individual instruction, by instituting lessons in each division, to be conducted by the chiefs and sub-chiefs of families; since the adoption of this measure, our progress, both in respect to instruction and education, have been immense. The degree of willing docility, quietness and emulation have been doubled. The proof is clear. The punishments amounted to twenty-four during the last six months, in the general class, while in the last three months of the family classes there were only two."—P. 14.

"Should we direct our views to the future, we may be permitted to hope that this nursery of good practical individuals will exercise, some day or other, a beneficial influence in our rural regions, where they will carry cultivation, or at least practical knowledge. Their neighbours will listen to them, and will copy them the more easily as they will be in immediate contact with them; and it will thus be the office of the late Colonists of Mettray to aid in uprooting the old habits of routine, to which our peasants only cling so strongly, because they distrust the advice and example of men who are placed by situation above them. It will be beautiful to

see, that by this new system of education, those who had been until now a just object of embarrassment and anxiety to their country, are now enabled to contribute to its riches and prosperity."—P. 17.

"We must do justice to those estimable young men who fulfil all the offices indispensable to the administration of our Colony. Formed by us, they have become our affectionate, intelligent, devoted disciples. They wear, winter and summer, the uniform of white cloth, the straw hat, and the sabots. Their life is one of humility and devotion to its object. A red chevron is the only distinctive mark of their rank; this rank is purchased by a severe novitiate, and these young men receive from our hands this modest decoration of worsted, with as much pride and joy as an officer receives his epaulettes. It is that they are in truth the officers of the Colony, and that all the distinguished men who have seen them at work know that they understand their mission."—P. 23.

Such is the result of Mettray in 1842. The next year presents no falling off; on the contrary, there is a more confident tone in the report for 1843, doubtless generated by the continued success of this excellent system. We purposely abstain from the detail of individual cases—suffice it to say, that the various reports abound in the most affecting instances of a restoration of the criminal to virtue and honour. It will be seen in the course of the following extracts, that an attempt has been made to under-value all such institutions as Mettray, by a reference to the general depravity of society, and to the hopelessness of dealing with individual cases, when the general causes of crime and destitution are left unexplored, or, if explored, are not destroyed. The report answers the objection, but we are glad it has been raised: we have no indisposition to deal with the causes of crime; we are for the most searching investigation into those causes; we adopt in its fullest extent the language of the petition of Her Majesty's Justices for the Borough of Liverpool, which we shall presently insert. We desire, above all things, this inquiry into the predisposing causes of crime; ignorance and want have long prevailed, and their fruits are lamentably obvious, yet we are still disposed to inquire, for the result of that inquiry must be, that ignorance and want are among the disposing causes to crime, and there is no doubt that Education will be able to affect one of these causes of that of which we complain, whatever may be done

with the other. No man hesitates to arrest the progress of the pestilence, though it walketh in darkness. Without being very uncharitable, we fear all such reasons are but excuses for inaction, when no other more valid can be found.

Some of the visitors from Hospitals having heard of the anxiety of persons to obtain the services of the Colonists when the term of service expires, visited Mettray, in order to examine the rules and practices, with the view of adopting such of them as they might think good and useful for the children confided to their care. These humane persons would at once discover that the system must be taken altogether; the adaptation of parts of it to other institutions could scarcely be expected to be successful. We proceed with our extracts from the report on the state of Mettray in 1843.

"It is thus incontrovertible that establishments analogous to that which you have founded would save from corruption, children abandoned to destitution and crime, and restore them to virtuous and laborious habits. By thus arresting the evil at its source, we should, infallibly, materially diminish the number of those crimes the increase of which is so calculated to afflict and to alarm society in general.

"Other means have been employed at Mettray. Not neglecting to address ourselves to the intelligence and the conscience of individuals, we have endeavoured to form a collective conscience and intelligence—that of the Colony of Mettray. We have fused together all the individuals; we have made them one body; we have placed the honour of this body under the guarantee of the interest of each individual; we have made of the Colonists of Mettray, what an able colonel makes of his regiment, each individual of which would fear, in committing a fault, to sully the honour of his colours. The children of Mettray know that the title of Colonist restores them to the world, replaces them in society, purifies them from the stain of condemnation, only on the condition that the name of Mettray shall be unspotted. In leaving the Colony, they know that its eye pursues them every where, that the report of their conduct will be read over to the Colonists, and this perspective restrains them in the path of duty. The fear of seeing their name regarded as infamous by their comrades, and their scruples as to blackening the reputation of the asylum which has been opened to them, is a perpetual bridle on the impetuosity of their passions. It is no longer the chief who commands and who punishes—it is their equal; an *esprit de corps* has been created at Mettray; here is the secret of the result of which you are about to hear the recital."—P. 5.

"See in this way how great has been the gain of our school, when fifteen of its scholars are among our functionaries and employés."—P. 23.

"The Colony of Mettray having been recognised as a parish, can administer all the sacraments, and bury, within its own bosom. Our Colonists see with gratitude, that instead of a grave common to all, those who die in the Colony have a tomb religiously taken care of by their companions."—P. 26.

"Not one of those who had acquired our confidence while in the Colony has deceived our expectations when sent abroad; but some, on the other hand, have falsified our doubts by their unexpected good conduct.

"The labour which the Colonists freely perform in our fields, their obedience, the good feelings of which they give evidence, and their progress in improvement, give us a foretaste of the use which they are likely to make of their independence when they shall be restored to themselves and to society. We have their confidence; they are now convinced that we have no object in view but the promotion of their truest and best interests. There are no contests between them and us; the total absence of confinements, lockings-up, and brutal punishments, produces, from the very moment of their arrival, a lively impression on the children. They comprehend, on descending from the prison-like vehicle which conveys them hither, that they are become prisoners on parole. As a proof of this, when one of our heads of families asked one of them, who had twice perilled his life in trying to make his escape from the *Maison Centrale*, why he did not attempt to fly from the Colony, where he was subjected to so much harder labour, he replied—Because at Mettray there are no walls."—P. 16.

"We have also every cause to be satisfied with our Elder Brothers, who are elected every month by their comrades. Our heads of families acknowledge that the assistance of the Elder Brothers contributes much to the good government of the family, and the office thus becomes a powerful moral agent on those children who are invested with this first distinction."—P. 18.

"He who commands others, sees the necessity of making his actions and his words accord, and we have often seen our Colony, invested with this first authority, cure themselves of faults to which, up to that time, they had been addicted. The necessities of our position place us in an unfavourable situation as to the products of our workshops; for our duty is, to place the young workman in an employment as soon as he understands his profession, and a good opportunity presents itself; and, in this last case, we anticipate, even by some months, the appointed period for setting the Colonist at liberty, when it appears to be for his advantage. This privilege,

granted to us by the Minister of the Interior, is for us a most powerful means of exciting emulation."—P. 19.

"It is often said to us—Do not create an insulated world, an ideal family. Before you improve the condition of prisoners, and cherish the outcasts of society, succour the distresses of the poor, and reform the habits of corrupted society. So that, in presence of a disease, we are to renounce the attempt to paralyse its effect, to prevent the causes which produce it, or to realise the good which is at this moment in our power. Certainly the social body is covered with numerous wounds. We must discover their origin, and dry up their springs; but, looking forward to this immense work, and while we are elaborating these benevolent ideas, let every one seize on one of these wounds, and cicatrise it, if he can—he will have deserved well of the general body; and these partial and progressive cures will assist the general restoration to health.

"The object of this institution is, then, just, useful, and charitable; as to the means which we have employed in attaining this object, they have only raised against us a single objection. The results at Mettray cost a high price. The price is very small if you consider that they have been produced even during the progress of our foundation; that we have paid all our expenses from our first establishment to this day; that we have no debts,—and that, as to the expenses of maintenance, we can compete with the institutions which have been longest in operation; in short, that we have only been in existence for four years, and that already we are as rigorously judged as if we had been founded ages ago."—P. 30.

"It is time that we should introduce into the science of political economy—into the study of the riches and productive powers of a nation—the education, the morality, and the well-being of her children. It is too much overlooked that the masses are composed of individuals; that these individuals compose families and societies.

"Well, then, you who have, as we say, picked out from the refuse, beings, children who had been too early abandoned in despair, you tear from evil a population condemned beforehand; you snatch them from their connection with the wicked, and you associate them with the good. Calculate the enormous benefit which results to society, from the difference between a malefactor the less and an additional honest man. Two things are incontestible—that the work proposed at Mettray, which was considered as an impossibility, fit only to be placed in the catalogue of Utopias, will soon be actually accomplished, and morally realised. You have obtained what it was considered as impossible to effect at any price—the amendment of the criminal—by convincing him, and without any employment of brutal force."

"Out of forty-five children placed by us in situations out of the

establishment, the conduct of forty-two has been irreproachable. It is impossible to deny these results; and it would be unjust to disparage them, by reverting to the paltry sum which they have cost. To produce them required agents more numerous, more moral, more devoted, than if we had had prohibited enclosures, walls, bolts, or a battalion of infantry mounting night and day round our circle, which is guarded only by confidence and activity. Services like these must be proportionally remunerated."—P. 31.

We are tempted to give even more copious extracts from the report of 1844, not only because it confirms all our previous impressions, but because all the details are most valuable. We shall however content ourselves with a few of the more important passages.

It would appear from the following extract from the Report of 1844, that the directors of Mettray have well considered the best mode of reforming the criminal population. They seem to agree with the Justices of Liverpool, who appear to admit that there may be doubts as to the successful reformation of adults, though none can be reasonably entertained as to the reform of the younger offenders:—

"It is our conviction, corroborated by daily experience, that the true basis of every penitentiary system must rest upon institutions designed for the correction of Juvenile Delinquents; it is by this step that it is logical, that it is necessary to commence that reform which is now working out in every country where progress has become a matter of necessity: to found penitentiaries for men hardened in crime, or asylums for liberated felons, before caring for the fate of children whose first steps are entangled in paths of crime, and who at a future period will certainly swell the ranks of criminals, is to attempt to place the roof on the building before we have laid its foundation."—P. 7.

"When we shall have succoured the wants of infancy, when we have sustained its tottering steps, when we have fortified it against the dangers of bad example, armed it with moral instruction, and provided it with the means of gaining an honest subsistence, then the work of the reformation of criminals will be more than half accomplished, then will our prisons cease to be filled with a prodigious rapidity perfectly appalling, and penitentiary reform will become so much the easier and more certain, as we shall have fewer culprits to reform."—P. 8.

"The cause of our success at Mettray may be found in a most fruitful idea, which consists in substituting the feelings of family

connection for that subversive spirit of association which has made a prison a dangerous institution, and in some sort a moral plague, and in applying to moral influences for those results which in former epochs were expected from bars, whips and terrors.

"This family system we employ in all its extent : we commence it when in our power, even before the arrival of the child at the Colony, and we continue it long after he has taken his departure from it ; we neglect no circumstance capable of producing a salutary and durable impression on the mind and the hearts of our young people. Nothing can be a matter of indifference when we are dealing with man and his amelioration.

"Recognizing the powerful influence of first impressions, we go ourselves to seek our children, in the Maisons Centrales, where they are confined. Who does not know the power which a journey exercises over our relations of intimacy, and the confidence which succeeds it ? Three days spent in a journey give you more insight into the character of your travelling companion than a whole year passed in the habitual relations of life, and we cannot be too early in learning the character of our children, in order to choose the means which we are to employ for their reform ; it is perhaps because we have never studied the moral constitution of man, as we have studied his physical one, that up to this time the results of education have been so few. During the journey we converse with our new Colonists, and, above all, we leave them at full liberty to talk among themselves in our presence, which enables us to catch the dispositions of their minds, and to seize as it were the secrets of their hearts : we thus learn from the first, what may be their natural dispositions as to sobriety or intemperance, neatness or negligence, vivacity or dulness, as these reveal themselves naturally, in that sort of familiarity which is authorised by the life of a traveller.

"On arriving at the Colony, our first care is to distribute our new recruits among our different families, in order that by being thus dispersed, the evil influences which they may bring with them may be less felt, and that the original Colonists may, by their example and their counsels, predispose the new comers to receive our instructions. On the face of one of our houses is inscribed, ' Let us love one another, for charity comes from God.'

"This precept, which penetrates deeply into the hearts of our Colonists, has a powerful influence on their habits of life. We can safely attest, incredible as it may seem, that nothing is more rare than an indecent or a brutal action among children who have hitherto associated only with the most gross companions, and have never had any examples before their eyes but those of the most extreme brutality, while on the contrary they never fail to seek with eagerness every opportunity of succouring and assisting one another.

Thus when one of their comrades is dangerously ill, there is a struggle as to who shall watch by his pillow, and their zeal in this respect carries them so far, that we find ourselves obliged to award the performance of this painful office as a reward for good conduct. The organist of our chapel is a blind young man, whose infirmity has excited the compassion of all our children: one of them exclaimed, I would willingly give two of my fingers to restore to him his two eyes. This lively, and decidedly expressed, feeling of charity, is it not the foundation of all morality, since it is the first principle inculcated by the religion of Christ?"—P. 11.

"Our school for undermasters, an addition to, or rather completion of, the institution, whose principal instructions are on the one hand agricultural, and on the other devoted to teaching the elements of moral science, is destined, if further developed, to exercise an immense influence in the country, by preparing men capable of directing institutions similar to your own, and it will contribute powerfully to promote penitentiary reform. In fact, it is not sufficient to have found the means of preventing prisoners from growing more corrupt—we must also labour for their improvement, by working on their moral sense: we spare no exertions to bring this normal school up to the level of its high mission.

"Some persons, at the same time that they have highly approved of the administration of Mettray in many respects, have not concealed from us that they thought our personal staff too numerous. In this they would be perfectly right, were they considering a mere manufactory, or if we were only teaching the practice of a trade: in a manufactory, a single overseer, placed in a gallery, can overlook fifty workmen working in the same shop. But morality cannot be taught like a trade, and different cautions and cares are necessary to change the heart of a child, from those which exercise his fingers: without speaking of the difficulty of superintendence during field labour, and the care of a farm, where the labourers are dispersed, the task of substituting good feelings for bad ones is a work which cannot be accomplished without multiplied efforts, and without, we may almost say, the employment of a superintendent for each individual child: it is besides the instruction which is given us by religion, under the pious and consoling emblem of the Guardian Angel."—P. 13.

We have space but for a few extracts from the Report of the State of Mettray in 1845.

"Extracts from the Report of the Agricultural and Penitentiary Colony at Mettray, read at the Meeting of its Founders, at Paris, June 1845. Sixth Meeting.

" 521 Children have been admitted.
348 are now at Mettray, of whom—
105 have been received within the present year.
12 have been sent back to prison.
17 have died.
144 have been placed out; the earliest above three years since.
Of these 144—
7 have relapsed.
9 conduct themselves indifferently.
128 remain to this day *irreproachable*.

"Three-fifths of the Colonists have been inscribed on the Tableau d'Honneur, in the course of the year, which requires three months of exemplary conduct. 180 names are on at this time, which is a considerable proportion, as, from the recent addition to our numbers, many have not been in the Colony the required time.

"It is worthy of remark, that at the approach of the solemnities of the Church, faults diminish in a great proportion; so that the religion of our Colonists is shown, not in external observances only, but in voluntary application of it, to the regulation of their laborious lives.

"We wish that our children should understand the reason, the necessity, of the tasks imposed on them.

"Passive obedience is a yoke endured by weakness, and broken the first opportunity. Obedience founded on conviction fixes laws, which are first yielded to, then adopted for self-government, and which cannot afterwards be forgotten.

"The placing them becomes every day more easy. Requests for children exceed, each year, the number we have to dispose of; and the correspondence laid before you shows the value attached to them.

"We regularly answer all letters from the children who have quitted us. Many who are placed in the neighbourhood return and spend Sunday in the Colony—rejoin their comrades, sit at the same table, kneel at the same altar.

"A severe discipline was necessary. The nature of their employments left them full liberty. Yet of 521 children, not one has escaped from us.

"Twelve similar Colonies are now founded in imitation of Mettray."

We have gone greatly at length into the analysis of

these reports on Mettray ; they, in fact, contain our case : and though, as we before stated, we have not extracted individual cases, it is not because we do not feel them to be of importance to a right understanding of the subject, but because we would not at too much length trespass on the attention of our readers. To such of them as desire to become fully possessed of all the necessary information on the subject, we recommend the Reports themselves ; they will be found full of interest and instruction.

At the risk of tiring our readers we must make another extract. Much is said by those who are more industrious in making objections than in originating reforms, respecting the impossibility of raising children born amidst vice and crime to a happier state ; and it is not unfrequently urged, that we find children innately vicious, and that negligence, want, and ignorance, are not sufficient to account for the existence of the evil which daily develops itself. From the "Rapport sur la Fondation, les Resultats moraux et la position financière de la Colonie Horti-
cole et Agricole, pres Rouen, depuis le 14 Jan. 1843 jusqu' 21 Dec. 1844," we make the following extract :—

" ETAT CIVIL.

" Of 60 children—

8	are natural children.
12	have no father.
10	have no mother.
3	have neither father nor mother.

—
Total 33

Seven are imprisoned, as accomplices of their parents.

These 60 children have—

92	brothers.
78	sisters.

—
Total 170

Of these 170—

7	are natural children.
23	have no father.
32	have no mother.
5	have neither father nor mother.

—
Total 67

"The 103 others are often left to the care of brothers and sisters under fifteen years of age, whilst their parents are undergoing sentences of longer or shorter duration. This terrible picture, if from effects we turn to causes, answers completely the reproaches which are occasionally addressed to us, namely, that of favouring the children who have committed crimes, in preference to poor children. Whilst we approve the idea of founding Colonies for the children of those who are in misery, we are, nevertheless, of opinion that juvenile Delinquents, who also form a part of the destitute, have a prior claim, from the excess of their misery, and still more from the excess of evil with which society is threatened, if we do not endeavour to direct them from the career of vice and crime. It is, then, for the purpose of applying a remedy to so many calamities, that we are employed in endeavouring to save children frequently abandoned by their families, at other times led away by the example of their parents, and disowned by society, which makes them responsible for faults of which they are the first victims. These children are better off in our establishment than between four walls, deprived of air and of sun, under the eyes of an armed centinel. There a stranger rarely casts upon them a look of pity or of interest; no succouring hand aids them to escape from the abyss into which they are fallen. Here, on the contrary, a benevolent society protects them—care and paternal counsels encourage them. Hence comes the change which is worked in them, and the development of generous sentiments, until then suppressed or unknown. Their good conduct in the establishment proves the progress of their moralization, and is a pledge to us of the future. Here, all corporal punishment is entirely banished."

The public attention has been of late absorbed in the free-trade question; we hope we shall shortly have disposed of that matter in a satisfactory manner, and that the legislature will then have time to set about other labours most necessary to be done. The reformation of the criminal population is unquestionably one subject which must occupy the attention of the Government; it is, indeed, a reproach that it should have been so long delayed.

However much we may regret that the Government has not yet taken this important business into consideration, we are consoled by the fact that the public mind has been deeply impressed with the necessity for legislation on the subject. Indeed in some instances the active benevolence of individuals has anticipated the duty of the Government. The City Solicitor, with praiseworthy motives, has called the attention of the inhabitants of the metropolis to the

misery and wretchedness of discharged criminals; and a public meeting, encouraged by the energy and example of the Bishop of London, has formed an institution for the reception of those who have been discharged from prison. The Grand Juries in the country have frequently felt the painful duties imposed upon them, and have made formal representations to the Courts on the subject of the punishment of children. More recently the Grand Jury at the Central Criminal Court have made a most formal representation of their opinions. At the Sessions in the month of May last, the Foreman addressing the Recorder said, he

... "was requested by his brother jurymen to state, that they were aware they had been engaged a longer time than usual at the present session; but they thought it right to say that they had devoted no more time to the consideration of each case than was necessary to afford to each party accused that right which the constitution gave him, of not being put upon his trial without twelve men expressing their opinion, upon their oaths, that there was ground for such a course being taken; and he begged to state that no bill had been returned except with the consent of twelve of their body. The foreman went on to say, that the grand jury had felt great difficulty in disposing of the cases of juvenile offenders: in many cases the parties were unwilling to prosecute them, although the evidence was conclusive; and the grand jury were placed in the position of violating the solemn obligation they were under, by the oath they had taken, or else to send such offenders for trial before the petty jury. They had, however, in such cases, felt it their duty to act upon the evidence, although it was repugnant to their moral feelings. He then handed the following presentment to the court:—

"The grand jury respectfully present, at the close of their duties, the solemn conviction forced on them by their recent investigation, that there is something fundamentally defective in legislation, both as it regards the decrease of crime, and the reclamation of criminals. The instances of a second conviction coming before them have been numerous, and it would appear to them as though our jurisprudence had it in view, that a citizen once charged with guilt, should never cease to be a criminal—beggared by the unnecessarily heavy expenses of his defence, and subjected, during his confinement, to association with characters the most depraved, and forced on the world at the close of his confinement, without money or repute, the accused is made for the rest of his life a criminal by profession. In the case of the young this is still more deplorable, and is complicated with grievances which the public

share. The grand jury, among many similar instances, have had before them the case of Thomas Miller, No. 34, Middlesex, a child of eight years of age, for stealing lead to the value of —, with a former conviction; and the case of two boys, of the age of sixteen, No 119, Middlesex, for stealing to the value of one shilling, with a former conviction against one of them for stealing to the value of sixpence. The irrationality of moving the complicated and costly machinery of law for the legal punishment (and for such acts) of children, neglected and untaught, forcibly impressed itself on the minds of the grand jury; and while expressing their surprise and regret that the magistrates of police courts cannot make similar cases to these, matters of summary jurisdiction, they would earnestly invite attention to the necessity of some general measure for removing children charged with such trivial offences, after their release, from the depraving circumstances that must insure their repeated and continued appearance in our law courts in the character of criminals. The grand jury believe it is not out of the sphere of their duties to suggest the importance of doing something which, by diffusing information, and improving the reasoning powers of our poorer population, may remove from our calendar numerous crimes which now owe their origin solely to ignorance; and they feel convinced, while an improved agency of this kind, using public means rather for the prevention than the detection and punishment of crime, merits support both as humane and efficient, it shall as strongly appeal to public consideration on the ground of a judicious and great economy.

“The Recorder said, he collected from the grand jury that they had concluded their labours, and that in the course of those labours they had felt a repugnance at carrying out the law in certain cases; but that notwithstanding this private feeling, they had acted upon the evidence, and without reference to their private feelings. It appeared to him that the grand jury had performed their duty with great propriety, and the country was much indebted to them for their services. As to the topics that were referred to by the grand jury in their presentment, he was not prepared to apply his attention to such topics at this moment, or aware that they would have been introduced to his attention; but if he had been, it would probably not be a convenient course for the court to enter into a discussion upon those subjects which would more properly form the subject of consideration by the Legislature. With regard, however, to that portion of the observations of the grand jury in reference to the jurisdiction of the magistrates in the police courts, he could state that in the present condition of the law, where a case of felony was made out, it gave them no discretion as to the course they should

adopt, and they were bound to commit the accused party for trial. That the powers of the magistrates were restricted in this respect might be a matter of regret, but as the law at present stood, they could adopt no other course than to commit the parties for trial. His lordship concluded by again thanking the grand jury for the great care and attention they had bestowed upon the cases brought before them."

The Recorder of Birmingham, M. D. Hill, Esq., a man whose devotion to his profession has not lessened his sympathies for the wretched, or weakened his sense of humanity, or impaired his feeling of responsibility as a judge, has brought the claims and sufferings of juvenile criminals before the public authorities of the town of Birmingham, and has produced a strong conviction on the minds of those who heard him, of the absolute necessity for immediate legislation. We ask for nothing wild or impracticable when we ask the sanction of a well-digested law for this great moral improvement. Our friends in the United States have gone before us. We ask for institutions for offenders merely, thinking that parochial schools, where paternal guidance is wanting, may supply those who are destitute but not criminal. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, however, in the year 1835 passed an Act to incorporate the Boston Asylum and Farm School for Indigent Boys. This institution was formed for "the education and reformation of boys who, from loss of parents or other causes, were exposed to extraordinary temptations, and in danger of becoming vicious and dangerous, or useless members of society." Before the establishment of this institution for the indigent, the municipal authorities of Boston had houses for the reformation of juvenile offenders. Previous to the entry into these establishments, however, the child must have been tried, convicted, and sentenced. The school, which was incorporated by the Act of State, is a school for poor and "morally exposed" children who are untainted with crime, and who may be rescued from evil by timely care. The citizens of Massachusetts have anticipated us. They have not only Juvenile Reformatories, but they have societies incorporated, which have objects far beyond those for which we require legislative sanction. It affords us much pleasure to say, that the societies at Boston

have had great success—are well supported; we need not add, that they are most honourable to the community.

The Committee formed to carry out the views of the meeting in the metropolis to which we have referred, opened a correspondence with the municipal authorities in numerous large towns, in the hope of inducing some of them to adopt the plan recommended by the Committee in London. What degree of success has attended this appeal we have not the means of forming any just estimate. Among other towns to whose authorities that Committee addressed itself, was the town of Liverpool. The Corporation sent the communication to the Magistrates of that borough, who, after mature consideration, embodied their views in a petition to the House of Commons. This petition was approved by the Town Council, and was adopted by that body, and they also petitioned parliament. The petition contains so much that we approve as to opinion and certain facts, and details so much of importance to the general consideration of the question, that we are induced to lay it before our readers at length:—

“ TO THE HONOURABLE THE COMMONS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, IN PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLED.

“ The humble Petition of the undersigned Magistrates of the Borough of Liverpool,

“ Sheweth,

“ That your Petitioners administer the laws in the Borough of Liverpool over a population which, according to the last census, consisted of more than two hundred and ninety-six thousand persons.

“ That the number of committals made by your Petitioners during the last seven years, for offences within their jurisdiction, is fifty-one thousand four hundred and thirty-four.

“ That of this number, 31,822 were males, and 19,612 females.

“ That 5,583 of them were under the ages of 17 years, and the remainder were above the age of 17 years.

“ That of this number, 25,988 persons were once committed, 8,056 were twice committed, 4,173 were three times committed, 2,847 were four times committed, and that 10,374 were committed five times and upwards.

“ That your Petitioners know that many of these last prisoners

were committed much more frequently than five times, though your Petitioners have not the means of stating with accuracy the precise number of times in which each prisoner has been committed beyond five times, except in cases hereinafter mentioned.

"That for some time the attention of your Petitioners has been forcibly drawn to the state of the younger portion of the criminal population, and recently your Petitioners have been requested to join in Petitions to your Honourable House, praying for the establishment of houses of occupation for persons discharged from criminal prisons.

"That your Petitioners, though deeply impressed by painful experience with the necessity for a thorough examination of the whole subject, and rejoicing to see the growing interest taken in the welfare of this wretched portion of our people, are nevertheless of opinion that the state of the criminal population of the kingdom, as well as the predisposing causes of crime, ought to be matter of careful inquiry by your Honourable House, before any legislative measure be adopted.

"That your Petitioners believe, that whatever differences of opinion exist as to the practicability of reforming any considerable proportion of adult offenders, there is little doubt that a very considerable number of juvenile offenders may be reformed.

"That your Petitioners have been informed of the results of attempts to establish reformatory institutions in Germany and in France; that in both those countries, institutions have been established for the reception and reformation of juvenile offenders, and that these institutions have produced, and are still producing, most beneficial effects.

"That the institution at Horn, near the city of Hamburg, and the Colonie Agricole de Mettray, in France, are those to which your Petitioners refer.

"That every report which has been hitherto published by the directors of these institutions has offered the strongest evidence of the success of the plans therein adopted for the reform of juvenile offenders.

"That an Asylum of the same character, though of but small extent, has for some time been established, with beneficial results, in the county of Warwick.

"That, in order to enable your Honourable House to form a judgment of the cost of the present system, your Petitioners beg to record the actual cost attending fourteen cases of juvenile delinquents, who have from time to time been committed to the prison of this borough. The cases referred to were fairly selected, in the year 1842, from the mass of juvenile prisoners in the prison, by one of your Petitioners, who was at that time endeavouring to ascertain

the charge incurred by the treatment of juvenile offenders in prison, in contrast with those in reformatory institutions.

"That the costs of prosecution, in the estimate, relating to these fourteen cases, are much less than the usual costs, because the Corporation of Liverpool are the public prosecutors, and all expenses are most economically conducted.

"That your Petitioners trust your Honourable House will find, in the importance of the subject, an apology for the length of this Petition, and for the details, in the possession of which your Petitioners deem it right to put the members of your Honourable House.

"That, for the greater convenience, your Petitioners refer to the cases by a numeral, 1 to 14, prefixed to each.*

"That No. 1.—Eighteen years old; can neither read nor write. First committed 8th January, 1835; last committal 22nd February, 1841. Committed sixteen times; discharged six. Last sentence, twelve months' imprisonment.

"No. 2.—Now sixteen years old; can read imperfectly, cannot write. First committed 15th August, 1838; last committal 31st January, 1842. Committed twelve times; discharged once. Last sentence, ten years' transportation.

"No. 3.—Twelve years old; can neither read nor write. First committed 3rd June, 1837; last committal 13th January, 1842. Committed ten times; discharged ten. Last sentence, three months' imprisonment.

"No. 4.—Twelve years old; can neither read nor write. First committed 26th September, 1838; last committal 31st January, 1842. Committed nine times; discharged seven. Last sentence, ten years' transportation.

"No. 5.—Twelve years old; can neither read nor write. First committed 8th August, 1839; last committal 16th September, 1841. Committed eight times; discharged five. Last sentence, three months' imprisonment.

"No. 6.—Ten years old; can neither read nor write. First committed 21st December, 1837; last committal 5th January, 1842. Committed eleven times; discharged three. Last sentence, seven years' transportation.

"No. 7.—Fourteen years old; can neither read nor write. First committal 9th January, 1838; last committal 8th March, 1842. Committed nineteen times; discharged four. Last sentence, three months' imprisonment.

"No. 8.—Thirteen years old; can neither read nor write. First

* These are the cases cited in the article of the Christian Teacher in 1842: the melancholy termination of the cases has been ascertained by the writer of the former articles on this subject.

committed 10th February, 1838; last committal 22nd February, 1842. Committed sixteen times; discharged five. Last sentence, three months' imprisonment.

"No. 9.—Fourteen years old; can neither read nor write. First committed 17th June, 1839; last committal 20th October, 1841. Committed seven times; discharged eight. Last sentence, three months' imprisonment.

"No. 10.—*Nine years old*; can neither read nor write. First committed 30th September, 1839; last committal 25th October, 1841. Committed four times; discharged twelve. Last sentence, 25th October, 1841, *seven years' transportation*.

"No. 11.—Twelve years old; can neither read nor write. First committed 16th October 1838; last committal 18th August, 1841. Committed seven times; discharged four. Last sentence, fourteen days' imprisonment.

"No. 12.—Twelve years old; can neither read nor write. First committed 2nd January, 1840; last committal 17th December, 1841. Committed five times; discharged six. Last sentence, three months' imprisonment.

"No. 13.—Thirteen years old; can neither read nor write. First committed 19th September, 1838; last committal 30th March, 1841. Committed three times; discharged five. Last sentence, three months' imprisonment.

"No. 14.—Thirteen years old; can neither read nor write. First committed 30th August, 1839; last committal February 2nd, 1842. Committed six times; discharged six. Last sentence, three months' imprisonment.

"That the costs of apprehension, maintenance, prosecution, and punishment of No. 1, was £129. 5s. 6½*d.*; of No. 2, £71. 2s. 10½*d.*; of No. 3, £74. 1s. 10½*d.*; of No. 4, £71. 13s. 1*d.*; of No. 5, £47. 9s. 3*d.*; of No. 6, £64. 6s. 6½*d.*; of No. 7, £99. 2s. 5½*d.*; of No. 8, £72. 1s. 4½*d.*; of No. 9, £52. 9s. 7½*d.*; of No. 10, £64. 18s. 9½*d.*; of No. 11, £28. 10s. 4½*d.*; of No. 12, £39. 8s. 10½*d.*; of No. 13, £26. 10s. 10*d.*; of No. 14, £47. 7s. 7½*d.*; and thus these offenders cost the public £889. 1s.

"That for the more full development of the moral and financial results of the present system of punishing juvenile offenders, your Petitioners have traced, as far as it can be ascertained, the subsequent career of the above-mentioned fourteen prisoners.

"That at the time of the return, four of them, namely, numbers two, four, six, and ten, were under sentence of transportation; that number one died in prison; that number three, after being again once imprisoned, was transported; that number five, after two several additional periods of imprisonment, was also transported; that number seven, after six several additional periods of imprisonment,

was also transported; that number eight, after six several periods of imprisonment, was also transported; that number nine, after one imprisonment, was also transported; that number eleven, after sixteen several additional periods of imprisonment, is again in custody for trial; and that number twelve has been imprisoned seven times since the return, but is now out of gaol, a prostitute; that number thirteen has not been heard of in Liverpool since the date of the last return; and that number fourteen has been transported after an additional period of imprisonment.

"That it thus appears, ten out of the fourteen children have been transported; that one is dead; that one is now in custody; that one is still among the criminal population; and of one only is there any hope of reformation, and of this last-mentioned nothing is known.

"That the costs of the various apprehensions, detention, and imprisonment of these offenders, will have to be added to the costs already given, and, in addition, the cost of the final transportation of the ten prisoners must also be added.

"That none of these fourteen offenders could write, and only one of them could read, and that imperfectly.

"That your Petitioners do not desire to enter into a statement of their opinions as to the causes of crime, further than to observe that to want and ignorance much of it may undoubtedly be attributed; your Petitioners upon this ground, therefore, as well as upon other considerations, respectfully suggest that it is the duty of the Legislature to provide, by a well-considered system of national education, for the redemption of a vast portion of the children of this country, particularly those in large towns, from ignorance, and its almost inseparable companion, vice.

"That though your Petitioners are aware that many obstacles present themselves to those who desire reformatory institutions instead of prisons, yet it is consolatory to know, that with imperfect means great results have been obtained.

"That at the reformatory institution in Warwick, already much good has been effected. From the year 1833 to 1841, 77 boys between the ages of 14 to 16 years were admitted into the Warwick Asylum,—the cost of their clothing and maintenance was £1,026.

"That of these 77 boys, 41 have been reformed.

"That the cost, divided by the number of the reformed, gives only about £25 as the cost of each reformation, whilst the costs of punishing offenders of the same class in the borough of Liverpool, by the foregoing statement, cannot be much, if any, less than 100 guineas.

"That the object of the benevolent persons who have conducted

the Warwick Asylum is :—To restore to the inmates of the institution the power of self-control. This they have endeavoured to do, by placing them under a certain degree of restraint—by setting before them the superior advantages and comforts which a well-ordered family has over an irregular life; by cultivating and strengthening religious impressions, and by keeping up a preponderating moral influence in the institution in favour of virtue and religion; by relaxing the rein of discipline as occasion may require, and allowing the inmates to exercise the power of self-control as they may appear to have acquired it.

“That your Petitioners have placed, as concisely as possible, these points of this important question before your Honourable House, in order to induce your Honourable House to order an investigation into the subject, so that the best evidence may be laid before Parliament, as to the successful or unsuccessful working of institutions to which your Petitioners have referred, and also as to the possibility of affording Houses of Refuge and occupation for discharged criminals.

“That your Petitioners, feeling the vast importance of the question, humbly pray that your Honourable House will appoint a Committee to inquire and to report on the state of the criminal population of these Kingdoms, more particularly into the state of the juvenile part of that population, with a view to ascertain, after due and deliberate inquiry, the best means which can be devised for the reformation of both juvenile and adult criminals, and for their restoration to the ranks of the respectable portion of the people.

“And your Petitioners will ever pray, &c.”

It will be seen that this petition prays for inquiry only. The petitioners appear anxious to direct the attention of Parliament to the subject, and they desire a well-considered and comprehensive measure, for the details of which Parliament shall be responsible; and in this view of the case we cordially agree with the petitioners. A parliamentary inquiry would not only accurately investigate the whole business, but the Committee, in their report, might suggest the remedy. Whether such institutions ought to be in the hands of Government, subject like schools to the direction and inspection of the Commissioners of Education, and sustained by rates, payable in the nature of County or Borough rates, or whether they ought to be under the government of parochial authorities, or under a separate

management directed by, and answerable to, the Home Secretary, might all be matter for the consideration and decision of the Committee. The object to be attained is one of lasting importance: once begun, it would be difficult to abandon it; if begun improperly, it must fail in its great objects. Deliberately considered and adopted, after mature investigation, we believe it will not only be a national blessing, but we also believe it will prove a very great national pecuniary gain.

ART. II.—THE POETICAL ELEMENT OF ROMAN HISTORY.

- 1.—*The History of Rome, from the first Punic War to the Death of Constantine.* By B. G. Niebuhr. In a series of Lectures, including an Introductory course on the Sources and Study of Roman History. Edited by Leonhard Schmitz, Ph. D. Vol. I., forming the fourth volume of the entire History. London, 1844. Vol. II. *ibid.*
- 2.—*Lays of Ancient Rome.* By T. B. Macaulay, Esq. 8th Edition, 1846.

DR. SCHMITZ has rendered a valuable service to historical literature by recovering these Lectures of Niebuhr from the notes of his auditors at Bonn, in the years 1828 and 1829. Whoever knows what the *heft* of a German student is, will be astonished that he should have been able to extract so clear, orderly and exact an account of them from memorials so confused and imperfect, especially when it is considered that the great historian's mode of lecturing was that which above all others baffles a reporter,—rapid, impassioned, and involved. We think, however, that he had no right to publish them as a "*fourth and fifth volume of the entire History*," a purpose for which they were never designed by the author. The *trade* are too ready to practise these arts, knowing how much purchasers are captivated by the idea of having a complete work, but no editor should allow himself to be accessory to the deception.

By far the most important part of these volumes is contained in the first ninety pages, which treat of the original materials of Roman history and the mode in which they have been handled, from the revival of letters to the immediate predecessors of Niebuhr himself. Nowhere can the student of history find an enumeration so full, or a criticism so comprehensive and sagacious. We design however at present to inquire only into one of the subjects which this disquisition includes—the influence of poetry on the early history of Rome. It is well known that Niebuhr attributes to this source nearly everything, except a ficti-

tious chronology and a few facts respecting law and the constitution in the first three centuries; and the brilliant success of Mr. Macaulay in reproducing the lays out of which he believes the history to have been formed, may have even more effect in giving currency to this opinion than the arguments of Niebuhr, or his own able preliminary Dissertation. The time seems to be arrived for a calm review of the doctrines of Niebuhr; they came upon us at first with a blaze and a flash which illuminated, but dazzled at the same time. His vast erudition and critical sagacity placed him so much above the majority of his readers, that it seemed almost presumption to call his conclusions in question, and the passionate earnestness with which he announced his convictions stood in stead of evidence, or turned slight probabilities into absolute certainties. We have latterly observed several symptoms of a disposition to return from this extreme of implicit faith in Niebuhr; even his opinions respecting the tenure of land in the Roman Commonwealth have been powerfully assailed.* We have always thought that the very confident tone in which he spoke of the poetical origin of the early history had imposed on the judgment of his readers, and some remarks in support of this opinion may have now a better chance of being listened to, than a few years ago.

We can hardly separate this inquiry from another, the amount of authentic materials, not poetical, which were at the command of the earliest Roman annalists. Had there ever been a time when the use of writing was absolutely unknown at Rome, it would be almost a necessary consequence that its history previously to that time was preserved by means of poetry, or was altogether a later fiction. This however is not a probable supposition. We lay no stress on Pliny's account† of an inscription older than the building of the city; but since Etruria on the one side, and the Greek colonies on the other, had the use of alphabetical characters as early as the foundation of Rome, it is not likely that this city, which manifests from the first so strong an influence of both Greek and Etruscan elements, should be destitute of this art. Nor can we admit with

* See the *Classical Museum*, v. 2, p. 254, 307.

† N. H. 16, 87. It was in Etruscan letters.

Niebuhr that the question whether it was in common use depends upon another, whether they imported the Egyptian papyrus, since not papyrus but *linen* is mentioned as the material on which the earliest books were written.* The testimony of Livy, however, Hist. 6, 1, speaking of the times which preceded the burning of the Capitol by the Gauls, "*parvæ et raræ per eadem tempora literæ fuere,*" and the probabilities of the case, lead us to conclude that little if any continuous history was written in the earliest ages of Rome. It is one thing to have the use of writing for short inscriptions, for preserving the numbers of a census, or engraving the terms of a treaty, another to employ it for literary purposes. Of the little that had been written, the greater part was destroyed in the conflagration of the city. And here we must complain on behalf of Livy, of a great misrepresentation of his words by Niebuhr, hardly to be referred to the inaccuracy of the note-taker, since it is made the foundation of an argument. He says, (Vol. I. p. 5,) "It is Livy himself who has brought the history of Rome into disrepute, because he states in the introduction of his sixth book, that a new æra and a new life began in Roman history from the destruction of Rome by the Gauls; that during the long period previous to this, history was *handed down only by tradition*, and that *all written documents* were destroyed in the burning of the city. This statement is only half correct, or rather altogether false." Livy has many false statements to answer for, but this is not one of them; for he expressly says, "*quæ in commentariis pontificum aliisque publicis privatisque erant monumentis incensa urbe pleraque interiere,*" nor is there anything in his text equivalent to "*was handed down only by tradition.*" We are at a loss to understand how Niebuhr committed or Dr. Schmitz passed over such an error, in regard to a passage which lies at the foundation of the whole controversy respecting the credibility of the early Roman history.

We deny then that this history *must* have had a poetical origin, but are quite ready to admit any proof that it *did* so originate. The following passage contains Niebuhr's last words on this subject:—

* Livy, 4, 7.

"I remain unshaken in my conviction that a great portion of Roman history arose out of songs—that is to say, a body of living popular poetry—which extended over the period from Romulus to the battle of Regillus, the heroic age of Rome. It is evident to me that several portions of what is called the history of this period formed complete and true epic poems. If passages like that of Cicero, in which he states from Cato that among the ancient Romans it was the custom at banquets for the praises of great men to be sung to the flute, have no authority, I really do not know what have any. The three inscriptions on the monuments of the Scipios, written in the Saturnian verse, may be regarded as specimens of ancient songs. The story of Coriolanus, the embassy of his mother, his return, and death among the Volscians, which cannot be reconciled with chronology, were the subject of an epic poem. The story of Curtius was another which has been placed in a time to which it cannot possibly belong. If persons *will* dispute the existence of such lays as that of the Horatii, I can point out verses in Livy, and although I cannot prove the existence of any verses in support of the lay of the Tarquins, I need only refer to the fact that such stories are always related in a rhythmical form and not in prose. Surely those who invented such brilliant stories were not wanting in the *os rotundum* to give them a poetical form. Into this point I will not enter; my conviction, which alone I have to express here, is, that at one time these lays had a poetical form. All that is really beautiful in Roman story arose out of poetry."—Lect. V. i. p. 12, 13.

We will take first the external evidence for the existence of historical poetry among the Romans. There are several passages in Cicero's works which have been quoted for this purpose. Tusc. 1, 2. Est in Originibus, (an antiquarian work of Cato) solitos esse epulis canere convivas ad tibiam de clarorum hominum virtutibus. This statement is repeated, Tusc. 4, 2. Morem apud majores hunc epularum fuisse, ut deinceps, qui accumberent, canerent ad tibiam clarorum virorum laudes atque virtutes: ex quo perspicuum est et cantus tum fuisse rescriptos vocum sonis et carmina. Valerius Maximus, 2, 1, 10, had probably no independent authority, and therefore though his expression, "egregia superiorum facta carmine comprehensa pangebant," seems to come nearer to an evidence of the use of narrative poetry, such as Niebuhr's hypothesis requires, we cannot lay any stress upon it. Cicero, Brut. 19, again quotes Cato's Origines. Utinam extarent illa carmina, quæ multis sæculis

ante suam ætatem in epulis esse cantitata a singulis convivis de clarorum virorum laudibus in Originibus scriptum reliquit Cato. These passages leave no doubt that it was an ancient custom among the Romans that the guests at a banquet should each in his turn sing to the flute, poems in praise of illustrious men of former times. Unfortunately we are left almost wholly in the dark as to the persons who were so celebrated. Niebuhr and Macaulay both assume that they were the men of the regal and early republican times, whereas for anything that appears, they might not have been in the proper sense Romans at all. There are only two passages that we are aware of, which throw any light upon this point, and both are unfavourable to the supposition that the men of the historical times were the subject of these songs: one is in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Hist. Rom.* 1, 79. It has been repeatedly referred to by Niebuhr, as if Dionysius himself had heard the songs to which he refers, while Macaulay and most of the editors understand it as a quotation from Fabius Pictor. It imports that when Romulus and Remus grew to manhood, they had not the air and bearing of swineherds, but such as might be expected from those of royal and divine descent; ὥς ἐν τοῖς πατρίοις ὕμνοις ὑπὸ Ρωμαίων ἔτι καὶ νῦν ᾄδεται. This last remark seems to us much more likely to have been made by the *Greek* Dionysius than by the *Roman* Fabius; but Niebuhr has extended it without any authority, from the circumstance of the godlike aspect of the twins, to the whole story of their birth and exposure, occupying nearly three pages of his own history (i. 184, 186). That Dionysius should have been so lucky as to find a portion of those ancient songs, of which Cicero regretted the loss, and of which Cato spoke as in use many ages before his time, would indeed be surprising, and hardly credible even of Fabius Pictor. But this difficulty, which induced Mr. Macaulay to think that Dionysius could not be speaking in his own person, is created only by the mistranslation of ὕμνοις, by him rendered *ballads*, and by Niebuhr *lieder*, which naturally suggests a comparison with the Nibelung and Chevy-Chase. A hymn and a ballad are very different things; history might well arise out of the one, not at all out of the other. That it was the custom of the Romans down to the time of Dionysius to celebrate in

hymns the illustrious persons of their own mythic history, we know from Horace, *Carm.* 4, 15.

“Nosque et profestis lucibus et sacris
Inter jocosi munera Liberi
Cum prole matronisque nostris
Rite Deos prius apprecati,
Virtute functos, more patrum, duces
Lydis remixto carmine tibiis
Trojamque et Anchisen et almæ
Progeniem Veneris canemus.”

i. e. Æneas, not as the Schol. Vet. explains it, *Gentem Juliam*. The ambiguity of the construction makes it difficult to say whether the *virtute functos duces* are mentioned as a separate theme, or are the same as the heroes of Troy, Anchises and his son; but it is so agreeable to human nature that the authors of glory to a nation should be “in their flowing cups freshly remembered,” that probably Horace meant to tell Augustus that he too should be *toasted* with poetical and musical honours, like the great warriors of former times.

Direct evidence then fails altogether to establish the existence of a ballad poetry among the Romans. Its place, however, may be thought to be supplied by an argument from analogy. Every nation, says Mr. Macaulay, has its ballad poetry, at a certain point in the progress towards refinement.

“Tacitus informs us that songs were the only memorials of the past which the ancient Germans possessed. We learn from Lucan and from Ammianus Marcellinus that the brave actions of the ancient Gauls were commemorated in the verses of bards. The vengeance exacted by the spouse of Attila for the murder of Siegfried was celebrated in rhymes of which Germany is still justly proud. The exploits of Athelstane were commemorated by the Anglo-Saxons, and those of Canute by the Danes, in rude poems, of which a few fragments have come down to us. The chants of the Welsh harpers preserved through ages of darkness a faint and doubtful memory of Arthur. In the Highlands of Scotland may still be gleaned some relics of the old songs about Cuthullin and Fingal. The long struggle of the Servians against the Ottoman power was recorded in lays full of martial spirit. We learn from Herrera that when a Peruvian Inca died, men of skill were appointed to celebrate him in verses, which

all the people learned by heart, and sung in public on days of festival."—Preface, p. 10, 11.

Examples might be multiplied ; but there is a circumstance which seems to us to forbid the application of these analogies to the Roman history. In all the instances enumerated, the production and preservation of a body of popular narrative poetry has been the office of a separate class of men, *ᾄδοί*, bards, scalds, minstrels, gleemen, *trouveurs*, *copleros*, or by whatever name their order might be distinguished. How indeed could any but a professional memory retain or combine them ? The *κλέα ἀνδρῶν* (Il. i, 189. Od. θ', 73), the epic recitations which formed a part of the entertainment at banquets in the heroic ages of Greece, were not volunteered by the guests, or demanded from each in his turn, but poured forth by men trained especially to this profession, and attached to princely houses, or in the decay of rhapsody and minstrelsy, wandering about and hired like the musician or the tumbler, to entertain the guests. The song, which every man at table was expected among the Greeks to furnish when called upon, under pain of being thought ill-mannered or ill-educated if he failed, was a short lyric piece, such as every gentleman might be supposed to carry in his memory, and be able to perform tolerably, in a musical nation, and with the usual allowance of candour to those who do their best for the entertainment of the company. Had Themistocles been called upon for a rhapsody, instead of a song to the lyre,* it would have been hard to have set him down as *indoctior*, because he could not comply with the call. Among these table songs of the Athenians, preserved by Athenæus, 15, p. 695, (Bergk. Lyr. Gr. 871,) all very short, and as unlike ballads as possible, some contain the praise of wine, some of beauty, others maxims of morality or prudence, but some the praises of brave men, as one in honour of Ajax and the well-known *scolion* on Harmodius and Aristogeiton.

Now, among the Romans we have no trace whatever of such an order of men as the Greek *ᾄδός*, the Celtic bard, and the Scandinavian scald ; and, therefore, as the argument is only one from analogy, we are warranted in con-

* Cic. Tusc. 1, 2.

cluding that they had no epic lays or ballad recitations. The only passage which even appears to indicate the employment of professional reciters at the feasts, to celebrate the deeds of brave men, is one quoted by Nonius from Varro, in which he says, "Aderant in convivii pueri modesti ut cantarent carmina antiqua, in quibus laudes erant majorum."* But this gives us no insight into the nature of the songs, and, as boys were employed, it is not probable that they were of any considerable length, so as to answer to the idea of a *lay*. On the whole, we shall probably be very near the truth, if we allot to these hymns the same amount of influence on Roman history, as to the *pæans*, *scolia*, and *epinicia* of the Greeks on their history, i. e. inappreciably small.

Undoubtedly, the Romans had poetry from the very earliest times. The songs of the Fratres Arvales and the Salian priests, if not as ancient as Romulus and Numa, must have been handed down from the age of the kings. The prophecies attributed to Faunus and his successors† were couched in metre, the rude Saturnian rhythm which appears to have been the earliest practised by the Latins. If we may not implicitly trust Dionysius, when he tells us that the soldiers of Romulus sang the praise of their commander in extemporary verse, he is at least good evidence of the existence of such a custom, and Livy mentions the *incondita carmina* with which the triumph of a successful general was celebrated.‡ But these are exceptions which rather confirm the rule; the Romans were a most unpoetical people, to whom literature and art were equally strange; and we find among them absolutely no trace whatever of the existence of such a body of popular narrative poetry, as nations of much inferior civilization have possessed.

Denying thus the reality of the supposed elements, out of which Niebuhr's epics were formed, we of course regard these epics themselves as altogether imaginary. The tone of confidence in which he speaks of them, parcelling out the history between the Lay of Romulus, the Lay of Tarquinius, the Lays of Curtius and Coriolanus, &c., almost persuades the reader that he must have some decisive evi-

* Niebuhr, 1, 216.

† Cic. Brut. 18.

‡ Liv. 3, 29. 4, 20.

dence, which has hitherto escaped observation. But there is nothing that deserves the name. "If passages like that of Cicero, in which he states, from Cato, that among the ancient Romans it was the custom at banquets for the praises of great men to be sung to the flute, have no authority, I really do not know what have any." Their authority is good for what they assert, and had they made any mention of ballads or epics, it would have been good for that too; but they do not, nor does any other Roman author. "The three inscriptions on the monuments of the Scipios, written in the Saturnian verse, may be regarded as specimens of ancient songs;" but why more so than the *epigrams* of Simonides? They are funereal inscriptions in metre, and that they were ever used as dirges or in any other way than as inscriptions, is in the highest degree improbable. It would have been well if the historians had used them as authentic records; but it so happens that no one action recorded in the epitaph of Lucius Scipio Barbatus is noticed by Livy, while no action which Livy ascribes to him is mentioned in the epitaph.* So little ground is there for supposing any connection between them and a body of history originating in ballads, compiled into epics, worked up by the annalists into a prose narrative, and finally polished and varnished by Livy. No one step of this whole process can be authenticated by ancient testimony, and we have surely a right to oppose negative evidence to presumptive. Livy and Cicero have indicated the private memoirs and funeral orations of the Roman families as sources of corruption and confusion in the history; Cicero, we have seen, was perfectly well aware of the ancient custom of singing the praises of great men at banquets, and lamented the loss of these songs; could he, familiar as his works show him to have been with Ennius, have been ignorant that Ennius had derived his materials from them? Niebuhr, in his History, (1. 221,) brought against Ennius the heavy accusation of having tried successfully to suppress the old native poetry of Rome, deferring to another time the proof of his charge. The proof never having been given, the charge must be held to be abandoned, but we think it was wantonly and unwarrantably made.

* Arnold's History of Rome, 2, 326.

If, however, "persons *will* dispute the existence of such lays as those of the Horatii," Niebuhr "can point out verses in Livy." If it were so, it would by no means follow that these verses were the traces of a poetical origin of his materials. "Metrici quidem pedes," says Quintilian (9, 4), "adeo reperiuntur in oratione, ut frequenter non sentientibus nobis omnium generum excidant versus," of which he has given a proof, by writing an hexameter himself, which scans perfectly on the fingers.

" Utendumque
Plane sermone ut nummo cui publica forma est."—1, 6.

Moliere has persuaded the world that they talk prose all their lives long, but Aristotle knew better, and declares (Poet. 10 Tyrwh.) that we very frequently utter iambs; and even measures more remote from the rhythm of speech sometimes drop oddly from the pen. Thus the 47th sect. of ch. 2, B. 2, of Smith's Optics,* begins

" When parallel rays
Come contrary ways
And fall upon opposite sides."

And we remember to have seen quoted from Whewell's Dynamics this pleasing verse,—

" Hence no force, however great,
Can stretch a cord, however fine,
Into a horizontal line
That is completely strait."

The verses to which Niebuhr refers in Livy (1, 26) occur in a legal formula, and here it might be thought that involuntary versification was out of the question. Yet it is not so; Law frequently disports in harmonious numbers. The officer of the court begins to swear the jury in a lively Trochaic. Tetram. acat.—

" You shall well and | truly tryand | you shall judge be|tween
the parties; "

and finishes his inquiry as to their decision in a still livelier Anapaestic. Dim. cat.—

" That is your | verdict, and | so ye say | all."

* Twining on Aristotle's Poetic. u.s.

It might therefore very well happen that a single passage in Livy might be capable of being read into that "horrid Saturnian verse" which is so very like prose. But it is astonishing that Niebuhr should not have observed that Livy himself quotes the formula, "*Decémviri pérduellíonem júdicent*," &c., as an ancient example of an *horrendum carmen*, and that instead of being, as his argument requires, a fragment of a ballad or an epic lay, serving to detect the poetical origin of the narrative, it stands alone, and has a special and exceptional character. No inference can be drawn from the use of verse in a legal formula to the metrical form of the narrative from which it was extracted. Nothing was more common than to compose laws in a metrical form, in order to fix them more firmly in the memory, in an age when writing was little used; the practice even prevailed of setting them to music, and perhaps the word νόμος may have been derived from this circumstance.* So closely had the Romans associated the idea of verse with a legal formula, which was as sacred to them as the law itself, that *carmen* became its standing name, and was preserved, as we know from numerous passages in Cicero, when such forms were composed in mere prose. The imprecation by which Decius and his son devoted themselves to death for their country is called *carmen* by Pliny (28, 2); but, though solemn and archaic (Liv. 8, 9, 10, 28), it cannot be reduced even to the rude Saturnian metre. These things are so well known, that we can account for Niebuhr's overlooking them only by his extreme eagerness to support his supposed discovery. But had there been in Livy's history frequent traces of a poetical origin, in diction and rhythm, they might have been accounted for much more simply than by the hypothesis of a ballad poetry. Niebuhr maintains that Livy wrote his History from the poetical annals of Ennius, whom *alone* he followed in the first part of his work (Lect. 1. 58). Ennius was a man of too much poetical genius (ib. 31) to have merely described and versified the events recorded by the annalists. If then there be in the arrangement and colouring of the early Roman

* See Wachsmuth *Hellen. Altherth.* 1. p. 208; Bentley on Phalaris, xii. 8. "Charondas's Laws."

history that free and imaginative character which marks a poet's hand, why should we not give the credit to him

"qui primus amœnam
Detulit ex Helicone perenni fronde coronam,"

rather than to a nameless race of "metre ballad-mongers," whose very existence is uncertified by a single passage of Roman history? Macaulay thinks the story of Tarquin's beating down the poppies in his garden (Liv. 1. 54) must have been borrowed from Herodotus. Him Ennius may have read, but if there be anything certain in Roman literary history, it is that the Greek *authors* were not known at Rome till the third century B. C.

Are, however, these marks of poetical handling so distinctly visible in Livy, as to compel us to the conclusion that his materials were created and modelled in the poetic mind? Niebuhr thinks so, and has pronounced every one blind who cannot see it (Hist. 1. 218). We have learnt to be very distrustful of these appeals to the *æsthetic sense*, and always the more so in proportion to the self-reliance which the appellant manifests. The history of the *higher criticism* warrants this distrust. When it has undertaken to decide on the age and genuineness of books or portions of books, by the definite tests of history, chronology, and language, it has been eminently successful; witness the exposure of the spuriousness of the Epistles of Phalaris by Bentley, and of the late origin of the Orphica by Hermann. But when it has gone beyond this, and tried to establish a criterion of genuineness by its own internal sense of beauty and propriety, it has as eminently failed. The great modern master of the higher criticism, F. A. Wolf, gained a high reputation for sagacity by his dismemberment of the Iliad; but in an evil hour he took the *Manuscript from St. Helena* into his Lecture-room, and demonstrated by the principles of his art, that it must have proceeded from the pen of Napoleon. His Homeric criticism has not proved conclusive. Mr. Grote's Chapter on the Grecian Epic is very instructive on this point. German metaphysics have not been more fruitful of short-lived systems, all appealing to intuitive reason, than the Homeric criticism of contradictory judgments, all derived from the *æsthetic sense*. Where one man sees unity, co-

herence, antique simplicity, another sees diversity, incoherence, modernism. It cannot be otherwise. To make a feeling so difficult of analysis, so various in individuals, and so variable in the same individual, so dependent on association and idiosyncrasy, a test of criticism, is worse than to take the foot of the chancellor for the time being, as the standard of Long Measure. Those, too, who believe that they possess this fine sensibility and delicate tact, are very apt to plume themselves upon it as a mark of genius, and express a very lofty contempt for all who are deficient in it; that is, all who dispute their decisions. We have read again the portion of the Roman history in which, according to Niebuhr, all but the blind may see the marks of an origin from epic lays, and still they will not reveal themselves to us. That the stories of Curtius and Coriolanus are out of their place, may be a good reason for calling in question the accuracy of Roman chronology; it may even raise a suspicion of their fictitious origin: but why an epic poet should be supposed to have misplaced them, rather than a prose narrator, ignorant or careless about chronology, we do not understand. A very different principle from poetic taste appears to us to have presided over the origin of the earliest Roman history, a desire to account for names, buildings, customs, rites and laws, of which the true cause had been lost. The Rape of the Sabines explained the mixture of Sabine with Roman population, the joint sovereignty, the name Quirites, the Sabine appellations of the Curiae. The Lake of Curtius was a *great fact*, whether the story of Curtius were so or not. Sepulchres existed, whose relative position was explained (Liv. 1, 26) by the narrative of the combat of the Horatii and Curiatii; so did the Pila Horatia and the Sororium Tigillum; and if tradition had not preserved the true story of these monuments, the deficiency would be supplied by fiction. We much doubt if any contemporary document preserved the long ceremonial of the declaration of hostilities (Liv. 1, 32), and are quite sure it never was a part of an epic lay: but it was a very ancient formula; its introduction was suitable to the reign of Ancus, who was at once warlike and religious, "et Numæ et Romuli memor;" so it was assigned to the first Latin War, "moremque eum posterì acceperunt."

The statue of Attus, said to have been accompanied with a whetstone (1, 36), would have painfully exercised the curiosity of after ages, without the legend of its miraculous division by the king's razor; and the profound homage paid to augurs at Rome, "*ut nihil belli domique postea, nisi auspicato gereretur; concilia populi, exercitus vocati, summa rerum, ubi aves non admisissent dirimerentur,*" would have been inexplicable to the popular mind, never content with general and gradual causes, without this astounding instance of an augur's skill. The stories of the attempt of the Sabine to obtain the superiority for his nation by the sacrifice of a bull to Diana, and its defeat by the quick-witted Roman priest (1, 44); and of the refusal of Terminus to quit his place on the Tarpeian hill, are evidently retrospective fictions (1, 55), dating from the time when the Romans had formed the notion of their own title to command; but patriotism and superstition are adequate to account for their origin, without the intervention of a poet. There never was a period in Roman history, answering to the heroic times of Greece. With the exception of Romulus, whose parentage is entirely mythic, its personages are all purely human, and they walk about upon the earth, engaged in earthly occupations, building, fighting, making laws, instead of flying through the heavens, sailing from the Euxine to the Atlantic, or going down into the infernal regions to come up again. The foundation of Rome nearly coincides with the æra of the Olympiads, that is, with the commencement of authentic history in Greece, and the use of the Greek language from very early times at Rome indicates a connection, which would produce a certain degree of correspondence in the progress of development in the two countries.

We by no means deny the existence of fiction, poetic fiction, if any one chooses to call it so in an etymological sense, in the Roman history, but we see no evidence that it ever took the form of poetry. The form is surely not necessary. To say nothing of the story-tellers of the East, what a mass of narrative fiction is comprehended in the legends of the Christian Church, orthodox and heretical, in every age down to the Reformation! Yet these, though they may have furnished materials now and then for poetry, never had to any considerable extent a metrical

form. Whether the love of the marvellous, which is incessantly at work in ruder communities, creating and combining history, shall clothe its results in numbers, depends on national character and aptitude. The Romans were as prosaic as the Greeks were poetical. Niebuhr thinks they cannot have wanted the *os rotundum* to express their fictions, if they had only brilliancy of imagination sufficient to produce them. The question, however, is not about poetic talent adequate to the inditing of a hymn in honour of a god, or a table song in praise of a warrior, but of the power to produce "an epopee which in depth and brilliancy of imagination leaves everything produced by the Romans in later times far behind it." Hist. 1, 220. In this point we are inclined to defer to the authority of Horace, who, in allotting to the Greeks the possession of the *os rotundum*, virtually disclaims it on behalf of his countrymen. Had not the Roman mind been thus essentially unpoetic, had it been in the earliest times so creative as to have produced epopees deserving Niebuhr's encomium, how happened it that it never created anything in later ages, in which language and rhythm had been so greatly polished and improved? It is no answer to this to say, that native genius was stifled under the load of imported Greek literature. Such an effect could have been only temporary. Had there been a real fire beneath, it might have been damped by the sudden imposition of a load of fuel, but would soon have blazed up again, and burnt the longer and the steadier from the abundance of the supply.

History has often had to rebuke the vanity of nations, assuming to themselves perfections which they never possessed; but we believe this is a solitary instance of her undertaking to prove to them how much they have underrated themselves. A genuine Roman would have thanked the gods that they had not made him and the people of Romulus poetical. His religious feeling would lead him, not only to tolerate, but to honour the author of a hymn in praise of his divinities, and he would feel how much the soldier would be animated to deeds of arms by the praise of valour, in the triumph or the banquet; but ballad-making he would have regarded as nothing better than effeminate idleness, deserving to bring upon him who

practised it a Censorian note. Indeed, if Niebuhr's views be correct, and the early ages of Rome produced such brilliant epic poets, we can only account for the deep and unanimous silence of the Roman authors, respecting, not only their names, but their existence, by a feeling of humiliation, similar to that which induced them to suppress all mention of the capture of the City by Porsena. They must have feared to forfeit their claim to be the masters of the world, if they were known to have indulged, like *Greeklings*, in the idle frivolities of poetry.

The question is something more than curious. There is no principle in historical philosophy more certain, than that national character, when a people has not been changed by inoculation with a foreign stock, is essentially the same, through all its stages from its germ to its decay. The Roman people would have been an exception to this law, if they had stopped short, after proceeding to a certain point in the development of a high poetical character; and a desire to remove such an anomaly has emboldened us to examine the foundations of a theory which, as Mr. Macaulay tells us, "has been adopted by the Bishop of St. David's, Professor Malden and Dr. Arnold, is now generally received by men conversant with classical antiquity, and indeed rests on such strong proofs, both internal and external, that it will not easily be subverted."

ART. III.—MAURY, ON THE SPIRITUAL LEGENDS OF THE MIDDLE AGES.

Essai sur les Legendes Pieuses du Moyen Age, ou Examen de ce qu'elles renferment de merveilleux, d'après les connaissances que fournissent de nos jours l'Archéologie, la Théologie, la Philosophie et la Physiologie médicale : par L. F. Alfred Maury. Paris. Librairie Philosophique de Ladrangé; 1843. pp. 280. (An Essay on the Spiritual Legends of the Middle Ages, considered in reference to the present views of Science and Philosophy.)

THE work before us is one of the many fruits of the awakened interest, with which the literary mind of France and Germany has of late years applied itself to the cultivation of mediæval history and antiquities. In studies of this nature, we are left behind at an immense interval by the scholars of the Continent. Our laymen, with few exceptions, are engrossed by the great practical or scientific questions of the day. The learning of most Dissenting Ministers, and of numbers among the Established Clergy, is turned aside with a narrow-minded contempt and abhorrence from every record of the days of Roman Catholic ascendancy, as blighted with an incurable taint of superstition and spiritual wickedness; and the renovated zeal in one section of our National Church, for the proprieties of ancient usage, and a pure ecclesiastical architecture, and for the memory of saints and fathers—is not a natural, pardonable excess of interest and reverence for times that are irrecoverably gone—but is really in many cases only another form of manifesting the spirit of clerical pretension and exclusiveness, and has called forth no literary effort, that will admit of comparison with the immense erudition, the broad views and the philosophical spirit, distinguishing the researches of our neighbours.

When the fanatical admiration of the republicanism of heathen antiquity, brought out by the French Revolution as a final result of the long strife that had been going on between literature and the priesthood, ever since the revival of letters

in the 15th century*—had subsided, and men began to reflect on the indiscriminate havoc which it had made, and which it threatened to extend, among the usages and institutions of European civilisation—a decided reaction took place in the minds of some distinguished persons—among whom the Schlegels were conspicuous—in favour of that form of society and opinion, against which so much Iconoclastic zeal had been displayed. A period in the history of the human race, which had been misunderstood and unjustly depreciated, was now likely to be as unreasonably exalted in the full tide of returning enthusiasm: but the permanent result—at which every lover of knowledge must rejoice—has been the direction of a portion of that exact and patient criticism, already trained and exercised in the schools of classical philology, to the interpretation of the monuments of the Middle Ages—a labour, first commenced with characteristic ardour by the laborious scholars of Germany,—and since taken up by the more lively and discursive spirits of France, under the special direction and encouragement of the present enlightened prime minister of that great country—M. Guizot—himself a distinguished cultivator of the same field of inquiry.†

We have a strong conviction, that every period of high civilisation must possess the clear consciousness of an antiquity in its rear, the monuments of which, literary or philosophical or artistic—made generally known and intelligently interpreted in the course of national culture—furnish, in their points of salient contrast with the actual state of manners, opinion and belief, so many subjects of fruitful and suggestive reflection for the understanding, and give breadth and comprehensiveness to its animating spirit. No idea is distinctly apprehended, nor are its manifold bearings and applications discerned, till it is brought into sharp contrast with another, very different from it. We believe it, for example, to be among the collateral advantages

* One cannot but call to mind, in this connection, the well known eagerness of President Jefferson to preserve the taste for classical literature, under the new republican institutions of his country.

† This remark must be limited to the more recent study of medieval antiquity: for, in one sense, the French were the precursors of the Germans;—an admirable foundation being laid for the more systematic research of the present day, in many elaborate papers preserved in the *Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres*.

of the mode, in which our religion has been transmitted to us—and a circumstance which makes it the natural ally and helper of mental progress—that its records are bound up with the history and literature of a strange people and a remote age, and that its sublime truths were originally delivered in languages, which have ceased to be spoken among men. The earnest and thoughtful—those more especially who feel themselves impelled to address their fellow men on the highest themes—are thus put, as it were, on a pilgrimage of mental toil, that they may bathe their thirsting lips in the fresh waters of inspiration as they gush from the native rock amidst the lofty, isolated peaks of divine truth ; and that renovating draught, and the healthful exercise which brings them to it, and the ever-widening prospects which open on them, as they climb the steep ascent—endue them with new vigour and deeper insight, and send them back, wiser and more far-seeing men, into the world of humanity below.

The mind of Europe, after the sleep of centuries, first awoke to the consciousness of its latent powers when the buried world of antiquity was once more laid bare to its view ; and though the contest which soon after arose, between the old and the new theology, gave an impulse to the researches of scholars on both sides, which no motive less intense than that of religion could have supplied—yet from that day to the present—a space exceeding three centuries, and distinguished by every attribute of intellectual superiority from the long period of slumberous faith and contracted vision that went before it—the highest mental cultivation of Europe has commenced, and been invariably connected, with the study of the authors of a departed literature—less, as we are sure every well-informed person will at once admit, from any actual amount of positive scientific instruction so conveyed (for the most advanced science of antiquity has scarcely furnished a basis for the science of modern times), than from the stimulating effect on the general action of the mind, produced by an almost constant comparison, in its train of habitual association, between the world actually lived in, and another, very different, made familiar to it through education and books.

It may be said, that old Greece offers an example of a people attaining a very high degree of civilisation, without

the knowledge of any by-gone culture to hold up a model or suggest a comparison. But the exception is more apparent than real; for the past which did not exist in history, was created by the imagination. The heroic world of fable supplied a contrast sufficiently sharp to the world of present fact, to furnish the kind of stimulus referred to; and it must be remembered, that the youthful mind of Greece was largely nourished by fable. The product, moreover, of this culture long partook more of the nature of poetry, than of science; which could hardly be said to have any existence till the time of Aristotle, when there was already an actual, clearly discerned past, with enough of history and literature, to exercise the mind in criticism and philosophical reflection.

It may be quite true, that classical studies, however much they may have helped to dissolve the spell, which held the mind in bondage to scholastic subtlety and priestly domination, and however valuable an element they may have formed, and may still form, in the general culture of the European mind—have occupied a disproportionate space in our systems of education, and must henceforward leave ampler room for pursuits more nearly related to the present wants of society;—it also seems reasonable, that mediæval literature and antiquities, in which we must look for the sources of our poetry and manners and forms of government and many of our existing opinions, and which are so deeply impregnated with the spirit of a faith, still acknowledged by us as divine—should engage a larger share of attention, and divert from heathen antiquity a portion of the literary industry which has been too exclusively devoted to it:—but we cannot subscribe to the utilitarian doctrine, that a literature is therefore unprofitable, and should be discarded from a course of liberal education, merely because it is ancient, and lies remote from the present ideas and uses of society; on the contrary, we are rather prepared to contend, that in the same degree, men's minds are drawn with increasing force towards the practical applications of modern science, and the vast possibilities of the future seize on all their faculties with a bewildering fascination, it becomes desirable to adjust the balance by weight thrown into the opposite scale, and to

fix the attention, especially in youth, on the earlier forms of human thought and action, and to exhibit the process through which society has slowly risen to its present elevated position—one age bound to another by a pervading moral principle of immutable obligation. Only in retaining old studies, we must not be fettered by old prejudices, but consider the larger demands now made by other objects on the mind, and the altered necessities of the age. Except where a particular language and literature have a direct bearing on the future vocation of an individual, or a language like the Latin stands, by a mere historical accident, in a most intimate relation to all the aids and sources of modern knowledge—the compulsory study of any portion of antiquity should not be made a fixed constituent of a liberal education, or be considered as alone entitled to the honours of learning; but the *whole* Past should be viewed as opening an immense and most interesting field of research—the various sections of which, Asiatic, Classical, and Medieval, ought each to be occupied by an appropriate class of cultivators, drawn to it by spontaneous choice and natural aptitude, and furnished with the suitable instruments of philology and criticism,—bringing forth and comparing the products of their respective inquiries, and placing them in definite and intelligible results before the general mind, to widen its views and enrich its accumulating treasure of experience.

What we have now said, relates to the influence of a knowledge and distinct consciousness of the Past on the general culture and enlightenment of public opinion. It might also be shown, did time permit, or the present subject require it—that a careful analysis of the operations of the human mind through another medium of expression than that which is habitually employed by the student—furnishes a most admirable discipline, calling forth and exercising the most diverse faculties, in the education of the individual. Circumstances may hitherto have unduly limited this discipline to the cultivation of two particular languages, which others, brought into closer connection with the actual wants of society, may hereafter be more largely associated with, or even in part supersede; but that some discipline of this kind is of the utmost im-

portance in the development of the youthful mind, we are persuaded that every one who has had any experience in education, will admit.

We have digressed almost unconsciously from the proper subject of the present article, and must return. The past which lies behind our modern civilisation, is complex—made up of Classical antiquity and the Medieval period, and the still remoter Orientalism of the Hebrews, which has mingled its influences with both; and if the whole of this vast background, on which are clearly drawn the grand outlines and indications of the divine economy, deserves our earnest and thoughtful contemplation—that portion of it, out of which our existing form of society has immediately emerged, the transmitted life of which is not yet extinct, but is still beating on in the inner depths of the European mind, must be entitled to even a closer inspection, and demands a more vivid realisation of its pervading spirit. Such a knowledge is indispensable to a full understanding of what society now is, of what it has been, and of what it has the inherent capacity to become.

Vico has made the observation, that the history of mankind seems to revolve in certain cycles, in which, after given intervals, the same or similar changes follow each other according to a prescribed law. It is certainly remarkable, that the two periods of the highest civilisation on record—the Classical, and the Modern European—have each been preceded by a state of society, in which the governing principle of the human mind was feeling, imagination and implicit faith, rather than reason and experience—in which its habitual aliment was fable rather than knowledge—and which, in reference to the views of the world which it held forth and called on men to adopt, may be called the *mythical*, as contra-distinguished from the *scientific*, age. The past, in the first ages of Greece, as during the Medieval period, was filled—not with the objects of clear, authenticated knowledge, but with the creations of fancy and the products of faith. There is a distinction, however, between these two corresponding periods of human development, which must not be overlooked. In the heroic world of Grecian fable, though there is probably in most cases a *substratum* of historical fact, it is next to impossible, from the absence of contem-

porary records, to discover what it is, and the antiquity which it represents vanishes away into intangible clouds; whereas, in the Middle Ages, though society was thrown back into its rudiments, and the antiquity which had gone before, was overcast with a shade—the dim consciousness of that antiquity was never utterly extinguished, and through the whole course of this period there ran an unbroken thread of contemporary history, encumbered, no doubt, with legend, and sometimes hidden for the moment under the accumulations of arbitrary fiction. In this case, therefore, it is less difficult than in the former, to separate history from imagination; and the sources of fabulous addition are also more accessible and obvious. Still the two periods throw light on each other, and help to explain the process that was equally operating in both; and in the work now under review, M. Maury has availed himself of principles already applied to the exposition of Eastern and Classical Mythology—to set in their proper light, and trace back to their suggesting element in the human mind, the immense mass of sacred legends which cover, as with a spontaneous growth, the entire tract of Medieval opinion and belief.

M. Maury's book discovers extensive research, and that enthusiasm for his subject, which is a condition of success, and without which the toil of accumulating his materials must have been insupportable. He appears to us to have taken his principles, at second hand, from the scholars of Germany, and to have applied them without any very profound reflection to the results of his Medieval research. They seem, in one word, rather to have been brought to his subject, than to have grown out of it. The influence of the Straussian criticism of the Christian records is perceptible throughout his performance.—But it is time that we gave some account of the mode in which he has treated his subject, and that we allowed him to speak for himself.

In collecting materials for an extensive work which he had projected, on the Symbolism of Christianity, he was struck with the obvious mixture of fact and fiction in the Medieval legends, and with the necessity for some definite criterion to distinguish them. The later editors of the *Lives of the Saints* had found it necessary, in deference to the more critical spirit of the age, to retrench much that

had been admitted into the earlier versions. But, in taking this course, they were evidently governed by no critical principle, and simply followed their feeling.

"Probability," he says, (Preface, p. iii.) "was their only guide. But it is not sufficient to reject. The facts rejected are too numerous, not to require a justification of their rejection. They are erroneous and fictitious: but still, what has given birth to so many errors and fictions?"

"These were the causes that it became necessary to inquire into. This inquiry was not made; men perhaps were on their guard against making it: but in depriving themselves of such a means of *exegesis*, they lost all certainty; and we must say, there is often no more reason for believing a particular fact, preserved by Butler," (author of the *Lives of the Saints*), "than some other, which he has purposely omitted. In the absence of all hermeneutic method, it would have been better, like the recent author of the *Life of St. Elizabeth of Hungary*, to reproduce ingenuously the original recital in all its candour and simplicity. We should at least have found in it a poetry, which has vanished from the modern composition, without any proportionate advantage being gained to truth."

Such is his statement of the feelings which led him to engage in the present inquiry.

In his Introduction, he contrasts the principles which governed the opinions and determined the belief of the classes in which the Christian faith first took root and spread, with those which now universally prevail among all educated men. What was once accepted in love and faith, without hesitation and distrust, in contempt of the vain science of the world—has passed into the schools, and become a subject of reasoning and criticism. Even in the Middle Ages, the scholastic philosophy which was something external to the religion of the people, was an intellectual training and discipline for the bolder spirit which came forth at the Reformation, and which has gone on increasing in its demands to the present day.

Thus the history of Christianity, according to him, traverses a curious cycle. It begins with disowning and despising science; it ends with seeking its aid and acknowledging its authority. This is a necessity forced upon it by the times; for the world is now governed by science.

Two preliminary observations are here necessary, to place the reader in the right point of view, for appreciating the spirit of M. Maury's work. His theory leads him to assume, that every assertion of the miraculous, as it implies a violation of the eternal order of the Universe, must have originated in imperfect knowledge, in the influence of the imagination, or in fiction; and he thus comprehends in one sweeping category—without making the discrimination, which facts, as we think, would of themselves suggest—the most simple and artless records of the wonder-working power of Jesus and the wildest legends circulated by Medieval superstition and imposture. At least, the reasoning which is openly applied in one case, is tacitly supposed referable to the other also. Again, throughout his book, there is a visible antagonism against the ecclesiastical spirit that is, at this time, using all its efforts to bring the mind of France once more under the yoke of ancient usages and beliefs. Something, therefore, must be allowed in his selection of instances and in his general conclusions, for the controversial purpose which actuates him.—But, with every deduction on both of these scores, there remains a large amount of ingenious and suggestive observation, sustained and illustrated by a great many very curious facts—to make his book well worth a careful perusal, and to entitle him to the thanks of every earnest searcher after truth.

The elementary principles to which he conceives the genesis of the Medieval legends may be reduced, and which furnish a rule of criticism for their interpretation—are three: (1.) the assimilation of the life of the Saint to that of Jesus Christ; (2.) a confounding together of the literal and the figurative sense; (3.) the explanation of symbols, whose original signification is forgotten, by arbitrary fiction or the alteration of facts. The proof and illustration of these principles furnish each the subject of a separate part of his volume. Of these parts we shall offer the reader a very brief analysis, interposing our own remarks as we proceed.

He observes—and we think with justice—at the opening of his first head, that the great idea of Christianity is the revelation of God's moral perfections in humanity, or, as the popular theology, without any scriptural precedent,

somewhat harshly and repulsively expresses it—the exhibition of the God-man—the holding up of Christ, as a perfect model and guide for the moral life of man. To be like Christ is the sign and assurance of salvation.—One of the most popular works towards the close of the Middle Ages, and still much read among the religious—was Thomas à Kempis's celebrated treatise, '*De Imitatione Christi.*' The pious reverence entertained for the founder of Christianity was extended to the most eminent of his followers, and all the principal members of his family—especially his mother: and the justification of this reverence was found in the assumed conformity of their lives and governing spirit to the faultless example of Christ. Zealous biographers—it may be, in the first instance, with a sincerely pious intent—failed not to develop this idea, and to supply from the suggestions of their kindled imagination, what was wanting in well-ascertained fact. The virtues and the miracles of Christ were equally transferred to his Saints.—This principle of assimilation to the life of Christ is copiously illustrated from the legends of the Middle Ages, and in the case of many of the miraculous incidents of his history;—as, for example, the annunciation of his birth, his power of fasting, his withering of trees by a word, sudden multiplication of the means of subsistence, walking on water, calming storms and tempests, and healing sickness and infirmity, through an agency in direct conflict with that of the Evil One—the resemblance, in all these instances, being far too minute and circumstantial, to admit the supposition, that the imitation was not designed. Resurrections are recorded, closely conformable to those of the Old and New Testament, even as late down as the life of St. Francis Xavier. Language occurs in this narrative, almost identical with that of Mary to Jesus, before the raising of Lazarus.

"A mother who had lost her daughter, and who, during the illness of the latter, had for a long time besought the Saint in vain—runs towards him, as soon as she knows he is returned, and throwing herself at his feet, bathed in tears,—says to him, almost in the very words of the Evangelist—'Master, my daughter would not have died, if you had been here.' Xavier yields to the prayers of the disconsolate mother, opens the tomb of the young girl, and orders the dead to come forth."—P. 22.

In general, however, it may be remarked, that miraculous narratives either cease altogether, or greatly diminish, in the lives of the more modern saints—except in the case of missionaries, like Xavier, who laboured in remote and barbarous regions.—Circumstances, connected with the passion of Christ, and the mysterious events intervening between it and the ascension, are, from a natural feeling of reverence, less frequently and distinctly imitated in the legends. This principle of conformity to the life of Christ was pushed to its furthest extreme in the narrations respecting St. Francis d'Assisi, the founder of the Franciscan order. A work was specially devoted to this subject, under the title of *Liber Conformitatum vitæ beati ac Seraphici patris Francisci, ad vitam J. C. domini nostri*. It is here shown, that the advent of St. Francis was announced by prophets; that he had twelve disciples, one of whom, John de Capella, was rejected by him, as Judas by Christ; that he was unsuccessfully tempted by the devil; that he was transfigured; and that he underwent the same passion with the Saviour.—His biographer goes so far as to assert in express terms, that the conformity of his life to that of Christ was such, that the Virgin herself, had she been capable of error, could hardly have distinguished him from her divine Son, and that he really was *Jesus Nazareus, rex Judæorum*. Nay, he was even exalted above Christ; for in the same work it is affirmed, that St. Francis healed many more diseases, and raised many more dead, than Christ; that whereas the latter was only transfigured once, the modern saint was transfigured twenty times; and that while Christ experienced the agony of his wounds for only a short space of time, St. Francis endured the pain of his during two entire years. In the seventeenth century, on the front of a conventual church at Rheims, the following words were inscribed,—*Deo homini, et beato Francisco, utrique crucifixo*.*

Other Scriptural personages besides Christ—especially the prophets Elijah and Elisha—are taken as models in the Medieval legends of Saints.—But nothing is more remarkable in these legends than the studied assimilation of the life of the Virgin to that of her Son. Side by side, they

* Pp. 26, 27, 28. In 1841 a new edition of the life of St. Francis d'Assisi was published at Avignon, in the preface to which it is declared, that all the miracles recorded of him are well attested.

represent respectively the types of *male* and of *female* perfection—the two elements into which the fundamental idea of Deity had been resolved.—The enthusiastic reverence for the Virgin which pervades the worship of the Middle Ages, may be accounted for from the common feelings of human nature. Women were proud of a female object of adoration, the model and patroness of the excellence of their sex; and men were won over to her devotion by a sentiment of chivalrous enthusiasm.—Through the whole of this extraordinary period, one great Biblical idea seemed to possess the mind, which it could not shake off—irresistibly modifying all its conceptions, and giving a particular form and colour to every narrative that passed into the literature of the time. Monks and clergymen were then the only historians; and the popular faith had a craving appetite for the marvellous, which it demanded should be satisfied. As the ideas of saint and hero were not very clearly discriminated, we find warriors and public men paralleled, in the chronicles of the age, with the personages of Scripture. We are told by William of Tyre, that, when the Crusaders appeared before Jerusalem, to deliver the Holy Sepulchre, many events occurred, like those which accompanied the death of Christ, and that the dead came out of their graves—amongst them, Adhémar, bishop of Puy—and showed themselves to numbers.*—This principle of assimilation, as a fertile source of legendary amplification, is borrowed from Strauss, who has freely applied it in his criticism of the Gospel narratives.

In his illustration of the two other principles, to which he refers the production of legends, M. Maury appears to us less clear and satisfactory, than in his treatment of the first. His general view, under the second head, is that the figurative expression of a moral or metaphysical truth has often been transformed by subsequent misconception into an historical fact, and so given birth to a legend. He takes, among others, the story of St. Christopher as an instance. In the popular belief, it was conceived thus: St. Christopher was a Canaanite of immense strength, originally called Offerus, who had resolved he would obey no master but one stronger than himself. He passed into the service, first of a king,

* P. 42.

and then of Satan; but finding the latter tremble at a cross by the side of the way, he determined to seek the Christ whom Satan acknowledged as his superior. He withdrew into a wilderness, and, to prepare for his conversion, at the advice of a hermit, he undertook to convey all travellers who offered themselves, on his shoulders across a torrent, which flowed down near the dwelling of the hermit. One evening, he heard a small voice, soliciting his aid; and issuing from his hut, perceived a young child, whom he placed on his shoulders, and dashed at once into the torrent. But finding the child become every instant heavier and heavier,—before he reached the middle of the stream, his prodigious strength failed him, and he sank. The child then exclaimed, ‘Christophor, Christophor,’ (i. e. Carrier of Christ,) ‘for that is the name which thou deservest, be not concerned, that thou canst not carry the world and him who made it.’

“The name, Christophorus,” says our author, (p. 55,) “contains the whole germ of this fable. We ought to carry Christ, that is to say, have the thought of him always in our heart, and his name upon our lips.* Here is the origin of the history of Offerus carrying Christ. He alone is truly strong, who refers his strength to God; for God is strength. This Christian truth, taken literally, has led to the conception of St. Christopher—i. e. the personification of him who carries Christ,—as a giant of prodigious strength. The different masters, whose service the Saint successively enters, have been imagined, in order to illustrate the precept, that all real power comes from Christ; that no one is strong, but he who submits to Christ. The child Jesus is stronger than the strongest of the earth; another precept, suggesting the idea of the Saint sinking under the weight of the divine infant.”†

Luther denied the historical existence of St. Christopher, and gave another interpretation to the fable. According to him, the Saint is the type of the Christian—the torrent, of the world—the staff on which he leans, of the word of God.

* “Portate Deum in corpore vestro.” 1 Cor. vi. 20. Vulgate. Prosper of Aquitaine has adopted the expression: “Portate Christum in corde vestro tanquam thesaurum.” And a later writer, quoted by Maury, (n. 2. p. 55,) still more distinctly says: “Quid est Deum portare? Imaginem dei representare, Christum imitari.”

† P. 56, 57.

In the same spirit, Maury conceives, that the stories of the miraculous efficacy ascribed to the Cross, of bodily resurrections, of the cures of blindness, deafness and leprosy, and, *vice versâ*, of sudden inflictions of the same—of the budding of rods and the springing of flowers—and of the multiplication of money in the hand of a saint—all originated in metaphorical forms of expression, which were afterwards misunderstood, and turned into fact.

This principle is probably applicable to a considerable extent; but M. Maury uses it, in our judgment, too vaguely and indiscriminately. Much of the miraculous which appears in these legends, belonged, we have no doubt, to the narrative in its earliest form, and, at the suggestion of the scriptural models, was a direct product of imagination and faith. Some of these figures were adopted into the Art of the Middle Ages, and so acquired an additional hold on the mind. For example, among the early Christians, the Balance was a symbol of the Last Judgment, and was, in this sense, often depicted in their burial-places. It was afterwards placed by Christian artists in the hand of the archangel Michael, who was supposed to have charge of departing spirits and the disposal of their ultimate fate. Hence a source of legends connected with his name.

Symbols are considered by our author, as a third source of legends. Symbols relate less to words than to things, the idea of which they strive to embody and fix in the mind, not directly and by simple representation, but through the medium of some assumed analogy. Simple representation is the lowest and most elementary mode of communicating instruction. When the mind is in a transition state, and feeling its way towards the conception of abstract truth, symbols come to its aid.

The representations on the tombs of the first Christians were chiefly symbolical, conveying a mystic reference to the principal doctrines of their faith. The Dove, the Fish, the Anchor, the Pelican, &c.—were of this description.* In process of time, when uncultivated barbarians were converted by wholesale to Christianity, the symbolical meaning, preserved without difficulty in the small,

* See Münter, Sinnbilder und Kunstorstellungen der alten Christen.

select body of the first believers, was lost ; and with the increased application of a rude art, as the means of popular instruction, the primitive image, which was rather a hint, than the complete expression of a thought, was expanded, and the representations became fuller and more strictly pictorial. Symbols were either transformed into histories, or kept their place mysteriously by the side of them, as in the symbol of the Lamb attached to our Saviour's person, and in the symbols of the four Evangelists. The Churches became, in time, a great embodiment of history and symbolism—in the striking language of M. Maury, "*un vaste livre de pierre, dont toutes les pages étaient ouvertes à la fois, pour qu'on y pût lire à loisir la loi de Dieu et l'histoire du Christ.*"—(P. 107.)

The presence of God was originally indicated by a Hand ; he was then,—in his intercourse with human beings, as described in the Old Testament,—depicted under a human form : but the visible exhibition of God, in his divine essence, was not attempted before the eleventh and twelfth centuries, when he was represented as arrayed in pontifical robes, seated on a throne, with a crown on his head, and a sceptre in his hand. These anthropomorphic ideas of God were cherished by the mysteries and miracle plays, that were performed in the Churches and Monasteries.—We may notice the progress towards anthropomorphism in the representations of the Trinity. This mystery was first expressed by an union of the Symbols of the *Hand*, the *Lamb* and the *Dove*. Next, we have the Father, as an old man, with the infant Jesus on his knees, and the Holy Spirit still represented by the Dove. Later, the three persons are depicted, sometimes as three human beings of equal age, size and beauty ; but more frequently the Father is distinguished by the marks of greater age. In a manuscript of the fifteenth century, the Trinity is represented by three men, each clad in a tunic ; the Holy Spirit in the centre, under the form of a beardless young man, his nimbus surmounted by the Dove ; on his right, the Father crowned with the tiara, and bearing a globe surmounted with the cross ; on his left, Jesus Christ, holding the cross. On other occasions, we meet with the Virgin seated between the Father and the Son, and the Holy Spirit hovering over them in the figure of a dove.

At last, the feeling of reverence being to all appearance completely exhausted, the artists fell into the gross and monstrous representations, against which the Chancellor Gerson lifted up his voice.*

M. Maury then shows, how the various objects of the early symbolism—the Serpent, the Lion, the Stag and Unicorn, the Ass, the Swine, &c.—with the votive offerings in the Churches, and the prodigies and curiosities—such as fossil bones, which, according to ancient usage, were deposited there—gave occasion to legends, which gathered into them, as they spread, all kindred elements—and were enlarged and altered at each successive repetition. From the twelfth to the sixteenth century, we mark the increasing prevalence of the fantastic and extravagant in Christian Art. With the revival of ancient learning, heathen ideas introduced themselves; and in some of the works produced under this influence—as in the well-known Dance of Death—we may discern already that latent spirit of *moquerie* and scepticism which marks the advent of great social change. In the sixteenth century, Art departed altogether from the old hieratic type, and assumed that individual character, which took from its creations the religious influence which they had hitherto exercised.

We have barely opened a subject, under the guidance of M. Maury, upon which our present limits forbid us to enlarge; but to which, as it is full of interest and pregnant with suggestion, we may probably return on a future occasion, and which, we are sure, every one who would understand the manifold working of Christianity, and its deep significance among the great facts of human history, will do well to meditate with candour and thoughtfulness.

In his last chapter, our author goes into the question of authenticity and the value of testimony. It is hardly necessary to add, that his conclusions are, in every instance, against the reality of any miraculous facts, however fully attested—and that in these conclusions he embraces the primitive documents of Christianity as well as the legends of the Middle Ages. From his judgment respecting the

* Pp. 121, 22, 23, with the notes.

former, we have already expressed our dissent ; he appears to us to fail in a due discrimination of the two cases : but the question would lead us into a new field of argument, and is far too important to be summarily disposed of, at the end of a brief article mainly devoted to another subject.

ART. IV.—THE TRUE GRANDEUR OF NATIONS.

The True Grandeur of Nations. An Oration; by Charles Sumner, Esq., Boston, Massachusetts. (Delivered before the Authorities of the city of Boston, on the anniversary of the Declaration of American Independence, July 4th, 1845.) Republished in London: William Smith, Fleet Street. 1846.

WHEN we consider at how recent a time most unnatural and deadly hostilities with the United States of North America threatened this country, and how few among our Trans-Atlantic kinsmen dared to lift up their voices against the warlike spirit which had unhappily attained a political predominance, we feel that a debt of gratitude is owing to every American citizen who in the last year publicly protested in favour of peace, and denounced the profligate and inhuman spirit of territorial aggrandizement. Mr. Sumner spoke with an immediate practical object, and with the actual position of the United States filling his view. This alone enables us to forgive his extravagant overstatements and oftentimes fanatical declamation: for without such extravagance, the masses are not to be moved; and wise men lose their calmness and their measured tone, when great interests are at stake. Much less is it worth while to censure the flighty and flowery tone pervading the discourse, which is to be ascribed in part perhaps to the American atmosphere, in part to the character of the anniversary on which this oration was delivered. But because of the extreme importance of the subject, we deprecate all overstatement of the arguments, which occasions a waste of moral power and valuable enthusiasm on the part of the advocates of peace, lays them open to the dangerous, because just, assaults of ridicule, and alienates from their co-operation thousands of humane, able, but practical men. For these reasons we are desirous of analyzing the subject, following partly in Mr. Sumner's steps, who, in the beginning of his oration, aims to guard against one-sidedness, and does not profess to espouse (what is called) the extreme Quaker view. In a preliminary letter, he distinctly avows that "Force *may* be employed under the sanction of Justice, in the conservation

of the laws, and of domestic quiet." Elsewhere he expresses (p. 54) a decided approval of maintaining an armed navy, "as a part of the *police* of the seas, to purge them of pirates, and, above all,* to defeat the hateful traffic in human flesh." So too, in p. 4, where he has said, "*In our age* there can be no peace that is not honourable, there can be no war that is not dishonourable," he subjoins the following note:—

"It will be observed that this proposition is restrained to *our age*. It is not intended to express any opinion with regard to the past, and particularly with regard to the war of the Revolution. Wars are the natural consequence of the predominance of the animal part of our nature; but the day has now arrived in which we should *declare independence* of the bestial propensities, and recognise the supremacy of the moral and intellectual faculties."

In p. 7 he appears to approve of "defensive wars," when really such; "but" he adds,—

"A close consideration of the subject will make it apparent, that no war *can* arise among Christian nations, at the present day, except to determine an asserted right. The wars usually and falsely called *defensive* are of this character."

Accordingly, he defines War, in the only form in which it can possibly *now* arise among *Christian* nations, to be "A public armed contest between nations, in order to establish JUSTICE between them," and this he compares to the 'ordeal of battle' in the Middle Ages. Nevertheless, after thus approving (as we had supposed) of war when it is *really* defensive, and allowing that in other ages than ours such wars have existed, we find his whole oration to be against all war whatsoever. For instance, he has (in p. 30) these emphatic words in italics,—"*Christianity forbids war in all cases.*" Mr. Sumner must be quite aware that by far the greatest part of the world is in *our age* in the very same state as in former ages, and his horizon of vision must be limited to England and the United States, when he alleges that no defensive war can possibly now exist.

* We by no means wish to pledge ourselves to this *above all*. Much as we abhor the slave-trade, the mischievous and cruel results of trying to put it down by force, seem to call for a careful reconsideration of the fundamental principle.

Even so, how he can maintain his position is to us very obscure.

Our Christianity did not prevent our engaging in four severe wars in as many years, not one of which can possibly approve itself to Mr. Sumner as defensive:—the war of Syria, that against Affghanistan, that against China, and finally the war in which we subjugated Scinde. How then is he certain that his nation cannot have to engage in defensive war? If he reply, "Her strength forbids it, other great nations are not so mad," we fully admit this; but the argument would lose a large part of its weight, if his countrymen took his advice, permanently to disband the militia, do away with their ships of war and small standing army, dismantle their fortifications, and melt up their cannon.

Again, Mr. Sumner must know very well that the demand of Oregon was at first a mere election-cry, yet it has gone nigh to precipitate his nation into a war with Great Britain. We will not here discuss the propriety of our defending the rights of our hunters in Oregon; but proceed to observe that *Canada* also has already more than once been made an election-cry, by those who wished to outbid the stale claim of Oregon. It is not extravagant to imagine that if we had yielded up all the Oregon territory, the ambition of his people might be inflamed for the conquest of Canada, in which case, surely, he must admit, that if we repelled the invasion our war would be *defensive*. The truth of his proposition can only be saved by so limiting the word "Christian" as to make it a truism, nor is it clear how many nations in the world Mr. Sumner regards as Christians. For instance, is not Mexico engaged in defensive war, at this moment, against the United States, whose troops have invaded her country? or will he reply that Mexico is not a Christian state? To say that the *invader* is not Christian, would be more to the point.

All this is exceedingly weak, if regarded as an argument addressed to mankind at large. Whatever strength it has, is due to the fact that it is spoken to citizens of the great North American Republic. Two great nations in the world—China was, until very lately, a third—enjoy the great privilege of being quite beyond the necessity of war, so that it can befall them only through their own wilful

wickedness—we mean France and the United States. Their dominions are so compact, as to leave nothing vulnerable. They have no distant and petty dependencies to protect.* France is touched by nations separately far weaker than herself, and unable to combine against her, except when forced into union by her aggressions. The events of her great Revolution were exceptions, and are never likely to recur. Whether Mr. Sumner holds France to be a Christian nation, we cannot judge; but there is no nation in Europe which could so certainly, if she pleased, enjoy undisturbed peace, without the most remote danger of being forced into defensive war. The United States are similarly circumstanced, for although they lie in contact with many wild tribes of the continent, these have long since fatally learned the white man's strength, and will never volunteer aggressive hostilities. Besides, of all savage nations,—indeed, we believe, of all known nations whatsoever, unless it be the Turks,—none observe treaties more faithfully than the American Indians. No dark plots and conspiracies are to be feared from them, as long as the white men act an honourable part; and this gave the Quakers of Pennsylvania an inestimable advantage, while carrying out their humane principles towards their wild neighbours. It is most true, that the United States have only to will peace, and by a very moderate exertion of wisdom, peace they will command. The same would be true of England, if she had no possessions out of Europe; but on this point all turns.

We exceedingly differ from Mr. Sumner as to his invidious interpretation of the term *national honour*, which he wishes to explode altogether. The case is, we submit, exactly the same as with personal honour. There are coxcombs and bullies who often fancy they are insulted, and pick a quarrel in defence of what they call their honour; but we cannot infer that there is no such thing as dishonour to be feared from too passive a submission to injury. If a man is walking in the streets with his wife, and a ruffian attacks her, we hold that it would be a deep dishonour in him not to defend her; and if occasion required, he must defend her with as much "hoar's" or "lion's" might as he can sum-

* In strictness, *Martinique*, *Guadeloupe*, *French Guiana*, and the *Isle of Bourbon*, are exceptions; but unimportant in a general view.

mon into his frame. Mr. Sumner injures his case by the superfluity of learning, with which he proves from Homer and Shakespeare that a man in battle degrades himself into a wild beast. Of course he does; though it is a great misfortune, he must so do if he is to fight at all: and that this is sometimes a duty, Mr. Sumner does not deny. That a policeman must fight against robbers, a sloop of war against pirates, he allows without reserve. But to return. As honour may force a man to fight in defence of his wife or of his child, so may honour force a powerful state to go to war for the protection of its dependencies or subjects. The weaker the object defended, the stronger is the appeal to honour. Mr. Sumner therefore by no means gains from the argument, "*Of what use has the war been?*" as if rescue from attack, and security for the future, were not sufficient *use*.—To take his own illustration. Some five-and-thirty years ago, the French nation, being at war with England, exercised its belligerent right (as the phrase is) of hindering neutral powers from trading with England. The English retaliated, with far greater power to enforce their determination by sea; and the neutrals, one and all, suffered severe losses in their trade. The weaker states at once withdrew from the effort, but the spirit of America did not so easily submit to what she regarded as the dictation of England, and when her merchant ships fell into the hands of our cruisers, a new mortification awaited her in our claiming our own seamen, as many as we found on board of her vessels. This was, in itself, no aggression upon her, and was a most natural and consistent proceeding on our part, when, through want of seamen, we were violently impressing our own people at home. But the Americans have made a law, without consulting us, that any persons (British subjects or others) who reside a certain time among them are *their* citizens: and consequently it was impossible for us to reclaim our men without offending their national pretensions. Besides this, no skill on the part of our officers could save them from mistaking *native* members of the republic, children of those whose independence we had acknowledged, for British subjects; and considering the despotic power which our captains possessed, and our strong demand for sailors, there can be

little doubt that we really impressed many genuine American citizens. We have recounted the case thus at large, to show how complicated and difficult it was. Mr. Sumner informs us that "the greatest number of American seamen ever officially alleged to be compulsorily serving in the British navy was about eight hundred," and infers, that his country ought not to have made war upon us *for anything so small*. We do not understand this arithmetic. To us it seems to be a question of principle, depending on its liability to repetition, as well as on the moral features of the case. If we had landed on the coast of New Rhodes, and carried off five hundred seamen to serve as sailors, Mr. Sumner surely holds that a war to recover them or to forbid repetition of the outrage would be defensive; yet he might still urge that it was better to allow 500 men to be made slaves, and say no more about it, than "doom the whole country for three years to the blight of war." "Our commerce," says he, "was driven from the seas; the resources of the land were drained by taxation; villages on the Canadian frontier were laid in ashes; the metropolis of the Republic was captured, while gaunt distress raged everywhere within our borders." Finally, America was glad to make peace with us, when our contest against France was terminated, without obtaining on our part any guarantee or promise that we would not renew our impressments if like circumstances should recur. From this Mr. Sumner proves logically enough, by the confession of his own government, whose words he quotes, that "*The United States had appealed to arms in vain.*" It is a good *argumentum ad hominem* against the secretary who penned the despatch, making such guarantee on our part a condition of peace; but it does not persuade us that the war was really in vain. America ought not to have attacked us: this we most assuredly believe; but *not* because 800 men were too small a consideration. If neutrality was impossible, a far more reasonable and just conduct would have been to declare war against France,—whose decrees had been the first offence,—after stipulating with us, that we should abandon our claims of impressment in case of her so doing. But she remembered with gratitude the aid given her by France against us, and she despised us as

a beaten foe,* and little did she imagine that while our main efforts were engaged against our neighbouring antagonist, we could by a left hand stroke, and without any loss sensible to the nation, inflict on a Trans-Atlantic power, sufferings so severe ; sufferings, the effects of which were felt for many years by an infantine republic. Her passions impelled her into that war, and this was the fault. She did not make allowance for our difficulties, and for the sincere intentions of our government to claim none but our own seamen. But we say, if we had knowingly and manifestly carried off 800 native Americans, if we had refused redress, and shown a disposition to repeat the offence, the smallness of the number is not to the purpose. The *national honour* is involved in protecting individuals and weak dependencies ; and if this is a mere name, then *virtue* and *justice* are mere names.

Nor is it true that America gained nothing ; although what she gained would have been purchased far more cheaply by greater wisdom and moderation : but she has prominently brought forward *the rights of neutrals*, so as either to hinder future European war, or, probably, to make it less mischievous to neutral countries. Powerful states, when involved in war, treat *belligerent rights* as the only ones which deserve consideration. This might be correct, if a war were decreed against an offending power, by the judicial sentence of a tribunal which represented the interests of all the great nations of the world. In such case, the neutrals would be really or virtually represented in the Congress ; or at any rate, they would be situated as individuals in a community, whose neighbour falls under the sentence of the law to their great inconvenience. My lawyer may be arrested for a crime, when his aid is of the utmost importance to me ; or my banker may be suspected of holding forged notes, and a seal may be put on his whole establishment ; and meanwhile, I cannot get money to pay my creditors. Now in fact, the war against Napoleon, though not decreed by a Congress, was, more

* We could not conquer our colonies at *first*, because we were too merciful to proceed to extremities ; like the Dutch against Brussels : *afterwards*, because the great Whig party, in jealousy of the increasing power of the Crown, would not allow of a conquest which it would need a standing army to hold.

decidedly than any war in all European history, waged by the will and sentence of all the nations of Europe,—(except unhappy Poland, who hoped restitution from him!) and this was a new ground why America ought to have borne her wrongs and losses from us more meekly. Not but that we were probably overbearing enough, when we could appeal to Grotius, Puffendorf, &c., on *belligerent rights*; for these great writers, we understand, treat every independent state as having an undoubted right, of its own judgment, to decree war on any other state, and then to expect from neutrals tame submission to any amount of loss, which may be requisite for an efficient prosecution of the war. The most common form of it is in the stoppage of maritime commerce. A more horrible illustration is in the blockade of Genoa, of which Arnold, and now Mr. Sumner, have given so affecting details.

The outline of the facts is as follows: The French general, escaping with his army from Austrian pursuit, throws himself into the neutral city of Genoa. The Genoese have no force to resist him: the Austrians attack the walls in vain; and call on the British fleet to co-operate by blockading the city by sea. The French general takes all the provisions of the town for his own soldiers, so that there is no chance of starving the French until numbers of the innocent Genoese shall have first perished by the most awful of deaths. The city is at length captured by this inhuman means; the French troops are saved *with the honours of war*, not until twenty thousand hapless Genoese, old and young, women and children, whom we ought rather to have protected against the French, have died by starvation. This is just and justifiable by the (so-called) Laws of War, which systematically confiscate the rights of neutrals.*

The behaviour of belligerents towards peaceful merchantmen on the high seas is in strange contrast to the prevailing mercy towards the unarmed population of a hostile country. Mr. Sumner speaks of it as an established practice, (we wish it were universal!) for an invading army

* Arnold can find no remedy, but to permit the whole population of a town so circumstanced, to retire unmolested!—a gracious privilege; which, as Mr. Sumner observes, would equally doom a majority to perish by starvation or other suffering.

to respect private property to such an extent as to pay for all that men or horses need. A general who should trample down and burn the country would in these days be regarded as a monster of atrocity; yet as long as the capturing or driving off merchant ships is approved, we are forced to infer that forbearance in the other case is not through humanity, but from a view to selfish objects,—viz., better to secure supplies of provisions, and to avoid rousing the spirit of the peasants. In like manner, then, if belligerent states find that they bring on themselves the indignation of neutrals by their outrages on them at sea, it is likely to enforce on them greater moderation; as we trust the future will show, if our better hope is not fulfilled, that no general maritime war will be any longer possible.

A like view we think must be taken, in retrospect, of the other calamitous wars which have been waged, especially in the last two or three centuries. They were shocking and hateful: most of them were caused by guilt or ignorance on both sides, and they are not for a moment to be defended: yet they have *not* been fruitless. Mr. Sumner says:—

“The fruitlessness and vanity of war appear in the *results* of the great wars by which the world has been lacerated. After long struggles, in which each nation has inflicted and received incalculable injury, peace has been gladly obtained on the basis of the condition of things before the war; *status ante bellum*.”—P. 13.

In other words, the resistance has effected all that it aimed at: when this happens, the war has fulfilled a great service, though perhaps at a dreadful price. It has manifested the impossibility of foreign conquest, and has under severe penalties taught each nation to tolerate the existence of its neighbour. This is a fundamental condition, without which there can be no permanent stability of anything good or great. The dreadful contests for empire which have desolated Europe in past ages, are the price paid by past generations for the brighter hopes of the present: and however horrible the details of battle, (such as Mr. Sumner has well amassed, in hope of appalling men who have little realized what war means,) yet history declares that the permanent evils produced by war, when conquest does not follow, are slight in comparison to those inflicted by unjust laws and bad government. What has

ruined Italy and Spain?—internal mis-government; and foreign war has had its *worst* result in hindering the establishment of wiser institutions.

The incessant wars of the Greek republics did not hinder their increasing in numbers, wealth and strength; so that in Demosthenes' day Greece was stronger in men and money and in all physical supplies than she had ever been: but from the moment she lost her liberty under Alexander the Great, she began to decline, so that the Romans found her greatly emaciated: and the fall which domestic tyrannies had begun, a purely foreign despotism rapidly precipitated. Precisely the same remarks apply to Italy, which has twice over had the same experience. Abounding in population in its early times of turbulence, it became comparatively a desert under Roman despotism. Again in the middle ages it became flourishing and famous; but under despotism it sunk into a weakness which an habitual state of war at the doors had not been able to inflict. So too, the wars of the French revolution during seven years of unparalleled exertion left France more prosperous than they found her: and after the gigantic efforts of fourteen years more, under a despotism which with all its severity was popular, France was immeasurably better off than under Louis XVI. Before her great revolution, disastrous as were her wars, these were not her worst curse, but the laws which forbade industry and pampered idle licentiousness.

These are topics which it would have been quite irrelevant for Mr. Sumner to insist upon. He was addressing a free people, whose personal rights and industrious energies receive the fullest possible respect from their public institutions; and who seem not fully to know their happiness in being free from the scourge of war. He fitly therefore launches forth in floods of eloquence and with versatile erudition on the dreadful subject; and, as we have said, we respect and value his exertions. Nevertheless, his is *not* the point of view from which, as we apprehend, a student of human nature, a historian, or (we will add) an English statesman, can survey the whole subject.

To begin from the beginning: it appears to us that a most mistaken use is made of the text *Resist not evil*, as if it meant to forbid our defending *others* who are suffering

wrong. We may forgive a personal wrong; we may decline to revenge a blow personally offered; but we cannot give away other men's rights, or refuse to succour the oppressed, under pretence of forgiving the oppressor. To hold that Christ meant this, is to hold that he taught an immoral doctrine, opposed to the first principles of right and conscience; and it is useless to quote revelation against such primary truth. Any attempt on the part of a community to act on such principles is inconceivable. According to this, no magistrate can employ a police force in repressing crime; which is to abdicate the functions of magistracy as recognized in the New Testament. But there are some who say, that a Christian ought to *submit* indeed to the laws, and be glad of their protection; but ought to refuse to execute them when the execution requires the use of force. This is to say,—that he should be glad to have others perform the useful work which his conscience will not let *him* perform in person. Yet what right has *he* to claim exemption from disagreeable service on the ground of Christianity? If he is to share the benefits, he must share the burdens of the community. In easy, quiet times, this Quaker doctrine is harmless, because so few receive it: but in any wide-spread popular riot, such as burst on the manufacturing towns of the north in 1842, the case is very different. No individual householder is then allowed to shrink from personal exertion: to plead for exemption on conscientious grounds is anything but honourable, however it may be palliated and pitied as a weakness generated by education in a highly respectable sect.

But if it be admitted that force may and ought to be used by the magistrate to put down domestic violence, none will hesitate to infer that he is equally bound to resist violence offered by a foreigner. If a fleet of Morocco or Greek corsairs were to descend on our coasts, no man who concedes that highwaymen ought to be repressed by force would deny that we ought to resist the pirates. Here then we have a clear admission that war, when *really* defensive, is justifiable; or rather, is a duty on the part of the magistrate: and if so, it is the duty of the subjects and citizens to assist him. To draw appalling scenes of bloody battle, which may rise out of resistance, is not to the purpose. Sentimental persons have tried to make us con-

demn the conduct of our commanders in the battle of Sobraon, who slaughtered the enemy for two hours together while crossing the Sutlej. But the fault lies on the head of the invader. *If* the war with us was purely defensive, (as we fully believe it to have been,) the invaders, one and all, *deserved* to pay their lives as a forfeit: and every one of them would have freely confessed, that if slain in open fight, he would have no complaint against us. The sole question that remained was, how many we could purposely allow to escape, without danger of prolonging the war and causing bloodshed to our own troops or ruin to our dependents. This is a purely military, not a moral, question; about which, after the dreadful losses suffered by our own armies, it is absurd for the public to criticise a military man.

Viewed then as an argument on the *general* question, we deprecate these hideous pictures of human misery consequent on a battle, as tending to impress the passions and bias the judgment. Those miseries are short, and affect but a small fraction of a population. They are not to be set in the balance of *reason* against the evils of losing national independence, to a people internally well-governed; yet they affect the *imagination* more, because so many sharp sufferings are brought into a heap and placed in open day.

With the inconsistency which pervades his whole address, Mr. Sumner, who approves of defence against pirates, quotes, with high approbation, the following sentimental tale from Mrs. Child's *Letters from New York*; [Note F, p. 98;] on which we intend to ground various remarks:—

“I have somewhere read of a regiment ordered to march into a small town and take it. I think it was in the Tyrol: but wherever it was, it chanced that the place was settled by a colony who believed the Gospel of Christ, and proved their faith by works. A courier from a neighbouring village informed them, that troops were advancing to take the town. They quietly answered, ‘If they will take it, they must.’ Soldiers soon came riding in, with colours flying, and fifes piping their shrill defiance. They looked round for an enemy, and saw the farmer at his plough, the blacksmith at his anvil, and the women at their churns and spinning wheels, babies crowded to hear the music, and the boys ran out to see the pretty

trainers, with feathers and bright buttons, the harlequins of the nineteenth century : of course none of these were in a proper position to be shot at. 'Where are your soldiers?' they asked.—'We have none,' was the brief reply. 'But we have come to take the town.'—'Well, friends; it is before you.' 'But is there nobody to fight?'—'No, we are all Christians.'

"Here was an emergency altogether unprovided for; a sort of resistance which no bullet could hit; a fortress perfectly bomb proof. The commander was perplexed. 'If there is nobody to fight with, of course we cannot fight,' said he: 'it is impossible to take such a town as this.' So he ordered his horses' heads to be turned about, and they carried the human animals out of the village, as guiltless as they entered, and perchance somewhat wiser.

"*This experiment on a small scale indicates how easy it would be to dispense with armies and navies, if men only had faith in the religion which they profess to believe.* When France lately reduced her army, England immediately did the same; for the existence of one army creates the necessity for another, unless men are safely ensconced in the bomb-proof fortress above mentioned."

So many and different thoughts crowd upon us, on considering the truth and error, the good and bad tendencies, mingled in this passage, that we have difficulty in disentangling them, so as not to mislead a reader as to our own sentiments. We have an unlimited faith in the power of pure moral influence, consistently exerted through an adequate length of time, to subdue brute force and passion, and assume a kind of divine authority. In so far as the account (history or parable, whichever it is,) inculcates this lesson, we warmly approve of it. Equally as to the practical question—"Might the United States safely and wisely diminish their standing armed force?" it is quite possible that Mrs. Child and Mr. Sumner are correct: hence the immediate tendency of such arguments on their own people may be beneficial. But in order that moral force may be as influential as the tale implies, it must ordinarily have been in exercise for a long time, and by its consistency and permanence have won respect and admiration: the immediate effect of such conduct as is described, on gross and worldly natures, is to produce mere surprise and contempt, and, if leisure permit, a wanton wish to make practical trial whether the non-resistance is genuine or a mere pretence. Happy exceptions there may be, as in the behaviour of the grave and noble-minded children of North

America towards Penn and his followers, (whose superiority in all art and knowledge is not to be left out, in reckoning the forces which acted on the Indian mind,) but as a general rule, infinite experience proves that to conquer violence by pure moral influence is a process of intense suffering to those who undertake it. An individual strong in faith and deliberately choosing for himself the course of the martyr, as the highest mode of acting, may consistently oppose meekness and passiveness to raging passion: and if, as is probable, he should be cut off prematurely, he often purchases a milder lot for his successors, should kindred spirits follow in his steps. Thus the Moravians and the Quakers in their earlier generations underwent severe persecution, until the persecutor gave up his attempts;—in the same spirit as a man who should have tried to train cats to guard the house like a dog, after flogging and killing a dozen of the poor animals, would at last desist, and having learned the cat's nature, be satisfied to leave it a cat. Just so, the great powers of the world have come to look on Moravians, and similar sects, as a sort of female population, and no longer dream of forcing them into battle: but they nevertheless take possession of them and of their property, and whenever occasion requires, know how to make them useful for military purposes. It is a great mistake to suppose that any softening moral influence has been felt, from conduct which appears to them only a whimsical fanaticism. If Mrs. Child's story is true, the military commander had, just then, other work on his hand; and thought it needless to lose his time upon a population, all whose good things might at any moment be leisurely secured.

But we deeply object to the tone of the narrator and the moral which she deduces, because it tends to make men imagine that the path she recommends is easy and comfortable, instead of being the path of martyrdom: this is a most grave fault. Moreover, whether it would be *lawful* for a community tamely to endure that which wanton invaders have ten thousand times inflicted on a helpless population, we hold to be more than doubtful, except where non-resist-

* It is obvious that these townsmen are supposed totally indifferent to the tie of *country*, unconscious of duties towards a king or fellow-citizens, willing to be transferred to the hands of every potentate in turn. But it is impossible to notice more than a fraction of what is here to be said.

ance should be dictated by manifest physical weakness, and where an opposite conduct would only exasperate.

Mr. Sumner indeed furnishes us with a business-like proof from real life, that non-resistance is the safest and most comfortable, as well as cheapest, method. He quotes, as decisive, the following passage from Mr. Jay:—

“The expert swordsman, the practised marksman, is ever more ready to engage in personal combats, than the man who is unaccustomed to the use of deadly weapons. In those portions of our country where it is supposed essential to personal safety to go armed with pistols and bowie-knives, mortal affrays are so frequent as to excite but little attention, and to secure, with rare exceptions, impunity to the murderer: whereas, at the North and East, where we are unprovided with such facilities for taking life, comparatively few murders of the kind are perpetrated. *We might indeed safely submit the decision of the principle we are discussing, to the calculations of pecuniary interest.* Let two men, equal in age and health, apply for an insurance on their lives; one known to be ever armed to defend his honour and his life against every assailant, and the other a meek, unresisting Quaker. Can we doubt for a moment which of these men would be deemed by the Insurance Company, most likely to reach a good old age?”

The argument is excellent, in favour of the great states lessening their standing armies by agreement: which is in part acted on, and we trust will be still more. But when the safety of the Quaker's life is adduced in proof of the safety of non-resistance as a universal principle, the fallacy is glaring. The Quaker's life and property are safe, because the magistrate defends them with weapons of war.* The man who wears arms shows his intention to depend, not on the magistrate, but on himself. Thus the decision of the Insurance Company will merely indicate, that they believe the collective and orderly force of the community, wielded by the magistrate, to be more trustworthy than private force: besides that (under such circumstances), the

* Just so, in Europe, little states can afford to be unarmed, because the greater states, in mutual rivalry, protect them. We know of an enthusiastic preacher, who made a rule of spending all his money every week, and *proved* that this was “the way of faith” by the weekly supplies with which he was infallibly furnished. But if all did the same, and none laid up anything in store, millions would starve at the first bad harvest: in fact, poverty would be universal and unconquerable.

very fact of wearing arms indicates a quarrelsome temper. But Messrs. Jay and Sumner ought to prove, that if no police force existed, and no magisterial authority were even pretended, (which is the international position,—unfortunately,) the unarmed man would *then* be safer than the armed. Yet in truth no analogy can be obtained from such cases, because the mind reverts to a state of barbarism and equal poverty. On the contrary, every great and civilised nation is (compared with savages) industrious and unwarlike, and its vast wealth makes it a mark for savage cupidity. If we can conceive for a moment a nation like England acting on the non-resisting principle, she would be a bait to spoilers, just as the Roman Empire in its decline was to the Northern Barbarians, when imperial jealousy kept the provinces unarmed, and sudden reasons of state called the armies away. Many an innocent town-population was then massacred in cold blood by a sudden incursion. The infinite riches of the provinces lured the eagle from afar, and the taste of prey did but whet the appetite.—That was an awful experiment, on a prodigious scale, of the intense misery that civilised nations, when unarmed, suffer from barbarians. But what have we, civilised Europeans, in recent times, ourselves inflicted on savages or on one another? Unhappily there is no want of historical illustrations. When Ovando and his Spaniards had landed in Hispaniola, the native queen Anacoana welcomed him, though a perfect stranger, with the warmest friendship. After he had received her hospitality and festivity for some days, he suddenly seized all her chief men and burned them alive; and having carried her off in chains, subjected her to a mock trial before Spanish judges, who had her publicly hanged.

Avarice was the horrible vice of the Spaniards; but another, yet more shameful to name, is habitual to a soldiery, long restrained from female society. A town which calmly welcomes in a band of soldiers, perhaps of ruffians, ought to calculate on the possibility, that the chief officers will pick out the fairest maidens or matrons, and summon them to share their beds. This has been, not only a common thing, but a far less calamity than other outrages, inflicted by the brutal masses. What would parents think of their passive behaviour, if they

found their male children carried off, some to be mutilated for the harem, others to be trained in warfare, and their most beautiful daughters to be sold as concubines:—one and all to be separated from Christian influences for ever, and to be educated in a foreign religion or forced to assume its externals. Nay, the whole population may be sold into slavery, and any of them constrained to serve the crimes or sins of their lords; perhaps, as some Helot, to follow him to battle, carry his armour, tend his horses. It may be said, “they would resist this even to martyrdom:” but what will their anti-warlike zeal avail, if they find the produce of their loom and their plough taken from them by the proud master to whom they have zealously stooped, and used by him to exchange for the materials of war? Hereby they will as efficiently serve his armies, as if they bore arms in person: a lot to which all their infant sons may be subjected, for anything which they do to prevent it.

Mr. Sumner, we suppose, will reply, Such things cannot happen *now, in Christian nations*. Yet now, nations called Christian pay for invading the villages of unhappy Africa, and carry off her sons into slavery; and it is evident that *if they dared*, and if it suited them, the same men would equally tear away Spaniards, Germans, or Englishmen, from their homes, families, country and religion. Is any one so childish as to doubt, whether it is the cannons and bayonets of Europe which repel the slave-dealer and kidnapper from her shores? Why, it is a recent tale, within living memory, that Algerine and Greek pirates prowled about the Mediterranean coasts for Christians to sell as slaves at Constantinople or Morocco. The armies and navies of Christendom, not Christian love and submission, have put down this horrible practice; and those who counsel the disbanding of armies and disapprove all forcible resistance to violent invasion, must lay their account for a renewal of such atrocities. Granted that an individual of strong mind may choose the martyr’s life for himself, he has no right to choose it for others; for his children, not yet of age to know the horrors in store for them: or for his neighbours, some of whom fail in courage when they discern what is coming. Indeed, the real problem, as it is found in life, is this: How are the able-bodied and

youthful to act, when the feeble by age and sex implore their aid; when brave men also, who are venturing their own lives in defence, claim that all who *can* assist, *shall* assist against lawless atrocity? If there is not entire concord in the innocent population, the few who resist bravely will exasperate the assailants to greater cruelty; and all semblance of the fair picture so praised by Mr. Sumner will vanish. A most essential fallacy is hidden in Mrs. Child's quiet remark, that "the experiment on a small scale indicates" what might be done in a nation at large. The concord in being willing to suffer, which is barely possible in a few, is morally impossible in entire nations.

Nor are we yet at the end of the absurdity: for if it is wrong to fight against foreign troops,—robbers, pirates, or whatever else they may be,—on the broad principle that Christianity forbids the use of force; it will follow that any half-mad wretch who chooses to run *amuck*, is to be allowed to stab whom he pleases in the street, unless a happy opportunity offers of securing him without danger to his life; of which forsooth we are to be wonderfully tender, with a total disregard of the lives which his violence threatens.

Undoubtedly, we no longer fear the same extreme miseries from war to the non-belligerent part of a nation, as in other times and places was inflicted; and this tempts delicate and sentimental minds to recommend *all* to proclaim themselves non-belligerents. But unless they will have it that Christianity was not intended to give rules of conduct applicable to the past ages of violence, but only to our own more favoured circumstances, they must either entirely give up the attempted "Scriptural argument," or face the full consequences contingent on the non-resisting principle. Mr. Sumner has no right to dwell upon *the present age* and on *Christian nations*, when he assumes so wide principles, and reasons abstractedly on the effects of non-resistance. From the "Odyssey," he assures us that dogs will not bite a man who sits down; in the "Iliad," Achilles respected the aged Priam; in Roman legend, the Gauls did not massacre the Roman senate, till one of the senators struck a Gaul with his staff; in Paris, Pinel has managed insane people better without strait waistcoats and chains; *therefore*, if we do not defend ourselves, we shall

never be robbed or plundered ! This, we repeat, is a most presumptuous and mischievous, because a false, hope. Those who choose so to act, must expect to be plundered, and far worse. If *their* faith can bear it and triumph over it, well ; but the majority will be depraved and debased by it. The persecutions which the Christian Church endured under Decius and Galerian, only prepared it to covet earthly power, and to use that power harshly against its adversaries. The sufferings endured by Protestants have made the English cruel towards Roman Catholics. The martyr-spirit belongs but to very few, and nothing can be more mischievous than for those few to press the multitude into a position for which they have no faith.

We have thus at length urged the grounds which sometimes make *defensive* war a duty ; because the opposite sentiment is a growing fanaticism, fostered by ignorance of the world, and plausible to young and tender natures. We do not thank Mr. Sumner* for his concessions on this head, when we find them all neutralized and refuted by his arguments. But we proceed to remark on the practical posture of England, in regard to this eminently important question. If, unhappily, we were forced into war against any leading power of the West, our numerous small islands and settlements expose our people to suffering at a hundred points. The same is true of our commercial navy ; moreover, we are open to attack from barbarians in countless ways ; the Kafir inroad has burst upon us, since these pages were first penned : in consequence, a considerable standing army and a powerful fleet are in the strictest sense defensive, being nothing but a virtual militia. The necessity of such an

* We can only allude to the numerous errors of his arguments in detail. He quotes Cicero's words, "I prefer the unjustest peace to the justest war," in proof that Cicero was a Quaker. But Cicero spoke of *civil* war only. In the endless massacres of the Gauls by Cæsar, he rejoiced without measure. So Socrates is produced from the *Gorgias* of Plato on the same side ; forgetting that Socrates fought at Potidæa, Delium, and Amphipolis ; indeed, with Plato, regarded a standing army a prime necessity of a state, and conquest over enemies a prime good of human life (Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 10-17). But reasoning from authority on such matters is contemptible. He enters into elaborate computations on the expense of war ; which is valid as reasoning, only where its avowed end is a pecuniary one. He argues that the precept, "Love one another," forbids war, as if it would not equally forbid punishing criminals ! The truth seems to be, that Mr. Sumner intends to attack aggressive, and "to reserve his opinion" about defensive, war, at least against "Christian" nations : and the doctrine of reserve begets incongruities.

apparatus is a heavy penalty on holding a great empire; but we have no longer a choice whether to hold it or not. Be it supposed that it has been formed by mere wicked ambition; it yet cannot now be suddenly abandoned without convulsion so dreadful, that the idea is inadmissible. Our clear duty is to multiply to the utmost our peaceable relations (which depend more on steady commerce than on anything else), and, in proportion as this may free us from the danger of war, we shall diminish our standing army. But, brought into contact as we are with barbarism in Asia, Australia, and Africa, our fleets and armies will long be needed as (what Mr. Sumner correctly names) a police force; nor is there any reason why all the European powers, if they choose to incur the expense, should not in concert keep a stipulated number of armed vessels, acting together in all the seas against pirates. At least, if any of them are jealous of the scale of our fleet, some such arrangement as this would seem to be the way of meeting it. We rather, however, expect that before long none will dream that we have, or can have, any designs against the peace of *Europe*, however much our extra-European greatness may be envied; and if by any means a limit could be set to our Indian Empire, we should have hopes, which at present are faint, that we might gain a universal reputation for loving peace; a reputation which would make us efficient mediators in the disputes of all great nations.

While thus forced to approve of defensive fleets and armies, we are utterly averse to the compact according to which a soldier or sailor enters service. He is expected to fight in *any* war to which *any* prime minister may send him, however strong his conviction that it is unjust and aggressive. Theoretical means may be suggested of avoiding this difficulty; but it is certain that they will not be adopted, as long as our recruiting serjeants can pick up able-bodied youths who have no scruples; nor does the least indication appear that our aristocratic officers feel any difficulties of conscience on these heads. It appears easier to tie down the ministers of the Crown from aggressive war, than to introduce any reform into the laws of enlistment. Finally, whatever increases the blessings of peace and the miseries of war, is a cogent force to preserve the concord of the world.

Mr. Sumner, with others, has a vague feeling, but has not distinctly pointed out what it is that makes war a very improper mode of obtaining *redress of grievances*. He has indeed the following remark:—

“The object proposed in 1834 [on the part of the United States] by war with France, was, to secure the payment of five millions of dollars. It would be madness to term this a case of self-defence. It has been happily said:—‘If, because a man refuses to pay a just debt, I go to his house and beat him, that is not *self-defence*.’—but such was precisely the conduct proposed to be adopted by our country.”

The direct process in such a case is the barbarian one, of landing on the foreigner's coast and carrying off property; which is either detained as a pledge for the repayment due, or else sold to indemnify creditors and defray the expense of capture. This barbarian fashion appears to us in principle far preferable to declaring war; because in the latter case, in return for a limited injury, an unlimited punishment is inflicted,* and on innocent parties; than which no wrong can be more execrable.—An obstinate or foolish French minister refuses to pay American subjects their dues. In consequence, the Americans think they are justified in blowing up innocent French merchant-ships, and, if occasion offer, laying French towns in ashes; a remedy disproportionate to the disease. But, in fact, if a modern state attempted to redress its pecuniary wrongs by a barbarian foray, it would have to calculate on retaliation; and not knowing on what part of its extensive dominions the retaliation would fall, it would need to keep up an entire war-establishment for defence. This would more than swallow up the value of the property withheld, and would be utterly absurd, unless it could hope to make the other party pay this expense also; which undoubtedly could not be done except by a war on a large scale. For these reasons we fully agree with Mr. Sumner, that the truly dignified and politic way of behaving under pecuniary fraud, if it refer to a past transaction and has a limit, is, to

* This explains the sailor's toast, which Mr. Sumner rebukes as devilish (page 40): “Our country! *be she right or wrong*.” War to obtain redress, ordinarily threatens evils enormously greater than the alleged wrong which caused it; hence it is a man's duty to *defend* his country, even if he believes herto have been originally in the wrong. On this depends the endless complication of the moral problem, especially since *offence* is often the only way of *defence*.

bear it, but with protest to other powers, and some separation of amity, such as may be felt. We were recently thus tried ourselves. French ships of war drove away our merchants from the Gold Coast, and inflicted serious losses upon them two years together, in spite of our foreign minister's remonstrances. In former days, we should undoubtedly have declared war; but at last arbitration was brought about; and the umpire decided that we deserved no redress, because forsooth the French had declared war on some petty African chief, and chose to blockade him; to the great convenience and gain of their merchantmen, and to our loss. But if the French habitually detained our merchant-ships on the High Seas, and levied money upon them, and no protestations availed to stop it, we should be forced to treat this as piracy, and to do our best to destroy their fleets, and of course their arsenals. The injury inflicted on our people by piracy is prospective and unlimited: we cannot say to it, in Mrs. Child's words, "If they will take our merchant-ships, they must:" and our rulers would be forced (as a miserable alternative) to encounter the indefinite suffering of war. If, happily, a Congress of Nations for arbitration should be brought about—little as we expect from its direct jurisdiction against unreasonable and ambitious powers—it would furnish the peaceful ones with a *speaking place*, which is the great thing now wanting to bring enlightened public opinion to bear on international affairs. At present, diplomacy so involves them in secrecy, that nations get deeply entangled without knowing what is being done, or why; nor is there any place for full avowal of the honourable reasons which induce a peaceful nation to submit to injustice—which, we apprehend, are always at bottom the same, viz., that it cannot be redressed but at the expense of worse injustice. If the Peace Societies succeed in preparing men's minds to desire such a Congress, they will have fulfilled a great work; but by their present constitution and proceedings, they shut out thousands from supporting them, and weaken their own powers of action.

No candid reader, it is trusted, can have read our comments, without seeing that we utterly abjure the warlike spirit, and deplore war, under all circumstances, as a cruel and dreadful infliction. If we have occupied ourselves

chiefly in vindicating *some* wars, and not in extolling Peace, or re-echoing the condemnation of battle-loving propensities, it is because the latter topic is superfluous to all except those whose greatness or gains depend upon other men's sufferings; and upon these an angel's eloquence would be lavished in vain. It would rejoice us to see a Christian abhorrence of rapacity and violence influential over the world at large;—the spirit of a minority pervading or restraining the majority: but of this we despair, until the Christian Peace-party shall avoid the extravagances which we have been pointing out. To justify some wars of defence, is the first essential to that soundness of view and power of Truth, by which the lovers of Peace must triumph.

We now see the United States engaged in war with unoffending and injured Mexico. It would appear, that in the New, as in the Old World, unless man were higher than man, the balance of power must be decided by the conflict of force. The experience of evil is essential to the stability of good; and as no aspirations, no efforts, no exhortations, obtain the desirable end, except by this most undesirable means, it remains for us to admire and adore the wisdom of Providence, which assuredly does work out the good at last, and often, not in spite of, but by means of, the evil.

ART. V.—DR. TAIT'S OXFORD SERMONS.

Suggestions offered to the Theological Student, under present difficulties. Five Discourses preached before the University of Oxford. By A. C. Tait, D.C.L., Head Master of Rugby School, late Fellow and Tutor of Baliol College. Murray: pp. 189.

DR. TAIT is interesting to us on many grounds. In the first place he is Arnold's successor at Rugby; in the next place, a short time since he excited great interest by the publication of a manly letter on the state of theological parties in the Church, which made the friends of progress hope; and further, we have certain recollections of the past, in which the name and form of Dr. Tait, before he was Fellow, Tutor, or Head Master, slightly but clearly mingle. We see and hear him now—at the distance of many years—with his clear, sonorous voice, his outstretched fore-finger in debate, and his dignified bearing; for, as a youth, Dr. Tait's characteristics were what, from the present volume, we should judge them to be now—dignity and maturity beyond his years.

We have not Dr. Tait's letter at hand, but the point in it which stands out in greatest relief on our recollection is this—that the Author, in his travels in Germany and his study of German, had become acquainted with a race of writers, who united with a belief in the essential articles of the Christian Faith, a freedom which could bear inquiry, a judgment which could separate essential from non-essential, and a learning which gave strength alike for the necessary concession and the successful defence. On the foundation of this school, or in sympathy with this school, he saw forming a body of English Divines—whose distinguishing trait was in the good sense of the word—rationalism. This sound, courageous, and truly Protestant School, was absorbing almost all the eminent talent and active power of the English Church, and would eventually swallow up the Schools of a more timid and traditional Theology. It was easy to see, though it would be invidious to specify, who Dr. Tait considered the leaders of

this Church of the Future. But in order to aid the accomplishment of this good work, it was necessary to establish as a preliminary condition the influence of sound German writers on the sympathies of the English Clergy. Here, Dr. Tait knew the timid of all parties would say, "there is a lion in the path." This lion—in the shape of an antipathy to everything German—he proceeds at once to attack.

Twenty-one years ago Dr. Thirlwall had to say,* "It cannot be concealed that German Theology in general, and German biblical criticism in particular, labours at present under an ill-name among our divines; so that no one is more sure of an attentive and believing audience than he who undertakes to point out its mischiefs and dangers, and no one of course has need of greater caution than he who thinks of importing any novelties from that suspected quarter." And then he adds, in a note:—"But it would almost seem as if at Oxford the knowledge of German subjected a divine to the same suspicion of heterodoxy which we know was attached some centuries back to the knowledge of Greek; as if it was thought there that a German theologian is dangerous enough when he writes in Latin; but that when he argues in his own language there can be no escaping his venom. Unfortunately for those who wish to become acquainted with the modern German divinity, without burdening themselves with this obnoxious accomplishment, the German divines continue more and more to prefer their own language to the Latin. Very few works of value have for many years past been written in the latter; and, at all events, whoever attempts to form a judgment on the merits of the modern school, without a knowledge of the former, will be either greatly disappointed or grossly deceived."

There is something distressing in the reflection, that at this distance of time, a prejudice which can have no better ground than fear or ignorance—both equally disgraceful to a seat of learning which should have courage enough to face, and information enough to foil, every skilful pass of error,—should exist and have to be bewailed

* See Translator's Introduction to Schleiermacher's Luke, p. 8, 9.

and combatted upon the same spot still. Dr. Tait, but in a less pungent manner, says the same thing now:—

"It is scarcely more than might be expected from this prejudice, if some English writers, *who draw many good thoughts from the Protestant Divines of the Continent*, seem not unnaturally to have become unwilling to refer more than is *absolutely necessary** to the sources to which they are indebted. The Author of the present volume is deeply sensible of the very limited range of his own acquaintance with the Divines who are thus looked upon with suspicion; but he has thought it a duty, in order to protest against this prejudice, as well as for other reasons, to refer distinctly to the few of whose assistance he has availed himself. For it is of much importance that English readers, if they do not know it already, should learn that Germany has to boast of writers in almost every department of theology, who unite the deepest learning with a sound and earnest Christian faith; and that it is to such writers we shall mainly be indebted, if the infidelity which is commonly associated with the name of their country be smitten and overthrown."—Preface, p. iv, v.

These words would however give a mistaken impression of the character of the Discourses, if they were regarded as a prelude to a volume deeply infected with a Hercynian taint. Let the reader be assured that if this book be not *anglior anglis*, it is nevertheless, in its whole tone, spirit, matter, language and application, thoroughly English. There is not a single subtlety throughout its pages. Its reader will not be betrayed into the illusive pursuit of a single impalpable shadow. No long intricate labyrinths ending in darkness, or in nothing but their own beginning, are here to be threaded. No laborious minuteness of detail to establish a point which looks large in the circumference of a German study, but exceedingly small in the world of man. No Lilliputian bonds, which though admirably compacted, plague and pester the Gulliver of English Common Sense, till they make even wise men mad. Dr. Tait has looked enough into the thoughts of men of other nations and other schools, to burst the boundaries of mere nationality and a petty sectarianism—but not enough to lose sight of the proportions of things, or to alter the texture of his practical soundheadedness.

* The Italics are our own.

"Shortly after the Author was appointed to the office of Select Preacher, and before he had entered on his duties, it seemed probable to many well acquainted with the feelings prevalent in Oxford, that great changes would soon occur in the theological atmosphere of the place. Symptoms were not wanting to indicate that the opinions which had been for some years dominant were about to disappear, almost as rapidly as they had sprung up; while nothing was so likely to give them for a time a lingering hold over the public mind, as those injudicious attempts which are often made to destroy error by mere protest, without any efforts to substitute a better system in its room. Subsequent events have certainly confirmed the impression that such a change was approaching, as the erroneous system alluded to has now, by the publication of Mr. Newman's Essay, received its deathblow from the very hand to which it owed its creation."—Preface, vi, vii.

Amidst "the shaking of all opinions which was likely to follow," the Author determined to hold out some hand of help and guidance, if possible, to the younger students of his University. He desires to impress on their minds the necessity of meeting error, not by protest against the false, but by an offer of the true. For this reason he would shun no means of thoroughly understanding any system which he repudiates, because he is persuaded that in every attractive error there is a mixture of truth, and while pointing out "some intelligible, enlightened and well-grounded Protestant system," taking its "stand on the Theology of the New Testament," he would enrich that system by whatever help from other nations and Churches, and whatever deeper study of its truths, he could command, and offer it thus enriched as the best protection against Romanism on one side and Unbelief on the other.

Accordingly, his first lecture is devoted to the exhibition of a model of controversy; which he finds in the Gospel of St. John. The object which the Apostle had in view in writing that Gospel he takes to be stated by himself in his conclusion—these were "written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing ye might have life through his name." He takes notice of the assertion of Irenæus, that St. John's object was to oppose the errors of Cerinthus and the Nicolaitans,* and that of Clemens Alexandrinus, that it

* In reference to the *Æon* theory.

was as a complement to the other Gospels; and he ingeniously argues that Eusebius and the early writers, in forming their opinions on the subject, whatever reference they may at first sight appear to make to certain outward traditions, did in reality rest their statements on an exegetical rather than historical or even traditionary basis; that they formed their views from an intelligent examination of the book itself, illustrated by the known history of the times, and the uses, to which their study of the Gospel made them see, it was obviously capable of being applied. He sums up his own idea of the object thus:—That St. John designed first, to oppose, if not the particular heresy of Cerinthus, undoubtedly heresies like his; secondly, to do this, by writing a substantive life of Christ, more spiritual than any given before; and thirdly, that as his first object was special, the material he would have to introduce in the prosecution of it, would be special too, and therefore often distinctly additional to what the other Evangelists had given, or if old, surveyed from a different point of view. He then proceeds to show how St. John was peculiarly qualified for this undertaking, first, by his intimate knowledge of our Lord and his doctrine; second, by his age; and third, by his temperament and character.

In dealing with his first position, Dr. Tait gets into a difficulty. He says that “St. John must have been acknowledged, even by his opponents, to be more likely than any other Apostle to be well acquainted with the true doctrine of his Master.” In the truth of this, thus simply stated, we acquiesce. We have never felt the difficulty which oppresses so many, arising from the different impression of Christ given by this Gospel from that built up in the others, and which has led to the supposition that both accounts cannot be true, or that in Matthew we must discern the Xenophon, and in John the Plato, to Jesus. But surely if Christ be what we suppose him to have been, it is little to suppose that he richly merited that epithet which our German neighbours apply when their admiration is high-wrought—of many-sided one: and surely the same being may have been the public preacher and the

* Dr. Tait is, by acknowledgment, largely indebted to Lucke for his critical material in this lecture.

popular actor of Luke, and the sensitive, meditative, prayerful, solitude-seeking spiritualist of St. John. Do we not see, and know, and feel, such things among us now? But then—this being granted in support of the substantial truth of both impressions—surely we must allow something for the idiosyncrasy of the witnesses. Let us grant all you want as to the objective reality, is there to be no subjective reality too? Is Jesus to be himself—the one and lonely—and are John and Luke to be nothing? Are the rays which, we aver with Dr. Tait, shone—to take no tinge from the media through which they descend upon us? Are the facts of Christ's life, the revealed thoughts of his soul, and the scattered and multifarious words of his mouth, to take no colour from the variously-hued minds through which they passed? And yet Dr. Tait, after giving expression to the spontaneous truth which we have quoted, adds—

“It is not of course meant that there is really any ground for drawing distinctions between the different degrees of heavenly illumination with which the Apostles were enlightened; but such distinctions were drawn by heretics at a very early time.* To attempt to draw these distinctions is indeed the sure way to shake the foundations of our faith, by raising questions as to the degree of deference which we owe to each inspired authority; while both the sacred writers themselves,† and, more distinctly, the wisest un-inspired Christians in all ages, following their example, have regarded the New Testament as one whole, the several parts of which God's providence did from time to time cause to be added to the already existing canon of the Old Testament, while the new works, as they were successively written, became invested with the same majesty of an unquestioned authority as belonged to the *γραφαί* of the elder time.”—“And when a man's mind is once satisfied with the historical proof that any writing is a genuine portion of this one book, he cannot, without sin and danger, draw distinctions of greater or lesser authority between the several members of what

* Thus our author would protect himself against the old cry of “Not Paul but Jesus.” The majority of writers in almost every School of Theology are liable to the charge of knowing little of the writers of other schools. How little should we hear now of “Not Paul but Jesus,” if it were not for the excellent memories of writers, who finding this old nag in the stable of controversy, will still make use of it, notwithstanding that those, to whom it is supposed to belong have almost forgotten its existence. Dr. Whately—if we remember aright—brings forward this same useful creature in some of his acute illustrations of Fallacies.

† 2 Peter iii. 15, 16.

God has united, that it may be, not in this or that portion of it, but as one whole, the perpetual record of his will."—P. 8, 9.

What *Book* is Dr. Tait speaking of? We have almost lost sight of this way of characterising the Scriptures among critics. A man's mind is to be satisfied that a book is a genuine portion of a book. This is indeed going back. The critical question surely is still—was this Epistle or this Gospel written by the author, and at the time, to which it is attributed? Is it a genuine writing of the age, an authentic production of the man? Dr. Tait says that the Sacred Writers regarded the New Testament as a whole. Most of the Sacred Writers were dead before it could have been a whole; that is to say, before the writings of which it is composed were all in existence; and all of them were dead long before there is the slightest feasible evidence that those writings were collected, and formed an actual whole. This mode of viewing the matter, also, entirely sets aside the question, What books are entitled to a place in the Sacred Canon? The very Epistle to which he refers as a strange authority for his strange assertion (2 Peter), Scaliger declared not to have been written by the Apostle at all, but "by one who abused his leisure time." The question at issue is not whether "any writing is a genuine portion of this one book;" but whether any writing has such evidence in favour of its genuineness and authenticity as to entitle it to a place in a collection of writings by Apostles or Evangelists of the first eighty years. Our Author by his mode of expression in this passage has exposed himself to a charge of bibliolatry of the worst kind: for his position requires the existence of the book as a previous condition of the genuineness of its component parts. Suppose "the one book" to be Schultz or Griesbach—then you have proved the authority of a Gospel or an Epistle, when you have shown that it is a genuine portion of that "one book." Suppose it to be Jerome—the same process is to be gone through. But a point arrives, as you approach still earlier times, when "the one book" disappears,—in fact, does not exist—and the only things that do exist (granting that they do) are the "portions" which are to be proved genuine by belonging to the "one whole," which

does not exist. "And yet," says our Author, "when a man's mind is once satisfied with the historical proof *that any writing is a genuine portion of this one book*, he cannot, without sin and danger, draw distinctions of greater or lesser authority between the several members of what *God has united*, that it may be, *not in this or that portion of it, but as one whole*, the perpetual record of his will." This language is so exceedingly strong and distinct that we do not feel able to attach to it any other meaning, than the obviously untenable one, which we have censured, especially as he also speaks afterwards of an "Apostolical or Canonical body," and makes the proof of an Apostle belonging to this to be the test of his authority. This carries the inspiration higher than is wonted—for it extends it beyond the writers, even to the combination of the works. However, it is probable that Dr. Tait would not adhere to the assertion in this extreme form, and that his meaning is simply this—that we have first to satisfy ourselves* that a writing is by one of the Apostles or inspired witnesses, and then from the whole collection of these writings, not from any one by itself, to collect the meaning of the spirit, and to abide by it. To this principle—which is the distinction between the followers of Dr. Pusey and their opponents in the Church—no Protestant Scripturalist could object.

Clear of this difficulty—which evidently damages his whole theory—the Author proceeds beautifully to state the advantages inherent in a Gospel by John—the "bosom friend"—the companion of his Lord's secret hours—and also the mature in age as well as holiness. From these peculiarities in John is drawn an argument for the existence of corresponding peculiarities in every controversialist who would advance the real cause of Christ—namely, that he should have "lived, if we may so speak, in the most intimate society of his now unseen, but still present Saviour;" and also that he should be called both by his

* "To satisfy ourselves with the historical proof," says Dr. Tait; but unless he allows of assistance from internal and traditional sources, he will find a deficit in his evidence; and "a gulf" between the time of the received composition of the Gospels and the traces of their reception in their present form, wider and better defined than that which he is happy to think divides the Scripture writers from the holy uninspired men who came afterwards.

office and his time of life to save younger members of the flock from error.

In the character of St. John as the Apostle of Love is found a still stronger claim for his being the model of controversy, which, unless it be "carried on in the spirit of love, is essentially unchristian." Error checked by force alone will spring up only the more vigorously. Heresy, as well as truth, has had its martyrs, and their blood has now a fertilizing power.* The Apostle's example is against, not only all persecution, but against "all bitterness or violence, even of speaking or writing against those who are in error." This "love" enabled the Apostle to "enter fully into his erring brother's difficulties and peculiar temptations, and thus must have conciliated at the very moment that it opposed." For no heresy ever "gained any adherents which had not some features of truth in it," and none therefore "can successfully meet such error except those who understand, and are willing to appreciate, the truth which is mixed up with it." Here the Author's remarks are sound, large-hearted and beautifully expressed.

"A man's mind is like a timepiece, which it is in vain to seek to regulate well, unless you understand something of its secret mechanism. You may stop the hands violently from without when it goes too fast: but, if you do so, there is great danger that you will never bring it into accordance with the true time; for a short period it will go too slow; and, afterwards, when it has recovered

* If there be one duty that modern writers have to do to ecclesiastical history more obligatory than another, it is to break down this mud-wall that has been built up between the Fathers and the Heretics. If the popular impression is to become purified, we shall owe it more to Mr. Milman than to any other writer of our day. His history of Christianity is signally successful in placing the Heresiarchs in their true position, as leaders of thought. He overleaps the boundaries which the Church has raised between these eminent men, as Remus did his brother Romulus's wall, which the latter had intended as a defence of the City. He gives the opinions of the Heretics as elements in the thought of the age, and would no more think of excluding the views of Pelagius from the History of Christianity because the Church had dubbed him Heretic, than he would have excluded Tertullian because he had African blood in his veins. In reading ecclesiastical history, as too often written, it might be supposed that the question of Heresy and Orthodoxy was as easily settled as a question of race—the Fathers are all right, the Heretics are all wrong—as clear as that Paul was a Jew, and Tiberius a Gentile.

the minutes it has lost, it will go too fast again."—"Again, when these feelings are discovered, it is vain to seek to cure them by mere thwarting. Christ's religion is no dry, unnatural system, which cannot be embraced by our minds till they have been forced into some formal mould, contrary to their whole nature. As the Lord Jesus came to save and teach men of all times, countries and characters, one of the clearest marks that his system is divine is to be found in its wonderful adaptation to every want of human nature. Each one may find full vent for what still remains of good and noble in his lost heart, within the wide circle of Christ's real truth; and if any, following their natural bent, have hurried into error, there is but one wise course for seeking, by the aid of God's spirit, to rescue them. The superstition of an exuberant imagination will never be cured by prosaic arguments on the danger of a voluntary humility and worshipping of angels. The simple credulity of the uninstructed is not to be regulated by sermons upon evidences, nor the daring speculations of a philosophic mind scared by lectures on the temptations of human wisdom and the blissfulness of ignorance."—P. 21, 22.

Thus St. John combats the *ψευδωνυμος γνωσις* by the true *γνωσις*. When men hesitate to reconcile the Majesty of God with a practical superintendence of the affairs of this lower world, he declares, "No man hath seen God at any time;"—but adds, "the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father; he hath declared him." So to the anti-materialist philosophers he grants that all that is born of the flesh is flesh—but points out the higher birth of the Spirit that may be combined with this.

"Had St. John met his Gnostic Antagonists by mere protest and denial, he might have encouraged a low materializing system," (as the doctrines of the Ebionites are rather arbitrarily designated,) "almost worse than the errors he was opposing; or, at best, another work would have been required, to vindicate the mean of truth. As it is, however, St. John's Gospel allows and appreciates those features in the Gnostic system which were opposed to what was low; thus carefully does he guard his opposition, and as it were indirectly employ one heresy to strengthen resistance to the other."—P. 27.

The same spirit led the Apostle to prefer a positive statement of facts and truths in their natural order to

the same laid down in a dogmatical form, or drawn up in polemical array. Thus Neander answers Strauss.*

Further—

"Who knows not that mere dogmatical statements of Christian doctrine are cold and powerless, compared with that spiritual energy, with which it becomes invested when set forth in the holy lives and deaths of those whose every act and word embodied it? Surely the real secret [this is a curious passage] of the great influence of what I will not hesitate to call the most truly religious section of our own Church, and of that wonderful progress which their opinions have made in England, from the days when a man was sure to be reckoned a dissenter or a fanatic for preaching them, is not to be found so much in any learned statements of consistent doctrine, in which these writers are usually regarded as deficient, nor yet in the powerful preaching of many of them, nor yet in that unwearied assiduity in their parish duties, which was long the peculiar characteristic of the whole school; but rather in that silent influence which they gained in every family, as they found their way to the heart, in those countless, simple histories of holy men, women and children, who lived and died rejoicing in the Great Gospel doctrines, because they had taught them the love of Christ: surely, also, Rome's wis-

* It is gratifying to perceive the honourable mention made in an Oxford University Pulpit of the merits of Neander. Dr. Tait calls him, without reserve, "the great Ecclesiastical Historian of Germany," and speaks of his *Leben Jesu* as "a critical and historical narrative of the real facts." Of course he is aware of the great freedom, as it would be called in this country, with which he applies his criticism in reducing the Gospel records to what he would admit to be the real facts. Though on the Conservative side as regards Strauss, Hase, and others, on whom he remarks, he is on the destructive side as regards the common English theory of strict literal adherence to the statements made. Neander's Book is not, as is popularly supposed in this country, a controversial work, written in reply to Strauss. It is properly a running commentary on a *Diatessaron*; the greater part of which might have been lying in his desk before Strauss had left the Gymnasium. It is, to our judgment, composed on critical canons for the most part as sound as Strauss's work, in the insane consistency with which he carries out and applies his theory, is unsound. But it must be recollected that Neander's clear perception of critical necessity, while it allows him usually to take the statements in the Gospels in something of the same literal spirit with which we in England usually receive them, compels him nevertheless *occasionally* to apply the hypothesis of Paulus, and give a rationalist interpretation to some passages, and also even occasionally to have recourse to the hypothesis of Strauss, and admit of the infusion of a mythic element in the narrative. See his criticism on the initial chapters of Matthew and Luke for a curious combination of all three principles.

dom is well shown in the mode in which she seeks to recommend her follies, by investing them with a holy interest in the lives of Saints."—P. 33.

Thus also "the Holy Spirit suggested to St. John that no arguments against error, or laboured statements of systematic truth, could ever gain one-thousandth part of the influence possessed by a simple narrative of what the Lord Jesus did and said." And then follows the beautiful statement, that thus it was provided

"By the writings of St. John, that, to the end of time, if a man, brought up under Christian teaching, be ever tempted by vain speculations to adopt a mere intellectual or low rationalising theory of Christianity, he may have the thought of its deep spiritual fulness recalled to his heart at once by the mere mention of the names of Nicodemus, and the woman of Samaria, or of the upper chamber and garden in the suburb towards Bethany, where our Lord spake those heavenly chapters which I suppose no earnest man ever read without emotion, which seem able to sustain us under every difficulty, and to give the most vivid realisation of Christ's presence that can be attained in thought on earth, till he comes again bodily and visibly to dwell with us for ever."—P. 34.

Variety in Unity.

Such is the title of the Second Discourse. We yield to its noble spirit of trust in Truth, and reverence for freedom, and charity for man, the hearty tribute of our unqualified admiration.

"This oneness of Jesus Christ, the object of our worship, of which the Apostle speaks, does not exclude that diversity in our modes of conceiving of many of His doctrines, and of serving Him, to which the peculiar circumstances or character of each of us may naturally lead. God has not made all men alike; He has made the children of his universal family to differ, race from race, nation from nation, individual from individual, by the grand distinctions of blood, climate, country, political state, and disposition; and our Christianity, though one and unchangeable in its essence, must, in outward appearance, vary with our varying circumstances. There is more truth than might at first sight be supposed in the eastern simile that, when the Almighty looks down upon the garden of the Universe, which he has planted, and waters for his pleasure, He is not delighted with that dull monotony which would force all the beds, how-

ever different their soils, to yield the same fruits and flowers; but what really pleases Him is to see each exhibiting, in its own way, the product of that better nature which He has given it, and putting forth in luxuriance its own peculiar riches, as an offering in His honour."—P. 42.

Guarding against the supposition that vigorous weeds can be regarded with pleasure as well as healthful flowers, and asserting that to allow room for varieties of worship and doctrine is absolutely necessary if we would have any real unity of heartfelt earnest piety, the Preacher proceeds, by an ingenious collection of instances, to show that variety existed even in the Jesus, who was notwithstanding essentially the same yesterday, to-day and for ever—now he was the quiescent Word, now the Minister of Creation, now the Angel of the Jewish Covenant—now the newborn Babe at Bethlehem, the boy at Nazareth, the man in Judea, the Sufferer, the Conqueror, and the Mediator. So in the Bible is a like variety—the searching, practical wisdom of the Proverbs, and the exalted contemplative piety of the Psalms*—the regulated holiness of James and the enthusiastic outbursting of Paul—the outward look of St. Matthew in his life of Christ, and the inward look of St. John. Again, how many and how different are the characters on which, nevertheless, "the Holy Spirit has stamped the seal of Christ's approbation." The Patriarch—at once, King, and General, and Priest—these offices again in their separation—King, Priest and Judge—quiet Mary and busy Martha—(but, busy as she is, full of steadfast faith)—Anna and Simeon, waiting day by day in the temple, and Cornelius, "full of alms and prayers in the midst of the duties of a Roman garrison."

* There are so many matters of detail, and so many applications and illustrations of a common principle, in which we should differ from the Author, that we forbear to interrupt, more than is unavoidable, the description we wish to give of the character of his volume. But were there sufficiently ample opportunity we might develop further the variety indicated above. Is there not a contrast, for instance, not only between the "wisdom" of the Proverbs and the "Piety" of the Psalms, but between the plain worldliness of one proverb and the exalted morality of another—between the exceeding sublimity of pure devotion in one sentiment in a Psalm, and the mournful intensity of what we should call unchristian hate, contained in one closely following? And is not this variety pregnant with suggestive matter in reference to the common, and even the Author's, theory of inspiration?

"And so," continues our large-hearted guide, "to pass beyond the limits of sacred history, his mind must have little of a real catholic spirit who despises the wild retreat of the strange Egyptian hermit, because his soul kindles rather as he dwells on those public scenes in which Christ's truth was borne victorious in the sight of men, by the popular eloquence of Chrysostom, or the practical vigour of Athanasius: who cannot bear the homeliness of Latimer, because he loves rather to be instructed by the learning, which almost overburdens the piety of Taylor; who has no admiration for the uncompromising zeal of Luther, because he has more sympathy with that winning gentleness with which Leighton sought in vain to teach men of different thoughts and tempers to live as brethren."—P. 57, 58.

In the same spirit, speaking of the bond by which all should study to live in peace who are joined together in essential unity, he says—

"As this lesson will teach us not to confine too much the limits of our own communion, so even where circumstances, over which we have no control, have made outward fellowship impossible, still shall we learn from it to study the fellowship of the heart. The most ardent attachment to our own holy forms, the most full appreciation of their efficiency in guiding our own souls in the way of life, nay, a conviction that our own Church seems more likely than any other to be our Lord's instrument in the great work of spreading a pure, and enlightened, and orderly Christianity throughout the world,—our conviction of all this can have no natural connection with any uncharitable feelings towards those who are not able to agree with us."

After citing a celebrated latitudinarian passage from the *Liberty of Prophecy*, he proceeds to give utterance to this interrogatory:—

"When will the day come when Christians throughout the world will remember, that however great the differences which divide sincere believers from one another, these never can be one-thousandth part so important as those which ought to separate them, by an impassable gulf, from all who live in sin?"—P. 62, 63.

We are about to speak of certain parties connected with the Church of England as of men who do not know the world. But before we employ this expression, we wish to give our notions of the phrase. Few men know much

more of the world than is implied in a sympathy with, and knowledge of, those states of mind and habits of life which prevail in that portion of society to which they are individually linked. The politician who is master of the weak points of his electors, or has a good knowledge of parliamentary tactics, would be said to know the world. The clergyman who mingles in society with the most liberal and cultivated minds in his neighbourhood, considers, no doubt, that he knows the world. So also in a less exalted way, perhaps, in the estimation of others, the Jockey, the Coachman, the Demagogue, know the world. And certain others also, who, because they know the workings of some of the lower passions of our nature, and seem to regard our nature as entirely wrapped up in them, these also know the world. And yet each of these parties is very blind, possibly, to another world, that stretches beyond his own, and is infinitely larger in its extent. To reduce this knowledge to its proper dimensions, we say that, to our mind, a thorough knowledge of the world requires that a man shall know all history and all literature, should have travelled in all countries, and studied all religions, should have mixed with all ages of life and all classes of society; and as no one man is equal to these things, no man knows the world—absolutely. But he who approaches nearest to what we have here described knows most of the world. The sense, therefore, in which we speak it, will be understood, when we say, that fanatics, recluses, and *men who do not know the world*, (i. e. who only know that portion of the world with which they have sympathy and intercourse,) may hope to bring the English People round to a straitened and dogmatic form of belief; but men who look out of the loop-holes of their *specus* on to the broad plain of actual life, will, we are inclined to believe, perceive that the only spirit which will do anything towards making of the English People one religious communion, is the spirit of large liberality in which the foregoing observations of the Writer of these Sermons is couched. He, and such men as he, are the true friends of the Church—in its size, in its influence, in its authority and dignity, because they and their principles are the only means that exist of preventing its becoming a Sect. Convulsive exertions on the

part of laborious men may impart a temporary and apparent firmness to an exclusive basis; but the only thing that can confer permanent life is a permanent and comprehensive principle suitable to all emergencies, and that principle is here.

So far the way, to our Author and all like-minded men, is clear. But, alas, the recognition of a common *principle* by no means implies agreement or even harmony among those who embrace it. Dr. Tait, of course, perceives that his principle has no practical value, or directly guiding power, unless he accompanies it by an application. We never knew a thorough-bred Oxford man fail in his logic—you are sure of his seeing and acknowledging a necessary consequence. Incessantly wrong in his premises, he is always (consequentially) right in his deductions. He bears still upon him the excellence and the defects of the old logic—easy about his premises, but resolute about his conclusions. He is loath to inquire about the foundations of his house, but very anxious that all the rooms shall be in strict keeping with the basement-story and each other. Who can wonder that a man should look at, and live in, Christ Church daily, and dislike to be asked whether it is safe in its foundations? Dr. Tait girds himself up to the application, and therefore the limitation of his principle. He sees what must come, and he faces it like a candid and honourable man.

“And here, lest this be misunderstood, it is well to speak plainly, and to state that this lesson must be taken with two limitations. First, we must protest against the errors of Rome, and stand apart from her, because, though she have the right foundation, she has raised on it the vain superstructure of wood, hay and stubble. Second, we cannot live in Christian fellowship with those who are not one with Christ, because the unity we aim at has the Lord Jesus Christ for its centre. This excludes all those who take reduced views of the nature of Christ.

“If any regard the Lord and Saviour who is to us the source of all our spiritual life, as a mere man, or a mere angel, or, what is almost worse still,* as a mere shadowy name,—if any, while they pro-

* “*What is almost worse still.*” This is curious, as illustrating the influence of a portion of the German criticism, even on a Divine of the Church of England. So much does the feeling grow—and we wish it to grow more—

less to revere its author, have reduced Christianity, to become one amongst many systems of poor human philosophy, while its words of life are placed in the rank of the early Roman legends; here is no pardonable variety, but a total change from what the apostles taught; these men cannot be united with us in the worship of Him who is the same yesterday, to day, and for ever."

Dr. Tait is right. There is, indeed, such a thing as *human* fellowship—such a thing as *social* fellowship—and also there is such a thing as *Christian* fellowship, distinct from the former two, and having its limits, as they have theirs. What these limits are, neither Dr. Tait nor any one else is competent to define. They are incapable of abstract measurement. They are not a matter of dogma—they are a matter of fact—and that fact is, the fact of actual sympathy. Fellowship is co-extensive with this, and with this alone. Dr. Tait, and others who attempt to define the boundaries of Christian fellowship, think that they take their stand upon a creed or a principle. They do no such thing. They take it upon the extent and the capacity of their sympathies: and these vary with every independent thinking mind. Thus Dr. Tait in his own large spirit says:—"In all our efforts to enforce Christ's truth, either on our brethren at home, or still more on

which prefers agreement in the sentiment of the heart to agreement in dogmatic formulæ. Time was, when the order of full-bodied doctrine and of heretical departure therefrom was something in this way—1. Athanasianism. 2. Nicæanism. 3. Arianism. 4. The form of doctrine which attributed a simply angelic pre-existent nature to Christ. 5. The form expressed in the Apostles' Creed, involving miraculous conception, but no pre-existence. 6. Priestleyanism—or the simple humanity of Christ. 7. The historical existence of Christ, as a good and wise man, but fallible and uninspired. And thus being introduced beyond the limits of heresy into the regions of "infidelity," there opened two depths, about the comparative profundity of which there might be doubt—that opinion which declared that Jesus of Nazareth had an existence, but was an enthusiast or an impostor, and that which proclaimed his whole history and existence an imagination and a fable. But now it is found that the greatest coldness and heartlessness can comport with an acknowledgment of orthodox or only slightly heretical formularies, and that a true heart of reverence and a penetrating sense of exalted love for Christ and for Christian doctrines can co-exist with a critical scepticism as to the authenticity of the records in which the memory of them is now preserved. As a student and an observer, Dr. Tait has penetrated to the discovery of this phenomenon; and, therefore, we have his remarkable, and as it were hesitating, position, that the belief in Christ as "a mere shadowy name," is "almost worse still" than regarding him only as "an angel!" Perhaps, however, this may be on the principle of Plutarch, that he would rather mankind should believe that such a man as Plutarch never lived, than that they should believe anything derogatory of him.

men in other countries, we must be most cautious not to press on them a greater resemblance to ourselves than the Bible requires." But Dr. Pusey takes a different position—sufficiently well known. We would not say which is the more generous—we do not say which is the better—for one would comprehend what the other would exclude, and the first exclude what the last would comprehend. It is, in fact, the old difference:—Dr. Pusey inclines to sympathy with the "old learning," Dr. Tait with "the new:"—the first with the Continental Catholic Churches, the last with the Continental Protestant Churches. Dr. Pusey is "liberal" as regards Catholics out of the Church, Dr. Tait is "liberal" as regards Protestants out of the Church. What man is "liberal"—(we mean in the extension of *Christian* fellowship) in *both* directions? We answer none:—because there are limits to his sympathies, and his sympathies cannot flow in opposite channels. Each too has his bounds, beyond which he cannot pass. Dr. Tait states this in the passage already quoted. He takes his stand on the Nicene Creed: he can go a little on one side so as to embrace the Athanasian, a little on the other, so as to embrace the High Arian. This is substantially the same ground which Dr. Arnold took twenty years ago, and we are glad to find that his successor has not declined from that measure of liberality. It is notorious that within the Church itself, bound together as it is by its creeds and its articles, this test of sympathy is the practical test of fellowship. One clergyman will not allow another to do duty for him; nay, will not speak to him, (not on personal, but on religious grounds)—though they are both in the same outward fellowship—because the outward fellowship is nothing where the inward fellowship is wanting. It is so with every Church in Christendom, down to the minutest sect. And it will often happen that individuals in different Churches will agree together better than individuals in the same. In spirit we may, possibly, sympathize more with Dr. Arnold and Dr. Tait than with many others to whom we might be nearer in expressed dogma. Because the dogma is after all but a very imperfect expression of the sentiment, and, with Dr. Tait's pardon, it is quite possible that one who, in dogmatic language, regards Christ "as

a mere man," or a "mere angel," may yet have within him such a heart of love for his Master, may yet enjoy such a holy companionship with him, may sit at his feet with such a humble, reverent, loving wish to learn from him who was the meek and lowly in mind—that he may reasonably regard, in comparison with his own, the views of his very sound and orthodox neighbour as "low and materializing" in their tendency. This is not the language which we by any means wish to adopt towards others;—but the outward divisions of Churches are not always the real divisions, and the only thing we pray for is, as broad a basis as is possible or practicable for all Christians to stand on as a community—and then to allow them to unite themselves to any one of those numerous and often refined varieties of form and ministration which would grow up under this comprehensive shade, according to their several idiosyncrasies.

We have left ourselves but little time or space to speak of the three remaining Discourses. But though questions of interest present themselves to us in almost every page of them, we have said enough in our full comments on the two Discourses already examined, to indicate the character of the rest. The third and fourth are on the "Dangers and Safeguards of the critical study of the Bible," and the fifth on "Theology, both Old and New." Besides these, there is an Appendix containing two Short Sermons on Gospel Facts and Gospel Doctrines.

There is something of an alarmist tone in this part of the book. Dr. Tait shows with great success the necessity of critical studies, and the folly of choosing to walk blindfold amidst rocks and chasms, in order to keep out of danger. He proves that there is no choice, but to enter into the critical examination of the Bible—its authenticity, its authority and its meaning. Herein consists the only safety of religion. Nothing is so dangerous to the cause of Christianity as the impression that there are questions connected with its origin and its history which its friends and advocates dare not discuss. He, himself, is fully aware of the unprepared state in which the opening out of such discussions would find the English Clergy. "Is it not certain," he asks, p. 105, "that there are many questions connected with the authenticity and authority of these

books, on which we, in this country, with all our vaunted learning, are not as yet prepared with the requisite information and thought to enable us to vindicate the truth?" In this part of his argument he is very successful, and though the alarm which he manifests on the possible results of these inevitable inquiries is very great, and frequently expressed, it is not too emphatic for the occasion, and for the position taken by the English Church. We tell him frankly that that alarm is well grounded. For these studies, all indispensable as they are, and necessary to save the Church and the cause of Christianity in this country from contempt, will not only be dangerous, but fatal, to the theological theory even of such a comparatively liberal man as Dr. Tait, and still more so to the views of less far-seeing and reflecting men. "So awful, indeed," says our Author, p. 82, "are the results which may follow, and so many are the instances in which faith is altogether shipwrecked, that men advanced in years, who have themselves known the peril, cannot think without fear of the duty of leading their younger brethren to enter on this field, when God's Providence has imposed this duty on them as teachers in His Church." Now this terror in a man placed as Dr. Tait is, and in an University placed as Oxford is, is perfectly legitimate. Their claims to learning make the critical study of the Sacred Canon inevitable, and their orthodoxy makes that study full of perils. The awful passage of the soul through inquiries, in which all that it has hitherto regarded as sacred, inviolate, essential to truth and to salvation, is brought in question, and perhaps given up, is indeed a passage which no one, who has gone through it, can ever forget, and which, among material things, has no better analogy than the passage through the Valley of the Shadow of Death. There is no exaggeration in Dr. Tait's expressions of compassionate terror. He is right in saying, that at Oxford and at most other places they are "perilous studies." Tears, anxiety and spiritual homelessness—doubt, self-reproach and pale sorrow—are their common accompaniments. Dr. Tait, indeed, promises safety and consolation at the end. He advises, while studying the "human authors," to keep in mind the one grand object of the "Divine Author" held ever steadily in view, viz., the salvation of men, and to remember that these books were only written "that ye might

believe that Jesus is the Christ, and that believing ye might have life through his name." This looks like an intimation that the books may be freely given up to the inquisition of the critic, and that the spiritual result of belief in Jesus, and in moral salvation through him, is all that we need really be deeply concerned about. We wish we could bring ourselves to believe that such is Dr. Tait's position. But we fear that he holds out to the student the expectation of his landing safe, after all his inquiries, in the usual views of the authenticity and inspiration of all the books of the Canon, and the dogmas of the Nicene Creed. He speaks hopefully (p. 85) of the "full manhood in which, by God's help, after having known, it will be sure to vanquish" these doubts. He even says, "God cannot have made it the imperative duty of His servants to enter on any course of study, without being ready to shield us, while engaged in it, by His Almighty power." This is very good, and very true. But in *what* are we to expect that God will shield us?—in our own preconceived opinions? in the Nicene Creed, and the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures? Possibly—certainly, if these be *true*.

But the only thing of which the pure-minded, candid and industrious inquirer can be sure of, is that God, who is the God of Truth, and the Lover, therefore, of those who ardently seek truth, will protect from all conclusions that shall endanger his soul's safety, his spiritual well-being. On any other ground, Dr. T., in his remarks on the results of critical studies, as affecting orthodox belief, is truer as an alarmist than as a comforter. It is not true that men who enter into these studies may rely upon their final return to the faith of their childhood and their Church. They may very likely attain a higher and better belief—and thus there is room for comfort and for confidence; but Dr. Tait has no authority to say that they may fully expect to revert to the same—only better understood and developed. This is the mistake by which Orthodoxy prepares a crop of fresh doubts, terrors and anxieties for each generation. Many men may, indeed, work themselves round after all the mass of loosening speculation which they have gone through, to their former position; for—Lord Brougham notwithstanding—the Will has great power over the Faith. But this cannot be pro-

mised to men who follow their inquiries in inward and outward freedom. And the promise of it only serves to make them miserable at the encounter of the reverse, and to renew a similar struggle, a similar hope and a similar disappointment to thousands of sensitive consciences in the generations that follow. There is no choice for a Church with three creeds and thirty-nine articles, drawn up in an age of partial means and opportunities of inquiry, but absolutely to abstain from and to discountenance every investigation which may tend to invalidate any one of its positions, or to modify those positions according to the progress of Truth, and the clear results of evidence. The first of these alternatives would sink the Church in a cowardly and ignorant torpor, which, as Dr. Tait truly says, would be destruction to it as a conservator of Christianity, and involve a state of things, growingly impossible, in a country like England, with a People incessantly advancing in the spirit of intelligent inquiry—and the second of these alternatives inevitably leads to the overthrow, not of the Church, but of the more untenable of its dogmas.

The mind and learning of Oxford once turned in the direction of critical biblical studies, with the same acumen and exactness which have characterized its study of the remains of heathen antiquity, will produce that dogmatic change which is the only condition of the future sincerity and happiness of its Clergy, and its future influence, if not existence, among the People. The infidelity which the working Clergy are for ever encountering, and bewailing in our large towns, and which they are powerless to resist, will spread ere long, especially with a general State education, into the country. That infidelity is not of the heart. It is an infidelity occasioned by the perseverance of the religious world in dogmas which are dead—though embalmed—which have lost their vital existence, but still exhibit a decked-out body. A good rough wind from Germany will do a world of benefit in the Halls and Colleges of Oxford, and we trust that we may soon hear of it whistling through her quadrangles and gardens with sanitary power. Englishmen, and especially Oxford men, are too sturdy to be blown away by it, but it may brace their nerves, and banish their prudery.

ART. VI.—WHEWELL'S SYSTEMATIC MORALITY.

Lectures on Systematic Morality, delivered in Lent Term, 1846. By William Whewell, D.D., Master of Trinity College, and Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. London: Parker, 1846.

AMONG various recent signs of a humane and thoughtful spirit extending in the upper ranks of English Society, there is none more expressive, or of greater promise, than the increasing regard for moral and political studies in the old Universities. The change is not spontaneous and accidental; it is not one of those caprices of taste, which, especially in secluded societies, may be introduced by the ascendant genius of one or two men; it is manifestly concurrent with the rise of new questions and the growth of nobler sentiments, in the world around; and must be ascribed to causes social rather than academic. The legislator and the clergyman, educated in these retreats, and adorned with the accomplishments in highest favour there, found themselves afterwards thrown upon a life in which their attainments left them hopelessly at fault; whose problems of action no philology could interpret and no calculus solve; and in whose controversies they were overmatched by men of very inferior culture, only possessed of the right instruments of thought, and using them with more dexterous faculty. The whole range of modern interests, from the topics of political economy to the highest discussions of speculative religion, lies beyond the routine which makes the "Senior Wrangler" and the "Double-first." The characteristic changes of the last half-century, the rapid increase of large towns, the augmented power of capital and labour, the growth of our colonial empire, the altered proportions of sects, have started a number of social questions, respecting the functions of Government, the rights of Industry, the means of Public Education, and the proper office of a Church, demanding for their treatment a combination of historical knowledge with habits of philosophical reflection. The new want has been felt even at Oxford and Cambridge, difficult as it is to penetrate their college walls with any influence from without: and the fact that

the ancient learning of the one, and the modern science of the other, are used, no longer as the mere study of words and symbols, but as lessons in human nature and the Divine plan, as aids in the judging of living interests and duties, as no less rich in suggestions for the future than in treasures from the past, is an emphatic sign of progress in the new generation towards an earnest and manly mind.

The peculiar mental discipline of the Universities is very apparent in most of the metaphysical and ethical literature proceeding from their distinguished men. They apply Greek or medieval doctrine directly to the exposure of existing fallacies and the correction of existing opinion. They leap down from Aristotle to Bentham, from Plato to Coleridge, with the fewest possible resting-places between. With the exception of Hooker, Locke, Butler, and Paley (an exception far from constant), the series of great writers who have formed the methods of speculative thought in Protestant Europe is but little known to them. Hence, they rarely appear at home in the province of modern philosophy; they enter its fields as strangers and emigrants; and betray how difficult is the transition, for a mind trained in the schools of Athens and of Rome, to the work of the Christian moralist and the Anglican Ecclesiastic. There is an historical chasm manifest in their modes of thinking,—an anachronism of argument,—a mixture of the Peripatetic and the Churchman, which, we are persuaded, must produce an odd effect upon continental readers unfamiliar with the cause. How can it be otherwise? Two grand agencies, the growth of the Inductive Sciences, and the spread of a Pauline Christianity, have impressed the most marked characteristics on the mind of modern Europe. Hobbes, Descartes, Leibnitz, Spinoza, were present at the infancy of these powers, and preserve the traces of their earliest direction. Berkeley, Hume, Hartley, and Helvetius, display, in further advance, some of their main lines of tendency; Reid, Kant, Fichte, and Cousin, mark the reaction towards an opposite point; while Mill and Comte, on the one hand, Schleiermacher and Coleridge, on the other, exhibit the extreme development of these influences at their negative and positive poles. These are the main links through which the light and force of philosophical reflection have been transmitted to our own times: and

without familiarity with this series, it is impossible to effect a communication between ancient wisdom and modern wants, or to apply an instrument of analysis powerful enough for the resolution of the problems that await us. The subordinate place assigned in the English Universities, when compared with the Scotch and Continental schools, to the study of philosophy and morals, may have the advantages claimed for it by Dr. Whewell.* But he ought not to be surprised if there be a price to pay for these advantages. The system may protect us, as he believes, from a race of conceited students ; but it also lessens the chance that, in the teachers, we shall have eminent philosophers, and accounts for the fact, that for the last century, Cambridge and Oxford have produced no names that can be mentioned with Dugald Stewart, Thomas Brown, Jouffroy, Schelling, or Ritter.

It might be expected that the deficiency to which we refer would be least conspicuous in the University which is renowned for its *Scientific* training ; since Mental Science does not differ from Physical in its methods, but only in its phenomena. The presumption however is disappointed by a countervailing advantage on the other side. The studies prevalent at Oxford are *human*, and keep the mind in communication not with *nature*, but with *men* ;—the literature which speaks their feeling for truth and beauty ; the logic which analyses their processes of thought ; the history which records the aims of their social life and polity. The practical sympathy with the sentiments and affairs of mankind which is thus maintained is, in our opinion, of far more importance for the purposes of psychological and moral investigation, than mere skill in the forms of scientific procedure. Accordingly, whatever recent contributions from Churchmen to our philosophical literature contain the promise of enduring reputation, are the work of Oxford divines : at least the declamation of Sedgwick, and the ambitious confusion of Whewell, contrast unfavourably with the moral thoughtfulness of Coplestone, and the perspicuous good sense and scholastic precision of Whately.

The eight Lectures referred to at the head of this article form a kind of Appendix to the large work by the same

* See his *English University Education*, p. 46, seqq.

author, reviewed in our fourth number. With the exception of the last two, (on International Law, and the relation of Church and State,) they are simply a defence of the Treatise on the "Elements of Morality" from certain objections advanced against it. The first half of the defence is directed against some critic imbued with Mr. Carlyle's mode of thought, and sympathising with his aversion to all systematic definitions of human duty. The remainder is a manifest reply to our review; unless indeed the very same series of strictures has been repeated in some other quarter unknown to us. The Lecturer excuses himself from all distinct reference to the criticisms which provoke his defence by the following plea:—

"I have endeavoured to remove some objections, which may be made to the *Elements of Morality*, but which are, I think, unfounded. Many of the objections thus noticed have appeared in print; but I have not thought it necessary to refer more particularly to the quarters from which they have been urged. It appears to me that in all subjects, the more *impersonal* our controversies can be made, the better they will answer all good ends; and certainly controversies on morality are most likely in this way to be really moral."—Preface.

This plea reads very amiably; but it upholds a practice essentially unjust. An author who takes upon him to represent in his own language the objections of an opponent is surely bound to provide the check of an exact reference. Few writers can be trusted,—wise men will hardly trust themselves,—to state with force and fairness the arguments which bear against their favourite positions; and to attempt this on mere credit, in evasion of the recognised securities, appears an unwarrantable demand upon their readers' confidence. No high-minded person will take offence at the restraint we would impose: honourable men do not wish their accounts to pass unaudited. The desire for a purely "impersonal" discussion looks very charitable, when stated in the abstract: and readers who suppose Dr. Whewell's reply to be directed against some nameable man, may be tempted to praise his forbearance. But how a controversy could become *personal* by referring to an *anonymous* writer, is a thing obscure to us. Our author, commenting upon an invisible critic, was at all events safe from the danger and the charge of "personality:" and, as

he has not concealed himself, he has done nothing to deliver *us* from such temptation to this fault as our infirmities of disposition may occasion. The scruples which have prevailed with the author of the "Elements of Morality" were unknown to the author of the "Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences;" who has replied (Book II. ch. 5) openly to an Article in the Edinburgh Review, citing chapter and verse: and if he has thus been tempted to a pungency of which, in the present case, we have no occasion to complain, he has also preserved a brevity for which, in these Lectures, we vainly sigh.

In these animadversions, we do not impute to Dr. Whewell the slightest degree of conscious injustice. He has no doubt represented our objections, as they appeared to him. That he has not represented them with invariable fidelity, may be the fault of the original, not of the version: only, while the original is kept out of sight, the translator plainly has the matter all his own way.

Nothing that appears in these Lectures at all relieves the first and fundamental objection to our author's "Elements of Morality." He seems to us to misplace his whole subject upon the map of human knowledge; to exhibit it in false and fanciful relations; especially, to proceed upon its assumed analogy to geometry; and, in consequence, to force upon it a method of treatment of which it is entirely unsusceptible. Let us put before us the design which he wishes to realize; and examine it in relation to the method adopted for its accomplishment. What is our author's *proposition*? To construct a "Body of Morality," avoiding and postponing the "Theory of Morality." And how does he attempt this? By the geometrical course of Deduction, beginning with certain so-called "Axioms," and proceeding by logical derivation from these, to draw up a complete system of precepts for the regulation of human life. And in what way does he describe the result supposed to be obtained by such process? As a "System of Truths," analogous to the collection of propositions in which an optical treatise expounds and reasons out the laws of light; distinguished from this not by any peculiarity of *method*, but only by having to deal with a different subject-matter, with volitions not with rays. Now we do not hesitate to pronounce the whole undertaking impossible,

and the author's conception of it absurd. He cannot construct a "Body of Morality," of any higher value than a catechism or book of proverbs, except as the result of a previous and complete "Theory of Morality." He cannot connect the parts of such a "Body" together by logical filiation, or commence it with self-evident first principles. And when it is produced, it will not be a series of Truths at all, and will differ from a scientific treatise, not less in its structure, than in the matter of which it treats. We will begin with the last point, and ascend to the first.

Let the supposed "Body of Morality," whether put together by Solomon or by Dr. Whewell, have been produced. What is it? how does it read? "Lie not. Lust not. Hate not. Train the children in thy house. Succour the wretches at thy door." Here is a set of precepts, a directory of action; but no truths. And such as the sample is, will the entire assortment be. It will not contain a proposition susceptible of proof or of contradiction; but will be wholly made up of *Rules* of conduct. Can it be necessary to insist upon the difference,—fundamental in relation to the present argument,—between a system of instructions for the guidance of the Will, and a series of beliefs recommended to the Understanding? Of the former, you cannot affirm, as of the latter, that they are *true or false*; but only that they are fit or unfit for a certain end. Except in relation to that end, no judgment of them can be formed; their validity being not logical but practical. To collect and arrange them is the business, not of Science, but of Art; a distinction not arbitrary and verbal, but founded upon an essential difference of procedure in the two cases. If I attempt to exhibit a system of truths, what order shall I follow?—the order of demonstration, by which thought advances step by step in apprehension and discovery. But what, if I frame a body of rules? I shall follow the order of action, by which the will advances step by step in execution. Many of the truths in the former series afford reasons for the rules in the latter; and all the rules in the latter find their ground among the truths in the former. Pick out the rules, as they incidentally arise, from the first, or the truths from the second, and they will present an example of utter disorder,—practical confusion in the one case, logical incoherence in the other.

The scientific elements that lie scattered along the path of Art may be rudely compared to types disposed in alphabetic succession for the convenience of the printer's hand. When presented in the order of knowledge, they are like the same types thrown into words and propositions, and suggesting a connected sense. Or the difference may be illustrated by the arrangement of articles in a cyclopedia of reference, contrasted with the exposition of the same materials in a systematic work of science. That the order of the *things to be done* for any end must be widely different from the order of the *reasons for doing them*, can hardly require proof or even illustration. Take the case of a treatise on land-surveying. It explains the instruments for measuring lines and angles, the chain, the theodolite, the repeating circle, the mode of using these for altitudes and for the horizontal plane; the formulas for the computation of triangles, the processes of verification, the correction for the spheroidal form of the earth. Gather together the principles on which these operations depend, and into how many sciences, remote from each other, are you obliged to dip? The plumb-line or the level bid you expound the law of terrestrial gravitation; your precautions in taking your base refer to the effects of heat; the observing instruments are constructed in adaptation to the properties of light; the trigonometrical equations are all a digression from the 4th proposition of Euclid's 6th Book, and the logarithmic tables from the principles of geometrical progression; the vertical heights go for their standard to the half-tide law, while latitudes and longitudes are determined by assuming the rotation, the shape, and the astronomical relations of the earth. The scheme of truths in which a body of *moral* rules find their scientific ground, is not indeed so amorphous and heterogeneous as this; but is equally incapable, till entirely recast, of forming a logical whole. The classification of *precepts in a code* will follow the order of our external business and relations; a classification of the *reasons* for those precepts will follow the order of our internal moral constitution. The one will regulate its divisions by the *occasions* of action, the other by the *principles* of action. And since the same spring of volition, involving cases of moral choice perfectly similar in complexion, may manifestly run through all sorts of out-

ward occasions, in the home, in the market, in the commonwealth, and on the theatre of nations, it is plain that the *objective* arrangement suitable for a body of rules cannot coincide with the *subjective* arrangement requisite for a system of Truths.

Dr. Whewell then may take his choice, to give us a Body of Rules, or a system of Truths; but he cannot give us *both* by one and the same operation. If this be allowed, then the next point clears itself without further trouble. Truths organise themselves into a "System" by being disposed in logical series. And since Rules follow a different principle of arrangement, their order is *not* logical, and the claim to a nexus of ratiocination among them is an idle pretence. Precept is not deducible from precept, as truth is from truth. From the command, "Do not kill," I can no more infer (the very phrase is absurd), "Do not commit adultery," than from the rules of perspective I can learn how to mix colours. There is indeed a certain inferior department in the business of Art, into which deduction may enter. When I have learned the general rules of linear perspective, and am called upon to apply them to a particular drawing which I propose to make, it becomes necessary to translate the comprehensive terms of the rule into the special conditions of the present case, to look out the actual positions and directions of which these terms give the generic description. This exercise of fitting a mark of wide scope to the individual object, or subordinate group of objects qualified to receive it, is undoubtedly a process strictly logical. Nor do we deny that there is room for it in Morals, when once we have secured a complete and inflexible set of precepts, requiring only verbal interpretation. This is the main business of the magistrate and the judge, when administering a statute law, and adapting it to cases brought into their court. This would be the main business of the Christian moralist and divine, if there were a verbal revelation, infallibly defining all possible positions of the human will and conscience. And no doubt it is the prevalence of this view of Scripture that has so completely pervaded the ethical theology of Christendom with exegetical acuteness and judicial logic, and left it so empty of the philosophical spirit. It is obvious that the Moralists' work, so far as it consists of this operation, is

concerned, not with the relations of things, but with the meaning of phrases : it simply determines whether this or that case does or does not come within the scope of a certain definition. If that definition was framed by some omniscient mind, whose intent must be an unerring guide, and whose formulas can be neither too narrow nor too large for the cases they are designed to embrace, then will this process of legal construction yield us verdicts of absolute right and wrong. But the value of the subordinate decisions is entirely measured by that of the general rule ; and if, instead of being the true expression of natural law, it is only a rough generalization of our own, picked up from common life, hitting off the majority of instances, but having no pretension to unimpeachable precision, what do we gain by finding that here it fits, and there it fails ? We see something of the contents, but learn nothing of the merits, of our arbitrary rule : we judge by the datum of enacted law, instead of approaching the *quesitum* of perfect and unwritten law. The great office of the Moralist is antecedent to this, and bears analogy to the task, not of the magistrate, but of the legislator. He has far other work than to weigh expressions and analyse definitions ; viz. to shape into language a code yet unformed, faithfully representing the moral sentiments that characterise and consecrate human nature, and embracing the problems of external action that can be foreseen in human life. We must get our Rules before we can interpret them.

Now, incredible as it may seem, we believe that Dr. Whewell has no other idea of his function as a moralist, than this of interpretation. He fancies himself, not in the senate, but on the bench. In his circuit of human affairs he carries about with him certain ready-made formulas, into the origin and worth of which it is not his business to inquire ; and supposes that, by trying the measure of these upon every problem, all moral doubts must vanish. Several examples indeed are given in the fourth lecture of the manner in which he resolves knotty questions of duty ; any one of which will sufficiently illustrate our meaning. He first states that he is furnished with *five rules*, about which we must ask no questions ; "*I have found them*,"—and that is enough. They are ; "be kind, be just, be true, be pure, be orderly." Once supplied with

these, we have only "to discover their import in particular cases," to learn *what is just, what is true, &c.* (p. 92,) and we get an infallible answer to every perplexity. Here is an example

"Of our mode of dealing with moral questions; and especially, questions concerning duties of truth. For instance; take a common question:—May I tell a lie to preserve my secret? I am the author of an anonymous work,—*Junius*, *Waverley*, an article in a review;—it is important to me to remain unknown as the author. I am asked if I am the author: or I am charged with being so. Am I compelled to confess; am I allowed to deny? To this I reply negatively to both inquiries. I am not compelled to confess; but I am not allowed to deny. I am not allowed, by the rules of Morality, to say what is not true, because to tell the truth is inconvenient or disagreeable. The rule of truth, the conception of truth, admits of no such exception. The rule cannot be, never tell a lie except when to tell the truth is inconvenient or disagreeable to you. Such a rule would destroy the very nature of truth. It is not what we mean by truth; it is a rejection of the universal understanding which prevails among mankind. It is using words in a sense in which I know mankind do not understand me to use them; I may not therefore deny; I may not say *No*, when they ask me if it is so."—P. 95.

We have no quarrel with our author's verdict in this matter; only with his mode of getting at it. "In the course of deduction by which we have been led so far" (p. 94) does our reader find any satisfactory answer to the original doubt? What does it all prove?—that if Sir Walter Scott denied the authorship of *Waverley*, he said what was not true. It needed no ghost,—and no Professor, to tell us that. Who ever doubted it? The question is not the ridiculous one, "whether a lie would, in such case, be *true*?" but "whether a lie would, in such case, be *right*?" Upon which our author laconically remarks, "Be true!" What possible help to the moral embarrassments of life can arise from this method of verbal equivalents? We do not want to have our rules construed, but shown to be trustworthy. Their meaning is usually plain; their obligation sometimes obscure. This obscurity is of a kind which no mere interpretation can clear up. It arises from the concurrent demand upon the same point of action of *two* rules, contradictory in their sugges-

tions, but apparently equal in their obligation. Grotius is pursued by the officers of justice. His wife shuts him up in a box; and saves him by declaring it to be full of old books. Was she right? Dictionaries and deduction will hardly serve us here. Consuming the day in interpretations of "Be kind," "be true," we make no progress; seeing that this adroit lady certainly *was* "kind;" certainly *was not* "true." There is nothing for it but to effect a choice between our "rules," for one of them, unhappily, must go to the wall: and it is the moralist's business to find some just ground of choice. It has entirely escaped Dr. Whewell (even while using the phrase "conflicting duties") that this is the real nature of all "Cases of Conscience." He treats them as arising from the obscurity of a single precept, instead of from the collision of two. Accordingly, while he labours hard at the *construing* of his "five rules," he makes no provision for *comparing* them, and assigning to them an internal order of precedence. Evading thus the major duty of the real moralist, to trifle amid the minor business of the verbal interpreter, he is hardly entitled to plead against us for the dignity of casuistry, and to rebuke us in the following terms for our estimate of its Jesuistical tendency. We have at least set it upon a more respectable foundation than our author.

"The moralist must have some method of solving cases of conscience. When a man, wishing to do right, and labouring in the agony of a struggle of apparently conflicting duties, asks the Moralist, what he ought to do, it will not suffice that the Moralist should tell him, that cases of conscience are mischievous and corrupting things;—that they arise out of some sinister influence, some vicious propensity lurking in the heart. This may be so: but this, uttered in general terms, with whatever vivacity of imagery and vehemence of manner, does not help the poor inquirer in the particular case. He wants to learn *which* is the sinister side of the question; which is the worse, and which the better way. If the Moralist cannot tell him this, how is he a Moralist? or what is the value and application of his speculations?"—P. 98.

If the man in an agony were to carry his "Case" to our author, we happily know—for the next page informs us,—how conclusive an answer he would get.

"Our replies to questions as to what men must do, will neces-

sarily take this aspect ; *they must do that which will tend to make their moral being most truly moral !*"—P. 99.

If the Moralist can tell them *this*, is he not a Moralist?

Interpretation then will only distribute ethical precepts to their several cases : but will not enable us to deduce rule from rule. And if our "Body of Morality" have not the structure of a chain of reasoning, its primary elements cannot be related to the rest, as its supporting links. It does not take its commencement from "*Axioms*." There can be no axioms in Art, for every rule has its reason. They belong exclusively to Science, where *not every* truth can have its reason, but some must stand at the fountain-head of evidence, and be assumed as possessing a maximum of certainty. Our author's account of axioms, in his "Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences," has always appeared to us open to conclusive objections : but we were not prepared to find, in a writer of such eminent attainment, the confused apprehension of their nature which these Lectures betray. "Fulfil your promises ;" "give to each man his own ;" "love men as men," are here called *self-evident truths*. Why, they are not truths at all ; they are injunctions, which an opponent might dispute as unsound advice, but could not contradict as false propositions. As well might we designate as an axiom the precept, "Do not build your house upon a swamp." The counsel is obviously good in all these instances ; but it is good in reference to a certain end, readily conceived of by the mind, though suppressed in the exhortation. This peculiarity,—the reference to a suppressed end,—attaches to all *imperative* forms of speech, distinguishes them from the *indicative*, and makes it improper to treat them as statements of truth. Nor does a mere grammatical metamorphosis from mood to mood at all get rid of this impropriety, as Dr. Whewell seems to imagine. The precepts just enumerated do not acquire the character of axioms by being translated into the following categorical form : "Promises are to be performed ;" "each is to have his own ;" "man is to be loved as man ;" "to build your house upon a swamp is stupid." The suppressed end is not shaken out into the light by this change ; nor is it cancelled ; it still lurks in the expression, and detains it

from being the assertion of a truth. As the word "stupid" denotes that the act to which it is applied secures the needless *failure* of certain ends assumed to be desirable; so the phrases, "*are to be performed*," "*is to have*," "*is to be loved*,"—mark the *necessity* of the actions named, as conditions of some unquestionable good. In order to convert the precept of Art into a proposition of science, this suppression must cease; the end must be named; and the relation to it of the prescribed act as its condition must be affirmed as a matter of fact. Thus we obtain truths, instead of rules, when we say: "to build your house upon a swamp is the way to loss of health;" "to perform your promises is a thing which you feel to be obligatory." It is not necessary that the implied *end* which is to be sought or avoided should be an external consequence of the act, like the loss of health caused by the pestilential site of a dwelling. It may be an internal accompaniment or character of the act, like the feeling of violated obligation attendant on a breach of promise. And this, we conceive, is the peculiarity which distinguishes from all others the two Arts of *Æsthetics* and *Morals*. Their rules are good, as satisfying the feeling of Beauty in the one case, the sense of Authority or Higher Worth in the other. The *truths* therefore, which supply the reasons of such rules, must be the stated laws of our Imagination and Conscience. If those laws are ascertained by *immediate* self-consciousness, so as to be recognised without any perceptible analysis and induction, then the propositions affirming them may be properly called axioms. But at all events, to possess this character, they must cease to be *precepts* and be *bond fide indicative* predications.

Do we then "deny that there can be moral Axioms?" Not in the least. We only say that, if there be such, they are statements of *Psychological facts*, belonging to the province of knowledge; and that the Treatise at the head of which they stand, must either be a Theory of Moral sentiments, or a production anomalous and incoherent. Do we "deny that there can be a rationally-connected system of moral truths?" Far from it; we only say, that whoever exhibits such a system does *not* give us a "Body of Morality," but a chapter from the science of human nature and society. What is the use then of our author's protracted

labours, to prove "that there are moral truths;" and "that these should be definitely expressed and rationally connected?" Nobody questions it; but only whether "thou shalt not kill" is a moral truth; and whether it is logically connected with "thou shalt not steal." There may be plenty of deduction and demonstration possible; and yet it may be an instrument wholly unfit for constructing a Code, with omission of a theory, of Morals. It *cannot* do what Dr. Whewell would attempt with it: it *cannot help* doing what he has omitted.

The 5th Lecture of the present series is intended to explain the author's views of the relation between Law and Morality. He complains of having been misapprehended upon this matter; disclaims any design to make Law the basis of Morality; and thinks that he ought to have been safe from such a charge, because the second book of his Elements, though entirely devoted to an exposition of Roman and English Law, is put to no use in the succeeding parts of this work of "rigorous reasoning." Without remarking upon this extraordinary ground of defence, we will proceed at once to the corrected account now given of the relation between Moral duties and Legal obligations. After the most careful attention to our author's statements, we find it extremely difficult to say precisely what he means: but the following three things do appear to be distinctly affirmed upon this subject: That the difference between Law and Morality is the difference between external action and internal principle: That the Law must define men's outward Rights and Relations, and Morality adopt these definitions in its rules: That Law being compared to an inscription, Morality may be said to give the interpretation.

The first of these positions lies at the foundation of a large portion of Dr. Whewell's system. Yet when we begin to point out its unsoundness, we are met by expressions indicative of an opinion less open to objection. We find this variance from himself a phenomenon of such frequent occurrence in our author's writings, that we have ceased to lay any stress upon particular phrases or even entire propositions, till we have tested them by comparison with the general currency of his thought. In the present instance, if he were to quote, in evidence of his opinion,

the following sentence, "In our Code, Law is *a portion* of the letter, Morality is *the whole* of the Spirit," (p. 113,) we could only say, that if this happy statement had been steadily adhered to, the criticism we are about to make would have had no place. But we venture to affirm that our author habitually presents the matter before his mind in this way; "Law is the letter, Morality is the spirit;" and that some important fallacies are introduced by this curtailed conception. Take the following passage, remembering that the word rights denotes only *legal rights* :—

"What guidance do we obtain from comparing the narrow range of Rights [i. e. Law], with the wide expanse of what is right [i. e. Morality] ? What is *the* reason of the great difference of compass in the terms ?

"The reason is plainly this : that men, in determining Rights, have selected only such portions of the Supreme Rule as bear upon visible and tangible things ; and upon such actions relative to these, as are of an external and obtrusive character, introducing evident disturbance into the system of which men are parts. Hence they forbid theft, but not covetousness ; adultery, but not lust. They are content to keep men's material interest in tolerable balance ; they do not deal with the heart and mind. They regulate the external conduct, but do not attempt to reach the internal principle of action.

"This satisfies *them*. It is well that it does so ; for it is all that they can do. Human Laws cannot do much, in the region of internal principle. But though this satisfies Law, it does not satisfy Morality. *She* must go deeper than this. That she must do so, is evident from what I have said already, of the extent of her domain ; every thing which is or may be right or wrong, belongs to her. Hence, she must have something to do with intentions, as well as acts ; for those, too, may be right or wrong. It is wrong to intend to steal, though I do not ;—to put my hand in a man's pocket for that purpose, though I find nothing there ;—to watch him with that intent, though the eye of the policeman withholds me. Not only intentions, but desires and emotions, are wrong ; it is wrong to grudge another man's happiness ; to have a spite at him. There is a vast and varied field of desires, affections, sentiments, mental processes, all which must be subject to Morality, for all may be right and may be wrong ; and the Supreme Law must include all these ; and must, according to the case, decide which of these two, right or wrong, each of these things is."—P. 83.

The same distinction is stated in the Elements of Morality:—

“Law deals with matters external and visible, such as objects of desire, (Things) and Actions, and thus creates Rights. Morality has to do with matters internal and invisible; with desires and intentions, as well as with laws and rights.”—§. 460.

Once more:—

“We know that Morality must go far beyond Law, *and must do this in an inward direction*. It must go to virtues of the heart, as well as actions of the hand.”—P. 101.

This is the only boundary ever drawn between the two provinces, that offer themselves for definition. It did not occur to Dr. Whewell to ask,—if Law is but a *portion* of the letter, what is *the rest* of that letter; and what separates the part *within* the Law, from the residue *without*? These omitted portions of external conduct, which are not spoken of at the Inns of Court, are worth a little inquiry. It is unfortunate, we think, that our author, having indirectly recognised them in one transient expression, never approaches them again: for they spoil his whole project for marking out the field of human duty.

That the qualification for coming under the notice of Law is *not* the “external and visible,” or even the “obtrusive,” and “disturbing” character of an action, must be evident on the slightest reflection. The very examples adduced do not support the assertion. All the *vices* of lust are equally overt-acts, and sources of wide-spread and devastating wretchedness: why is adultery made the only *crime* of lust? The scolding of a vixen is of a highly “obtrusive character, introducing evident disturbance into the system of which men are parts;” yet, we lament to say, no law forbids it. Instances may be accumulated without end, of outward actions highly detrimental to the right order, the security, even “the material interests” of society, which legislation passes by in silence. In primitive communities, there is undoubtedly a tendency in the Law-giver to provide enactments suitable to all these cases, and extend his

cognizance over the whole of human life. But by degrees it is found, that some offences evade definition; others are beyond detection; yet more are best encountered by the retribution of private sentiment; till in the Codes of civilized nations, a very large portion of conduct is entirely dropped from magisterial care. No classification therefore of existing, legal obligations can give more than a *selection* from the table of contents which exhibits our *actual*, and perhaps once enacted, obligations.

Yet our author's whole scheme of duty is so framed as to cover only this narrow base,—indeed to grow up from it by the mere protrusion and parallel fluxion of its outline into higher regions. His morality is, in its very nature and by the necessity of its structure, a mere elongation of Law, without the possibility of any widening of its compass. For it is raised by the following process:—First; the analysis of Law presents us with five classes of Rights,—of Person,—of Property,—of Family,—of Civil Authority,—of Contract; which are defended by a corresponding number of precepts; Do no violence; do not steal; do not commit adultery; do not disobey authority; do not break a contract. Secondly; Law being the police of action, Morality, of intention, the five prohibited offences of the one must have, answering to them, five dispositions prohibited by the other: drawing these out, we have this set of Moral precepts; Bear no malice; do not seek what is another's; do not deceive; do not lust; do not desire to break the Law. Thirdly; these negative prohibitions, translated into positive injunctions of the contrary dispositions, present us with the five cardinal virtues: Be benevolent; be just; be true; be pure; be orderly. These fill up the entire scope of "the Supreme Rule." (Pp. 87—90.)

Now what are the objects upon which, in this scheme, the ban of Morality is set? *the Mental Springs of Legal Offences*: And what are the objects that lie within the circle of its approbation? *the Mental States that indispose for Legal Offences*. Within the limits of the one is comprised all that is wrong; within the limits of the other, all that is right. Here then, undeniably, we have a Morality precisely, and by its own gauge, coextensive with Law; with back-ground indeed *behind* the Law, but with no

margin *beyond* it. Extra-legal conduct, with its sources in the mind, contributes nothing to it, is wholly omitted from it, and might as well have no existence. For this would make no difference; the symmetry and proportions of our author's system would remain exactly as they are. He manifestly forgets, throughout this stratification of duty, within the frame-work of obligation, that "Law is" but "a *portion* of the Letter;" and that its projection can give but a portion "of the Spirit." The shadow of a fragment cannot have the form of the whole.

Is then Dr. Whewell's Morality of so low a cast, that a Legal conduct, backed by a Legal spirit, satisfies all its claims? Far from it. His bad method would make it so: but his better mind forbids it. He gives you a beggarly account of his resources to begin with; and comes out very handsomely in the end. The narrow plot for the foundation gets covered by a capacious and disproportioned roof. He effects this, so as to evade the consequences of his false commencement, by stretching his terms at every stage, and making them take in more than they profess. Thus the mental source of adultery is first described as "desire of her who is another's;" for which, on the next page, is quietly substituted the far more comprehensive word "lust,"—a word, however, still limited in its meaning to *one* passion. Then, when prohibition of the evil has to be turned round into command of the good, instead of naming the *right* state of this one passion as contrary to the *wrong*, our author slips in the word *Purity*; thus stealthily widening his empire over *all* the bodily appetites; nay, over every desire that can be classed with "the lower parts of our nature;" for his own definition of Purity is the "control of the lower parts of our nature by the higher." If all this can be made out from the prohibition of adultery, it is easy to see, how, by the stretching system, any magnitude of morality, however great, may be elicited from any quantity of law, however small. The fact is, no real and honest deduction has any place in all this system-building. That Law serves in the capacity of guide to Morality, and conducts our author to the provinces of duty, else undiscovered or inaccessible, is all a pretence. It is a piece of capital acting, we confess; still we never quite forget that the Professor is on the boards. He and Jurisprudence put on

the air of meeting for the first time ; are in the charming excitement of a first acquaintance ; he is in raptures at her hidden knowledge, and vows to resign himself to her direction. But all the while, they understand one another very well. Affecting to be led, he is the real conductor of his guide. With all his solemn, blindfolded look, he has excellent peep-holes for seeing his way. Mesmerised by the Pandects, he passes, through curious attitudes of logical catalepsy, into a state of ethical clairvoyance ; push a pin, shallow or deep, into the book of Morals, and he will tell you the doctrine which it pricks ; the sly Alexis possessing a certain private acquaintance with the volume, and having shuffled the leaves till he caught the page.

The next relation between Law and Morality on which these Lectures insist can be presented in a brief quotation :—

“ Law supplies the definitions of some of the terms which Morality employs, and without these definitions, Moral Rules would be indefinite, unmeaning, and inapplicable. Morality says, you shall not seek another man's property : Law defines what *is* another man's property, and what is mine. Morality says, you shall not desire her who is another's wife : Law determines whether she be his wife. Morality says, willingly obey or wisely rule, according to your station in civil society : Law determines what your station is. In this way, certainly, our moral precepts depend for their actual import upon Law. But I do not see how we can have any moral precepts which do not depend upon Law in this sense. To what purpose does Morality say to me, Do not desire the house, or the field, or the wife, or the authority, which is another's ; if I am allowed to take out of the hands of the Law the decision of the matter, what or who is another's, and to determine it for myself, in some other way ? I certainly do not pretend to make Morality independent of Law to this extent. Our Morality does not think it a degradation to listen to the voice of Law, when Law pronounces about matters which especially belong to her ;—matters which no other voice can decide, and which must be decided. So far, we accept from Law the determination of certain fixed points in the external world of things, in order that, in the internal world of thought and will, there may be something to determine the direction which thought and will must take.”—P. 103.

Now if to this extent Morality *is*, in our author's view, dependent upon Law, we should be curious to see the

range of its *independence* defined ; and to know what prerogatives it can ever acquire *against* the Law, whose definitions it is obliged to accept. The way in which these definitions are mentioned, as if they merely named certain indifferent external objects, about which, as the physical materials of action, Morality has occasion to speak, is altogether misleading. To say that Law is the mere Lexicographer, engaged prior to the formation of Ethical rules, in preparing the terms which Morality, on her entrance, must combine into rules, is to degrade *both* ;—Law, by depriving it of its moral character ;—Morality, by binding it to legal interpretations. The definitions of Law are nothing but so many moral rules complete, and not the mere vocabulary for their construction. When, for example, it “defines what is another man’s property, and what is mine,” it declares what *he is to have*, and what *I am to have* ; and what is this but to prohibit our interference with each other, and the interference of any one else with us ? From the very nature of the case, to define rights is to make rules : these are but different designations of the same real thing ; views of the same human relation from its opposite ends. A *right* names something as an object of defence : a *rule* names the same thing as not to be an object of offence. If therefore the Moralist is to wait for the definitions of jurists, he is entirely superseded ; there is nothing remaining for him to do, unless he choose to repeat their words, and say, Amen. If he is “to accept from law the determination of certain *fixed points*,” what is left to him, within the province of jurisprudence, but to register its edicts ? How can he pronounce a law *immoral*, adopting all the while its “definitions” and “accepting its points” as “fixed ?” Try the question in the very cases adduced by Dr. Whewell as illustrations. “Morality says, you shall not seek another man’s property : Law defines what *is* another man’s property.” A female captive from Dacia is given to a lady of fashion about Trajan’s Court, as her *ornatrix*, or lady’s maid. The lady is passionate, and particular about her head-dress : and day by day the poor maid is submitted to the thong for the imperfection of a braid, or hung up by the hair to be lashed for the scratching of a comb. The humanity of a Christian neighbour is excited by her cries : and he secures her escape and

restores her to her country. Is he a thief; and have moralists nothing to say about him, except that, having interfered with what the "Law defines to be the property of another," he has violated their rules? Terence the poet was a free Carthaginian; but was kidnapped and sold into slavery. By the Roman Law, the offence of his kidnapper was precisely the same as that of Trajan's Christian neighbour: both were man-stealing, and came under the definition of *plagium*. Is Morality "to accept the definition," and treat it as a "fixed point" that the two acts are on a level? Again, if a captive girl is sent into the harem of an oriental tyrant, and a noble-minded youth, knowing something of her history, and regarding her with pity and affection, rescues and marries her, is the Moralist to accept the legal determination that she is another's wife, and to pronounce the young man guilty of adultery? If he is not, then jural definitions may be disregarded in ethical judgments, and are *not* "the fixed points by which moral positions must be determined." But if he *is*, (and this certainly ought to be Dr. Whewell's decision,) then how can it be denied that the Morality expounded in this book *does* "substantially depend upon Law?"

In reading the "Elements of Morality," no part of its peculiar phraseology and reasoning appeared to us more original and less admirable than that in which Moral Affections are shown to be indispensable, because, without them, Jural commands would be in the sad plight of having "no significance." This language is explained and defended at considerable length in the 5th Lecture; with no result discoverable by us, except a new and ampler evidence of the author's inexactitude of thought and expression. With the familiar comparison evidently running in his mind, of "the letter and the spirit," he presents us with the following illustration of the relation between Law and Morality,—or, as they are here termed, Obligations and Duties: in which Law is presented as an unintelligible inscription which we have found; Morality, as the key discovered for its subsequent interpretation.

"To Obligations there must be Duties corresponding, though reaching much further into our being. The Obligations are superficial, but they may serve to mark the direction and position of the

Duties: they are like buoys, which float on the surface, and mark the place of the anchor below. They are like some of the easiest words in an inscription which we are trying to decipher: the inscription speaks of things the most profound and abstract, but there are also terms which signify wood and stone, loaves and houses. If we succeed in discovering the key to this inscription, we probably find out, first, the meaning of these terms of common use; and these thus understood, confirm us in our belief that the alphabet and vocabulary which we have adopted are the true ones. And thus we hold that our moral alphabet and vocabulary are true, because according to them, the laws which have universally prevailed among mankind have a moral meaning. Our duties I have said (*Elem.* 279) give significance—a moral significance—to our Obligations: and we must have such Duties as shall give meaning to our legal Obligations. Our moral system must be such that the Obligations between men, acknowledged as binding by the law of all societies, shall correspond to Duties of the affections by which such men are bound according to their social relation.”—P. 113.

Whether our readers, more accustomed than we to “things the most profound and abstract,” more familiar, it may be, with our author’s hieratic style, can decipher this illustration in a way convincing to themselves, we cannot tell. But we must freely confess our own failure;—puzzled chiefly by this; that the key which promises the most satisfactory results at the beginning, leaves us quite at fault towards the end. First, the Inscription is resolved into two groups of terms, viz. (1) certain “easiest words,” signifying “wood and stone, loaves and houses;” and (2) certain abstract words, denoting things “most profound.” Asking ourselves what these are to stand for, we find a direct answer as to the *first*: the “easy words” are the “Obligations” of Law. Nothing remains for the *second*, then, but the contrasted “Duties” of Morality: and this, undoubtedly, was the author’s meaning. The whole inscription has of course to be read off: so that the Moral duties are here described as the more recondite *objects of interpretation*, remaining obscure *till after* we have got at the meaning of the Legal Obligations. As *both* parts are successively submitted to study and explanation, *neither* can be treated as the *key* applied to the deciphering process: but if either *could* be loosely designated in this way, it would be the *easy part*, first read, and so assisting us through the darker portion that remains. That is to say,

Law helps us to the meaning of Morality. Unhappily, however, this is just the opposite to the doctrine which was to be illustrated. The Lecturer, having apparently some obscure sense of this, and feeling that the split inscription does not answer, shuffles it all together again into one, and adjusts his pair of types and anti-types after a fashion entirely new. And *now*, the words of the inscription as a whole are made to stand for Legal Obligations; and Duties become the *key*,—"the moral alphabet and vocabulary,"—by whose tentative application the cipher gives a sense. Thus Duties, which, six lines above, were the most *abstruse objects* of interpretation, suddenly turn out to be the *given instruments* of interpretation. A writer whose mind can thus slip about among images and relations, without consciousness of the incompatibility of their parts and the shifting of their terms,—and this at the very moment of elaborate vindication of his own precision,—betrays, in our opinion, a deficient command of the first requisites for successful philosophic thought.

Gathering together what Dr. Whewell has to say upon this part of his subject, we obtain the following luminous results:—

That Law enjoins only *some* things that are right: but the intention to do this part is co-extensive with the intention to do the whole.

That Morality must accept the moral determinations of Law: yet Law is not the basis of Morality.

That we must get at our Morality through Law: yet Law is without meaning till we have got our Morality.

Since the days of the Sphinx, we have heard of no enigmas more perplexing than these, which harass the gates and intercept the paths of philosophy at Cambridge. We trust they may raise up some Œdipus to unriddle them. It is enough for us to have explained why we cannot solve them.

It is a favourite doctrine of Dr. Whewell's, that human life has a certain *summum bonum*, towards the attainment of which all our voluntary powers should be directed. He conceives it to be nothing else than *rectitude* or "*rightness*," and regards this as the positive and purposed object at which, in every department of our agency, we should deliberately aim. Thus Morality is, in his view, not the *RULE*

of life, presiding over our pursuit of natural good, and preventing the lower from encroaching on the claims of the higher; but the *END* of life, which insists on having all natural good as its instrument, and is jealous of anything but itself being loved for its own sake. Hence we are never to be let alone in our affection for the most innocent objects or the dearest and most unexceptionable persons. Not only is our clinging to them to give way, when they would detain us from objects of higher claim; but our ordinary and unoffending attachment to them is not to remain simple and unanxious. It must be used and studied as a means of self-construction; instinct and affection are not merely to be restrained from transgressing their proper limits, but to be stiffened into the pædagogic character, and through life keep us locked up at school. "Things are to be desired as means to Moral Ends;" "property," for instance, "for the sake of equal laws;" and persons are to be loved *en passant*, as we proceed to Universal Benevolence.

Of this doctrine, which appears to us radically fallacious, Dr. Whewell renews his defence:—

"The possession of wealth may be a discipline of internal justice. Each man may have his own. Each man desires his own, by a natural desire, in which there is nothing moral, any more than there is in hunger or thirst. But each man may also desire to possess his own, because he desires that all men should possess their own; and thus, the desire acquires a moral character. And except the love of wealth and the use of wealth tend to its character, it cannot enter as an element into our moral education, as these, along with all other desires and actions, ought to do. The love of equal and steady Laws, in the progress of man's moral culture, tends to supersede the love of the wealth which such laws give him. This is evident; for in a moral man, if it once appear that such laws give a portion of his wealth to another, the love of justice at once overcomes the love of riches, and he resigns without a struggle what he so possesses. And in order that this may be clearly brought into view, as a consequence of our Principles, I would place, among those Principles, this:—that all External things are to be desired as means to Moral Ends; and this I would call the Principle of Moral Purpose."—P. 112.

Surely the reasoning here fails to support the rule. The "moral man," throwing up the possessions in whose title

he finds a flaw, gives no proof of loving his wealth as a *means* of just law; but only in *subserviency* to just law. There is no relation of *Means to Ends* in the case; but simply this, that, of two things good in themselves,—say (for shortness) Property and Justice,—the lower is not permitted to have preference over the higher. The error of the lecturer consists in the assumption that one thing cannot be *subordinate* to another, unless by being its *instrument*, an error which we trace through his whole system,—a perpetual source of fallacy and paradox.

The instrumental position and culture of the *affections* is justified by similar and not more conclusive considerations:—

“To love our brethren is a step towards loving all mankind as brethren; a step which helps us to the next. We see then that family love, besides the recommendation of being natural, which, taken simply, is not a moral recommendation, has the recommendation of being capable of forming a part of the moral progress which leads us towards that universal love to which Morality points as one of her cardinal objects. To love well the members of our especial family, is a good way of learning to love all the members of the great human family.

“In saying this, do I offer this universal benevolence as a consideration which is to lead us to the love of the members of our family; of father or of brother? Plainly not.”—P. 117.

We should have said, “Plainly yes.” Why offer us a consideration, showing the love to be a duty, *if not* “to lead us” to cultivate that love? What is the use of telling us that we must not be content with the natural feeling, because it is not moral, but must work at it deliberately, as the best way to philanthropy, unless you mean to present the affection to us as a proper object of quest and care?

It will be observed that our author's great anxiety is to impart to the affections a *moral* character, which, in their natural state, they do not possess. He proposes to effect this by making them instrumental to “the cardinal objects” of Morality, and recommending them to us in that view. Good. Only, if this instrumentality can *moralise* a feeling, there is no sentiment in our nature which has not the same title to cultivation as a duty. Even resentment is put, by Dr. Whewell's own hand, on this precise ground of claim:—

"Resentful affections, I grant you, *have* a rightful office in man's nature. That office is, to give energy to the love of justice. This is done, when such affections are no longer personal, but simply moral: when our swelling heart no longer impels us to the revenge of our own injury, but to the redress of all wrong: when resentment for offences is absorbed in indignation against all injustice. This is the office of the angry affections; and in this direction they are to be permitted and confirmed."—P. 117.

Resentment then, it would seem, is to be cherished; as leading to that Love of Justice, which is one of "the cardinal objects" of Morality. The same plea will obviously avail for every component element of our constitution. There surely is *no* primitive affection of which it may not be said, that it "has a rightful office in man's nature," and that it must exist as an operative influence in a perfect character. If this be the test by which we recognise a moral quality in our springs of actions and emotion, they are all moral alike; and nothing can be more futile than the attempt, by such means, "to determine *which* of our natural Affections may be recognised as being also duties, and which may not."

But while we deny that an affection is made moral by its "cardinal" tendency, we do not maintain that it becomes so by simply being natural. The philosopher, we conceive, might hunt for ever among the different properties of an affection, taken by itself, without finding the source of the *approbation* it may receive: for this plain reason; that *no one thing*, but only *one of two*, can be approved or disapproved; and a moral character can never be recognised in a propensity, till it comes into comparison with another, inferior to it, which vainly disputes with it for the same point of action. A being with *one* instinct only could not be a moral being. A second being, with *another* and *higher* instinct, operating also alone, would lie under the same disqualification. But a third being, endowed with both, and able to feel their relative worth, is introduced, by their co-existence, into a responsible life; and comes under an obligation to confine the lower of the two within the range of action in which the other finds no field. The moment he fails to do this, the usurping affection becomes, simply by its usurpation, *immoral*. It is vain therefore to attempt a classification of our springs of action

as moral and immoral. All, above the lowest, may be moral; and all, below the highest, may be immoral. But whenever they assume either the one character or the other, it is not in consequence of any permanent quality, but a result of relative place; it does not befall them taken singly, but in pairs. The attempt to give to certain affections a standard moral character, without any regard to the competing feelings which they exclude, seems to us to lead our author, in common with other writers of equal name, into much fallacious reasoning. In dismissing that which he has connected with the present topic, we have only to add, that we do not wish him to admit all natural affections, as such, to his approbation. They do not want to be approved. We would simply have them let alone, till a worse excludes a better, for then only do they become immoral, and want to be condemned. Moralists, like physicians, are too apt to push their prescriptions upon the healthy, instead of reserving themselves for disease; to invent artificial reasons for what everybody, unless annoyed by exhortation, will do of his own accord; and to fancy themselves the improvers of nature, rather than her vindicators and interpreters.

We are obliged to leave unnoticed many topics touched upon in Dr. Whewell's explanations. His doctrine of the Supreme Rule,—an incongruous agglutination of Aristotle and Butler,—must pass without further analysis. Nor can we ask our reader's patience, while we unravel the tangled thread of reasoning in the Sixth Lecture on the connection between Virtue and Happiness. The particular relation of the Cambridge Professor's system to that of Epicurus, we will leave it to the future historian to discuss; with the greater willingness, because not ambitious to appear as champions of the philosophy of the Garden. Enough perhaps has been said to sustain the positions which we deemed it right to take up in our former Review: and only enough omitted, to prevent questions permanent for the philosopher disappearing in the transient interests of the polemic. The necessities of self-defence, and the peculiarities of our work, have led us, more than we could desire, into criticism of expression, and animadversions upon method. To a superficial reader these things are apt to appear like a mere estimate of an author, rather

than an examination of his doctrine. Even were it so, Dr. Whewell is a man whose pretensions are so well established in some walks of Science, that his just place in others is a matter not indifferent to European literature. But every student in philosophy will admit, and no one more readily than our author himself, that, in psychological questions, the sifting of language is the weighing of thoughts, and that judgment upon the method of a system may carry with it a verdict on the contents.

ART. VII.—DR. HOOK'S LETTER ON THE EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE.

On the Means of rendering more efficient the Education of the People. A Letter to the Lord Bishop of St. David's.
By Walter Farquhar Hook, D.D. 1846.

THE Article, in our present Number, on Juvenile Delinquency makes unnecessary any further proof, that a necessity exists for 'rendering more efficient the Education of the People.' Children of the tender age of nine and ten, *who can neither read nor write*, are transported for seven years! Such facts, horrible and disgraceful as they are, show clearly how crime is to be accounted for, and really open bright hopes for those coming times in which the Nation will perform its own Duty of instructing and training the young, before it claims a Right to punish their offences against Society. All the leading Statesmen who have governed this country for the last ten years have recognised the indispensableness to the National well-being of a National Education, but none of them could devise a Scheme, by which the religious rights of parties could be preserved, and their religious jealousies and pretensions soothed and satisfied. The Clergy of the Establishment claimed a monopoly in the souls of the rising generation, which Dissenters could not concede. And Dissenters themselves showed a disposition to stand apart, rather than be mixed up with others whose religious peculiarities they would have to respect, when those peculiarities differed from their own. Meanwhile there was no instruction of the ignorant classes, because the higher classes could not agree upon points of faith! The children of the Poor were not taught to read or write, because in England men take different views in Theology! Many souls have perished for lack of knowledge, whilst the religious physicians have been disputing as to which of their Faculties shall have the care of their spiritual health and the glory of their partizanship.—It might have been expected that, if the doubtful points must be reserved for future settlement, at least the clear matters would be promptly proceeded with;—that if the child's faith must

be kept in abeyance, there was no reason why his initiation into reading, writing and arithmetic, into some disciplined habits of observing and thinking, should not at once commence. But this reasonable expectation was met by the cry of sectarian fear, that 'religion must be the basis of all Education,'—which, for the most part, meant, that each party dreaded the effect of *general* enlightenment, unless accompanied by the implicit inculcation of their favourite *particular* dogmas. All the time, there was no real difficulty in the case, if each party could only be satisfied with the fullest concession of *its own* just claims. The difficulties which Religion has made have mainly flowed from the religious vices of spiritual pride, presumption, and arrogance. Nothing more was ever asked than that each Party should be satisfied, if doctrinal tenets must be taught to children, with usurping the souls and consciences of those babes whose parents belonged to its Sect, and who consented to this pre-occupation of their faith. Examples were not wanting of successful instances of this combination of sectarian instruction in religion with general Education. The Government Schools in Ireland, and, until party spirit took possession of them, the Corporation Schools of Liverpool, were examples of this success. Still the religionists persisted in the principle that it was a violation of *their* Consciences to suffer other people to be guided by their own, and until lately no prospect has appeared of such a practical agreement as would suffice for the purposes of a National Education.

The Letter of Dr. Hook to Dr. Thirlwall is an omen of better things. The Vicar of Leeds represents the high Anglican feeling, and the Bishop of St. David's the utmost latitude of liberality and toleration possible to a Churchman,—and the Vicar addresses the Bishop in the confidence that on this question no substantial difference of a practical kind exists between them. The Letter of Dr. Hook is not so remarkable for the principles it avows, which in themselves are too obvious to have any novelty, as for the quarter from which the avowal proceeds. These principles we do not call *Concessions*, because we have no reason to believe that Dr. Hook, or the party to which he belongs, ever raised, or joined in, the religious cry against National Education. In one of the Tracts for

the Times it was distinctly stated that the Anglicans would not lend themselves to the warfare which Religion was waging against popular Instruction.

We shall give a brief analysis of the arguments and suggestions contained in the Letter of Dr. Hook.

1. It forcibly exposes our present deficiency of educational means.

"When I look upon all that has been done, I ask what is the result? I must contend that, compared with the educational wants of the country, we have done next to nothing; we have lighted a lanthorn which only makes us more sensible of the surrounding darkness: we have caused the waters to flow, but what we have effected is but as the jets of a fountain, and not the steady copious stream which is required."—P. 7.

"The proportion between the present annual outlay and the wants of the country may be shown by one simple fact. The parliamentary grant of 1845 was £75,000, being more than double the average annual grant since 1833. If 625 schools may be annually built with the aid of this grant of £75,000, accommodating 93,750 scholars, these numbers represent only one-fourth of the annual permanent increase of the population, which proceeds at the rate of nearly 365,000 in the year."—P. 9.

2. Dr. Hook exposes the defective *quality* of the Education given in our common Poor Schools.

"In the School what can the good young man effect? He cannot educate (it is physically impossible) all the children himself, and therefore he is obliged to have recourse to the *Monitorial* system; the result of which is, that while a portion of the children are vain, conceited, and puffed-up, a larger proportion are left in their ignorance. I have known instances of children who have been for two years at a National School, and have left it unable to read."—P. 13.

3. Dr. Hook, admitting that compulsion cannot be adopted in this country, thinks that there are various indirect means by which Education may be practically enforced. A child found begging he would send to the Industrial School attached to a workhouse, where it would be maintained and educated. He would require children of thirteen years of age to produce certificates, from the Inspectors of Schools, of having attained a certain amount of proficiency, before they were permitted to work full

time in a mill. The same principle he would apply to rural employments; and it might be extended to all apprenticeships of children. Before the State gives validity to a contract, it may justly require that the rights of the parties shall have been observed; that in the case of children, some amount of instruction shall have been bestowed.

4. Dr. Hook computes the number of Schools required to supply the Educational wants of England and Wales, and the expense of maintaining them. He takes the population at sixteen millions, and the number of Scholars as one in eight, or two millions. Allotting one hundred and twenty Scholars to each School, 16,666 Schools would be required. For the proper support of these, his estimate is £2,541,571. Calculating voluntary subscriptions and School fees at £1,400,000, there remains a balance of £1,141,571, to be raised by the aid of the State. It is probable that this estimate (p. 27) is, in itself, extravagantly large, and that the amount of voluntary support is rated too low. In the first place, 16,666, which is the number of Schools required, figures in the pounds by some strange mistake, which has not been corrected in the *third* Edition, from which we quote. Then, the salary of Apprentices, who, whilst receiving Education themselves, are to take the place of the present Monitors, is estimated at £15 per annum. Of these Apprentices it is computed that about 25,000 would be required, at an annual expense of about £375,000. Taking the average salary of Apprentices at £10, there is a reduction upon this estimate of £125,000. Again, Dr. Hook allots in this general estimate £150,000 a-year, for the expenses of thirty Normal Schools, which are to keep in training two thousand candidate Masters, and one thousand Mistresses, averaging £50 annually for each Student. Dr. Hook moreover would make this expense a necessary item for ever, by enacting that no candidate is eligible who has not received a regular training in one of these Normal Schools. This would be both an unnecessary expense, and a direct degradation of the office of School Master. Why should not all qualified men be eligible, on submitting themselves to 'a Board of Examiners?' If the Situation of *Educator* is made honourable, there will be no want of qualified Candidates,

who have themselves been educated without burdening the State. Our National Schools could not be degraded more effectually than by enacting that an Eleemosynary Education, or a training at a Normal Institution even if paid for by the Candidate, is an indispensable introduction to the office of Instructor. Normal Schools, however requisite, are only a provision to meet the present scarcity of qualified Candidates.

At the close of his Letter, Dr. Hook suggests, unwisely we think, that the Normal Schools might be voluntarily supported. Neither in their quantity, or their quality, would this be found to answer.

5. Dr. Hook approaches the question, How is religious Education to be administered to the children of the different Denominations, without the violation of principle? He manfully asserts, that however the State may recognize the value of a religious Education, it can itself only give a literary and scientific one; that it must divide Education into two departments, assume the secular one to itself, and call in the joint aid of Churchmen, Protestant Dissenters, and Roman Catholics, to supply such religious education as they themselves think best. This is only the application of a principle already in operation.

"Nor can there be any objection on the part of the Church to admit Dissenters to an equality in this respect; because, so far as education is concerned, this question is already settled: the State *does* assist both the Church and Dissent at the present time, and consequently, what I shall presently suggest will only be another application of a principle already conceded. The notion is now exploded which once prevailed, that the Church of England has an exclusive claim to pecuniary support on its ground of being the Establishment. Those who, like myself, are called High Churchmen, have little or no sympathy with mere Establishmentarians. In what way the Church of England is established, now in this portion of the British empire, it is very difficult to say."—"It ceased to be the religion of the whole nation when, many departing from it, a full toleration of all denominations of Christianity was granted. It exists, therefore, now, simply as one of the many corporations of the country, claiming from the State, like every other corporation, protection for its rights and its property. It is a pure fiction to assert that the State, by an act of parliament, has established the Church of England, or any other form of Christianity, to which it is exclusively bound to render pecuniary support, or to

afford any other support than such as every class of her Majesty's subjects have a right to demand. This is proved by the impossibility of producing any act of parliament by which this establishment was ordained."—"The Church has no more claim for exclusive pecuniary aid from the State, or for *any pecuniary aid at all*, than is possessed by any other of those many corporations with which our country abounds. To call upon Parliament to vote any money for the exclusive support of the Church of England, is to call upon Parliament to do what is unjust. The taxes are collected from persons of all religions, and cannot be fairly expended for the exclusive maintenance of one."—"And if the Church of England claims a right to the exclusive education of the people, it becomes her duty to supply the deficiency of the funds required, by appropriating her property to this purpose. Our bishops are, on this principle, bound to go down to the House of Lords and seek powers from the legislature to sell their estates, and their example should be followed by the more opulent of the inferior clergy. The help of the laity would be then sufficient. It would be better for the Church to have a pauperized hierarchy than an uneducated people; and where could the hierarchy be more respectable than when pauperized in such a cause?"—Pp. 37, 38, 39.

The suggestion which Dr. Hook makes on the religious question, is, that there should be attached to every School a class-room, in which the clergyman of the parish might give religious instruction to the children of his own people, on the afternoons of every Wednesday and Friday;—another class-room being provided for a similar purpose for dissenting ministers; and that in addition to this a certificate should be required from each child of attendance at some Sunday School. It is not our present object to determine, whether this is the best and most practicable scheme that could be devised. It is enough that with such principles no real difficulty remains,—and Dr. Hook will deserve well of his country, and not less well of his church, if he contributes to the general adoption by his clerical brethren of these wise and liberal views. No doubt many difficulties suggest themselves in the working out of Dr. Hook's proposal, but they are all of detail and arrangement, and involve no question of principle, if his leading idea be adopted.

6. Dr. Hook quotes the Bishop of Chester, the Bishop of London, and the Archbishop of Canterbury, in proof that the concession is already avowedly made even in the

National Schools,—"that the Church Catechism is only taught, and attendance on the established place of worship only required, *of those whose parents belong to the Establishment.*

"If, then," he adds, "the distinctive principles of the Church of England may be dispensed with, whenever it is deemed expedient to do so, in the National Schools, those schools may be as well in the hands of the State, as under the direction of the National Society. Give us a theory, and we can argue for it; give us a principle, and we can die for it: but why should we be beggars for a Society which has neither theory, nor principle, nor anything else to kindle zeal?"—P. 57.

7. To exclude the embittering influence of party politics, Dr. Hook suggests that the schools' funds should not be charged on the parochial assessments, but should be raised from a county rate, to be granted at the quarter sessions; and that the County Magistrates should define School Districts, and appoint for each District a Board of Management, open to all persons without religious disqualification, and carefully kept free of political or sectarian bias. All Government Schools would be visited regularly, by Inspectors appointed by the Committee of Privy Council on Education, who would make report of their conditions of efficiency.

8. Dr. Hook would foster the Voluntary principle in Education, by abstaining to establish a Government School in any place in which a good school already existed, sufficient for the wants of the district, whether conducted by Churchmen or Dissenters. Even in those cases in which an existing School was transferred to the Government, he would place the trustees and their successors on the Board of Management, and give them the exclusive use of the school-room on Sundays. And where new Schools had to be erected, he proposes that similar privileges should be conceded to private contributions.

9. Dr. Hook thus defines the objects of the literary or secular schools:—

"(1.) Strict moral discipline, which can only be enforced by well-trained masters, with diligent apprentices or under-masters: (2.) The exercise of the mental faculties; the ploughing of the soil as it were, preparatory to the sowing of the seed, which is much more important than sciolists are aware of, and in which, as regards

our lower classes, the present system is deficient. This implies, that whatever is taught, be it much or little, be it mathematics to the higher classes, or spelling to the lower, shall be taught well, correctly, and completely. Slovenly teaching makes slovenly minds, and slovenly minds are immoral. In order to improve the social condition of the people, they require to have their minds in early life well trained by consistent discipline and exercise, so that they may be capable, not only of reading, but of thinking. To accomplish this under the monitorial system is impossible."—"To learn a little well, correctly, and completely, is far better than to receive information on a multitude of subjects; it is by receiving and digesting information that the mind is exercised; and therefore (3.) another object must be, to have correct instruction given in reading, writing, arithmetic, the elements of mathematics, geography, music, drawing, history."—P. 68.

Dr. Hook's proposal thus comprises the following suggestions:—

I. Literary and Scientific Schools; to be taught by Masters and Apprentices, holding diplomas from the Government, upon examination by an authorised Board of Examiners. The Masters are required to have received a training in a Normal School: the Apprentices are to be bound by indentures to serve a certain number of years at specified stipends; to receive instruction from the Master; and to be examined, from time to time, by the Inspectors of Schools, whose certificates of progress are required for the payment of their stipends.

II. Religious Schools; to be held on Sundays, and on the afternoons of Wednesdays and Fridays. These Schools are to be supported by the voluntary contributions of religious congregations. The Establishment and the Dissenters are to make such regulations for the management and superintendence of their respective Schools, as may to them seem expedient.

III. The supervision of the Secular Schools is to rest with the County Magistrates, and lay Inspectors appointed by the Committee of Privy Council.

IV. The necessary Funds are to be raised by a County rate, and from Parliamentary grants.

Whether or not this exact plan may be adopted, we devoutly trust that Dr. Hook has read aright the spirit and tendencies of the times,—and that the present period of

our history is distinguished by an earnest zeal to secure true blessings for our poorer brethren, a zeal that will show itself in self-denying exertion, "and especially by that kind of self denial which is perhaps the most difficult, and therefore the most meritorious—the sacrifice of party prejudice, and the petty jealousies which pertain to party spirit."

ART. VIII.—RIGHT OPINION AS THE FOUNDATION OF RIGHT ACTION.

Right Opinion the Foundation of Right Action: sought in a free and Catholic Spirit, a primary object of every Christian Union. A Sermon, preached at the First Meeting of the Western Unitarian Union, held at Taunton, April 21, 1846, by Rev. G. Armstrong, A.B., T.C.D. London: Chapmans. 1846.

THAT the search after divine truth, conducted in a free and catholic spirit, should be made a primary object of every Christian Union, is the distinguishing peculiarity by which Mr. Dawson, of Birmingham, separates his theory of a Church from that received by the sects around him. He regards himself and his congregation as an association of students, engaged in earnest pursuit of "right opinion," and pledged to respect the freedom of each other, and help the common aim of all. The title of Mr. Armstrong's Sermon might appear to indicate that he had been captivated by Mr. Dawson's views, and wished to recommend them to the Western Unitarians. Having always felt dissatisfied with these views, on the ground that an *intellectual end* can never be paramount with men who meet to *worship*, we had hoped for some aid in our difficulties from this Discourse; and expected, at all events, to find the principles of Christian Union discussed by one who appreciated the questions they involve. We must attribute our disappointment, perhaps, to our high estimate of the ability and earnestness of the author. But we cannot disguise the fact. After careful reading of the Sermon, we can perceive that the Preacher does *not* embrace the doctrine to which his title seemed to refer, but rather inclines to the opposite view, that a creed, predetermined to be orthodox and not open to modification, must be the basis of Christian co-operation. We gather this, however, rather from a certain *look* and *manner* in the Sermon, which leave an impression of this sort, than from any distinct maintenance of the opinion. Indeed, notwithstanding an air of eagerness in the writer, we find it impossible to state either the positions which he defends or those which he attacks. We

rise with the assurance that there are some tenets which the preacher strongly admires ; others that he vehemently dislikes ; but what exactly they are, we dare not undertake to report. So far as we understand him, we fully concur in his leading positions ; and if there is anything from which we dissent, it is from his distastes rather than his convictions.

The question of the proper grounds of Christian union greatly needs a careful treatment ; and we wish Mr. A. had fairly taken it in hand. That there must be *some* community of belief among those who combine in worship, is admitted by all. That there need be *entire* community is affirmed by none. The question finds its solution somewhere between these extremes. By remaining fixed upon the first, our author leaves the matter where it was. We apprehend that so long as distinct and sharply-defined systems of theology are heartily received, the persons embracing different systems *cannot* combine. And if we are to suppose that creeds never alter in men's minds till they get rewritten in their confessions, we may prove unions to be impossible long after they have actually taken place. But it is in human nature to recede from once favourite systems by insensible degrees ; and during the process of transition, incipient sympathies creep into old alienations. What was error before does not seem to be *all* error now ; what was truth before, to be *all* truth now. Without being by any means prepared to throw themselves into sectarian combinations and professions historically opposed to their own, men may discover that the hard lines of their hereditary belief do not make a faithful partition of the world ; and that all the good does not lie on one side, and all the evil on the other. A thoughtful member of a Trinitarian Church, entering on this state of mind, begins to dislike the dogmatism and severity of the popular doctrines, to shrink from their exclusiveness, to feel the sublime simplicity of such a faith as Channing's ; yet neither his judgment nor his tastes permit him to join the churches, whose services he may consider as expressing an erroneous philosophy, an unsatisfying interpretation of Scripture, and a cold and flat devotion. A devout member of a Unitarian Church, opening upon a similar experience, privately feels that the faults which repel the approaches of others to-

wards his sect cannot be denied; he sees less difference than he thought between worshipping the God who dwelt in Christ and made him the symbol of divine perfection, and worshipping the element in Christ which was God; he inclines more and more to faith in a holy and sanctifying spirit; and feels the secrets of futurity more awful and less easily determined than he had supposed; yet he retains an unconquerable aversion to the textual reasonings, the trading analogies, the morbid pietism, and unsocial spirit of the common theology. Now, if these two men find each other out, can any body, by logic ever so close, prevent their sympathizing? And if, instead of being two, they be two thousand, must not the same result arise? Yet, if you endeavour to say in a sentence what they unite about, is the definition easy? It cannot be; because all your phraseology is taken from the characteristics of existing divisions; and this is a new and as yet anonymous one. Certain it is, that these persons concur in owning the same divine authority in Christ; cherishing similar conceptions of God; and aspiring towards a common type of perfection in their life. They belong to the same school of worshippers. But the metaphysical and historical elements of their creed remain at present very imperfectly settled: and time must elapse before they can agree upon them, and give them definitions. If this be what Mr. Armstrong ridicules as "the union of hearts not of heads," we regret that he thinks it worthy only of derision. It appears to us a natural, and indeed periodically inevitable, state of things; not by any means the realisation, but assuredly the promise, of a new and nobler era of Church, such as good men have often desired in their prayers.

Among many sarcasms scattered over this Discourse, there is one levelled at ourselves. Mr. Armstrong would have been saved the pain of writing it, if he had read and quoted the whole sentence of which he gives a part. We had maintained that the knowledge of God comes through the Moral rather than the Intellectual nature; that it is, therefore, capable of being lost through moral unfaithfulness, and incapable of being secured by intellectual sharpness. Mr. Armstrong thinks that, if this be so, if faith in God depends upon clearness of conscience,—sin ought to make no difference! How does he show this? "Sin im-

plies *choice* ;” and “there is no power to evade an original and innate impression.” Not a word had been said about “an original and innate impression.” Our doctrine was only that of the admirable Arnold ; “that any man may make himself an Atheist by neglect of duty and devotion ;”—only that of the highest authority, that “the pure in heart shall see God.” We were not conscious, in maintaining this, of either claiming “infallibility,” or uttering “denunciation.”

We seriously regret the sore tone of this sermon ; especially as it evidently arises from a mind chafing against imaginary heresies. The sound of ancient “Evangelical” controversy rings in our ears, when we hear the hue and cry raised against those who are guilty of “robbing Jesus of his *authority*.” Our author, we presume, means by this, “differing from me as to the highest *evidence* of his authority.” Among disciples, (with whom we desire to be,) we never heard, and cannot conceive, of disagreement as to the *reality* of Christ’s authority ; in various ages of the Church there have prevailed differences,—just such as exist now,—with respect to its most persuasive *indications*.